Second Polish–Soviet War (WFAC)

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Second Polish–Soviet War
Part of World War II
Date 23 October 1938 – 15 May 1940 Place Eastern Poland Result Stalemate Soviet advance stalls Poland joins the Axis Axis intervention results in invasion of the Soviet Union
Belligerents
Poland	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Edward Rydz-Śmigły (Marshal of Poland) Wacław Stachiewicz (Chief of the General Staff) Stefan Dąb-Biernacki (Army Wilno) Tadeusz Piskor (Army Baranowicze) Kazimierz Sosnkowski (Army Polesie) Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki (Army Wołyń) Kazimierz Fabrycy (Army Podole)	Joseph Stalin Boris Shaposhnikov (Chief of Staff) Mikhail Kovalyov (Belorussian Front) Semyon Timoshenko (Ukrainian Front)
Strength
29 divisions 12 brigades, 4,300 guns, 880 tanks, 400 aircraft Total: 800,000 men	33+ divisions, 11+ brigades, 4,959 guns, 4,736 tanks, 3,300 aircraft Total: 1,000,000+ men

The Second Polish–Soviet War (Polish: Druga wojna polsko-sowiecka, Russian: Второй Советско-польская война) was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Poland and a part of World War II. It began with the Soviet invasion of Poland on 23 October 1938 three weeks after the outbreak of World War II).

On 2 October 1938 the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom declared war on Nazi Germany in response to their invasion of Czechoslovakia, honoring their respective alliance treaties. Following this, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with the United Kingdom and France to establish a formal alliance against Nazi Germany. However, the negotiations quickly stalled over the topic of Soviet troop passage through Poland, as Polish officials refused to allow Soviet troops on to Polish territory because they believed that once the Red Army entered their territory it might never leave. The Soviets suggested that Poland's wishes be ignored and that the tripartite agreements be concluded despite its objections.

The situation deteriorated when Poland, in an effort to forestall a German occupation of Těšín (Cieszyn), invaded and seized the Zaolzie region on 2 October. Having previously warned the Polish government that such a move would leave the Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932 null and void, the Soviet Union annulled the pact and accused Poland of being an accomplice of Nazi Germany, demanding Soviet troop passage through Poland or face an invasion. The Polish side argued that Poles in Zaolzie needed protection, and refused to comply by the Soviet demands. As both sides mobilized for war, the Soviets denounced the Peace of Riga (which had ended the Polish–Soviet War of 1920), condemned the alleged mistreatment of the Ukrainian and White Russian people living on Polish territory and declared the Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932 for null and void.

On 23 October 1938 the Soviet Union invaded Poland, announcing they were acting to assist Czechoslovakia in their struggle against Germany and liberate the Ukrainians and Belarusians who lived in the eastern part of Poland from the pro-German leadership of Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły. Despite having numerical superiority in terms of men, tanks and aircraft, the Red Army had been crippled by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's Great Purge of 1937. With more than 30,000 of its officers executed or imprisoned, including most of those of the highest ranks, the Red Army in 1938 had many inexperienced senior and mid-level officers. Because of these factors, and high morale in the Polish forces, Poland repelled Soviet attacks for several months, much longer than the Soviets expected, and inflicted substantial losses on the invaders. In February 1939 they renewed their offensive and initially overcame the Polish defences, but the offensive ended in a stalemate in April as the Soviet Union found itself fighting a two-front war following the the outbreak of the Soviet–Japanese War.

From the summer of 1939 to 1940 no significant advances were made, as both sides entrenched themselves along the frontline and carried out minor offensives. The poor performance of the Red Army encouraged Adolf Hitler to think that an attack on the Soviet Union would be successful and confirmed negative Western opinions of the Soviet military.

Background

Historical background

The Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Warsaw on 25 July 1932. Fourth from the right is the Polish foreign minister Józef Beck.

The result of the Paris Peace Conference (1919) did little to decrease the territorial ambitions of parties in Eastern Europe. Józef Piłsudski sought to expand the Polish borders as far east as possible in an attempt to create a Polish-led federation to counter any potential imperialist intentions on the part of Russia or Germany. At the same time, the Bolsheviks began to gain the upper hand in the Russian Civil War and started to advance westward towards the disputed territories with the intent of assisting other Communist movements in Western Europe. The border skirmishes of 1919 progressively escalated into the Polish–Soviet War in 1920. Following the Polish victory at the Battle of Warsaw, the Soviets sued for peace and the war ended with an armistice in October 1920. The parties signed the formal peace treaty, the Peace of Riga, on 18 March 1921, dividing the disputed territories between Poland and Soviet Russia. In an action that largely determined the Soviet-Polish border during the interwar period, the Soviets offered the Polish peace delegation territorial concessions in the contested borderland areas, closely resembling the border between the Russian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth before the first partition of 1772. In the aftermath of the peace agreement, Soviet leaders largely abandoned the cause of international revolution and did not return to the concept for approximately 20 years.

After the Polish–Soviet War, the Polish authorities pursued a policy of "equal distance" between Germany and the Soviet Union. Most of Polish politicians, both on the left and right, believed that Poland should rely mostly on the crucial alliance with France dating back to World War I and should not support either Germany or the Soviet Union. To normalize the bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union, talks were started in January 1926 to prepare a non-aggression treaty. The treaty was to fortify the Polish gains of the Peace of Riga and was to be balanced by a similar pact signed with Germany. However, the talks with Germany were not started, and the Polish–Soviet talks were interrupted in June 1927, after Great Britain broke diplomatic relations with the USSR and Soviet plenipotentiary Pyotr Voykov was murdered in Warsaw. Instead, Poland applied to the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. The Polish-Soviet negotiations were resumed in Moscow, in 1931.

On 25 July 1932 the two countries signed the Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact effective for a three-year period. Ratifications were exchanged in Warsaw on 23 December 1932 and it went into effect on the same day. On 5 May 1934 it was extended to 31 December 1945 without amendment. Among other topics, both sides agreed to renounce violence in bilateral relations, to resolve their problems through negotiations and to forgo any armed conflict or alliances aimed at the other side.

Polish relations with Germany

While Poland's foreign policy had been that of an equilibrium between her two big neighbours through non-aggression treaties in 1932 and 1934. However, after the Rhineland remilitarization in 1936, Poland concluded that the Soviet Union were the weaker and the more hostile of the two powers, and that good relations with Germany were, therefore, more valuable and possible to achieve. The authoritarian, anti-semitic and anti-communist character of the Polish government also contributed to their orientation towards Berlin. Germany, on the other hand, with Austria and Czechoslovakia in the foreground of their foreign policy aspirations, also had an interest in wishing for harmony with Poland.

Despite the Polish inclination towards Berlin, there were serious problems in the relations between the two countries, concerning primarily with the Free City of Danzig, which had been created by the Versailles Treaty. In 1933 the Nazis achieved dominance in the city government, which was still nominally overseen by the League of Nations' High Commissioner. The German government officially demanded the return of Danzig to Germany along with an extraterritorial (meaning under German jurisdiction) highway through the area of the Polish Corridor for land-based access from the rest of Germany. The local Nazis also haassed the Polish officials and merchants in the exercise of their harbor and shipping rights. Besides this, around 750,000 ethnic Germans lived as minorities in Polish Silesia and Pomerania, with almost twice as many Poles living in Germany. There were repression and discrimination against these territories on both sides, which had not been alleviated by the 1934 Non-Aggression Treaty. In June 1937 German foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath received the Polish ambassador, Józef Lipski, in order to propose a "declaration of minorities". Following futher negotiations between Poland and Germany, they signed a declaration of minorities on 7 November 1937, which was signed with considerable ceremony in both Berlin and Warsaw. Hitler simultaneously gave his assurances to Lipski on Danzig, which were publicized in a communiqué stating that "it was confirmed during the conversation that German-Polish relations would not be disturbed by the Danzig question". While the declaration was only hortatory, it nevertheless marked a period of improved rleations between Germany and Poland.

When Hermann Göring visited Poland in February 1938 for a hunting trip, he talked with both Foreign Minister Józef Beck and Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, where he stressed the congruence of German and Polish interests in raising a rampart against Soviet communism. Beck also expressed "serious interest" in the Czech problem and the Zaolzie region, which Göring promised would not be infringed. Beck also suggested an extension of the 1934 non-aggression pact, to which Göring proposed a period of 15 to 20 years.

While the German annexation of Austria on 11 March 1938 caused alarm in Poland among Francophiles in the Polish Army who were nervous about Warsaw's pro-German proclivities an fearful of moving too far from France, it did not change the Polish policy towards Germany. Following the Anschluss, discussions of ways to improve the situation were for the most part carried on outside normal official channels, at meetings between Lipski and Göring. Late in August 1938 Göring again expressed approval of extending the 1934, while Lipski indicated a desire for better ordering of the Danzig situation.

Developments during the Sudeten crisis

Map of the Eastern Europe in October 1938, following the conquest of Czechoslovakia by Germany, Hungary and Poland.

  Poland

  Germany and occupied nations

  German allies and occupied nations

  Soviet Union

  Western Allies

  Neutral nations

In the spring and summer of 1938, the Polish authorities assumed that France would not fight if Czechoslovakia was attacked by Germany, and the Polish foreign minister, Józef Beck, believed that Germany would prevail and annex the Sudeten German territories. In his opinion, much could be gained in the short run by cooperating with Hitler. The destruction of Czechoslovakia, which Beck had long argued was an artificial creation, provided a unique opportunity for Poland, as they could annex the disputed Zaolzie and the town of Těšín (Cieszyn), which had a significant Polish population. Following World War I and the peace conference in 1919, both Czechoslovakia and Poland had been arguing over the territory on various historic, ethnic, economic and strategic grounds, and as a result it was on 28 July 1920 decided to partition the region. Besides the wish to annex the Zaolzie region, the Poles looked forward to Hungarian action in Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the creation of a common Polish–Hungarian border that would provide the base for a Balkan bloc, giving Poland greater security.

While tensions between Germany and Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland continued to escalate, the Polish ambassador to Germany, Józef Lipski, was briefed in Warsaw on 13 September on the Polish price for "neutrality": a recognition of the German–Polish frontier as final, an extension of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Treaty, and a written commitment to the solution of the Danzig question. Beck moved in two directions simultaneously: demanding the Czechs to give concessions paralleling those given to the Germans on the grounds of self-determination, and assuring the French that, if there was a general war over Czechoslovakia, Poland would either join France or remain neutral.

Throughout the summer, Germany had been trying to increase pressure on Czechoslovakia by encouraging Czechoslovakia's other neighbours to press their own claims. On 16 September Göring met with Lipski, who had earlier informed State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker in the German Foreign Ministry that "the Polish Government would categorically request" a solution to the Těšín question. On 20 September Hitler summoned Lipski to Berchtesgaden, where he told Lipski that a forceful occupation of the Sudetenland would be the best solution, as he had told Hungarian Prime Minister Béla Imrédy and Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya earlier in the day. Hitler warned that the British proposals would involve a new delineation of the frontiers, and Lipski outlined the geographical borders of the Zaolzie region that Poland would demand and assured Hitler that Poland would be prepared to use military force to secure Těšín. He and Hitler agreed that neither country would join in guaranteeing the new Czech borders until all the minority claims had been satisfied.

When Czechoslovakia capitulated to the Anglo-French proposal at 1700 hours on 21 September, both Poland and Hungary presented their demands in Prague later the same evening. Hitler had the previous day met with ambassador Lipski at Berchtesgaden, in which Lipski had outlined the geographical borders of the Zaolzie region that Poland would demand and assured Hitler that military force would be used if proved necessary. They also agreed that neither Germany nor Poland would recognize the new Czech borders until all minority claims had been satisfied.

The same day, on 21 September 1938, the Polish Army formed the Independent Operational Group Silesia and began concentrating large military forces on the border of Czechoslovakia, in order to forestall a possible German occupation of the disputed Zaolzie region. On 22 September Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta summoned the Soviet Ambassador Sergei Aleksandrovskii, where he told him that the Poles were concentrating a large military force on the border of Czechoslovakia, and asked Moscow to warn the Polish that an attack on Czechoslovakia would automatically void the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1932. Soviet intelligence had earlier reported on 10 September of extensive Polish army maneuvers along the Soviet frontiers, including the evacuation of families from border areas. In response to the Czechoslovak request, the Soviet government at 0400 hours on 23 September issued a formal declaration to the Polish chargé d'affaires that Moscow would denounce the non-aggression pact if Poland attacked Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union began to mobilize its forces on 21-23 September in response to the increased tensions between Germany and Czechoslovakia, who the Soviet Union were obliged to support in accordance to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact of 1935. When the Poles discovered the massive mobilization of the Kiev and the Byelorussian Military Districts, they responded with similar countermoves.

As the crisis escalated, the Czechoslovak military leadership acknowledge the possibility that they would have to give Poland territorial concessions in exchange for Polish neutrality. On 25 September general Ludvík Krejčí, chief of the Main Headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army, urged president Edvard Beneš to secure Polish neutrality and, if possible, transit rights for Soviet forces, as compensation for territorial concessions. As a result, on 28 September Beneš sent a communiqué to the Polish administration offering to reopen the debate surrounding the Zaolzie region.

The Red Army mobilizes

At 1800 hours on 21 September 1938 the Kiev Special Military District was ordered to mobilize and deploy in the regions of Volochinsk, Proskurov and Kamianets-Podilskyi a group consisting of the Vinnitsa army group, the 4th Cavalry Corps (34th, 32nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions), the 25th Tank Corps, the 17th Infantry Corps (96th, 97th and 72nd Infantry Divisions) and the 23rd and 26th Light Brigades. At the same time, the infantry divisions were to call up 8,000 reservists per division as well as their required complement of horses. These orders were being implemented the following day, as Komandarm Semyon Timoshenko, together with his staff, transferred headquarters from Kiev to Proskurov.

At 2345 hours on 23 September, the Commissariat of Defence issued similar orders to the Byelorussian Special Military District. The 5th and 50th Infantry Divisions along with a division of armoured trains were to be deployed around Polotsk; the 24th Cavalry Division, 16th Tank Brigade and the 79th Infantry Division around Lepel; around Minsk the 7th and 36th Cavalry Divisions, the 2nd, 13th and 100th Infantry Divisions and the 21st Tank Brigade; and around Slutsk the 4th Cavalry Division. To accompany these deployments, fighter plane squadrons were ordered to move to forwarding bases near the frontier to cover the Sebezhsk, Polotsk, Minsk and Slutsk sectors; light bombers were stationed at Vitebsk and Orsha, while heavy bombers were to operate from their usual airfields. In total, the preparations in Ukraine and Byelorussia included 30 infantry and ten cavalry divisions, seven tank and motorized brigades, 12 brigades of fighter planes and bombers, and two corps, one division, six brigades and 31 regiments of anti-aircraft forces.

Further orders were issued on 29 September to the Kiev, Belorussian, Leningrad and Kalinin Military Districts to call up from reserve and form seventeen additional infantry divisions, the commands staffs of three tank corps, 22 tank and three motorized infantry brigades, and 34 air bases. In addition to these forces prepared and deployed along the western frontier, a considerable second echelon of forces was formed in the interior of the country, comprising 30 infantry divisions, six cavalry divisions, two tank corps, fifteen additional tank brigades and 34 air bases.

Polish offensive into Zaolzie

Main article: Zaolzie Campaign

On 1 October 1938, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia on the false pretext that Czechoslovakia had suppressed the Sudeten German minority and had launched attacks on German territory. On 3 October France, Britain and the Soviet Union, declared war on Germany but failed to provide any meaningful support.

The news of the German invasion was met with alarm in Warsaw. At 07:00 Foreign Minister Józef Beck met with Michał Łubieński, the head of the Office of the Polish Foreign Ministry, and discussed whether Poland should mobilize in defense of Czechoslovakia. Beck also discussed the matter with Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish armed forces, and the Chief of the Polish General Staff, Brigadier General Wacław Stachiewicz. Beck had originally thought the Czechs would not fight, that the Western powers were unprepared to help them, and that the Soviet Union would limit itself to demonstrations. Now as hostilities had broken out, and the French signaled that they would fulfill all her obligations, Poland was put in a predicament whether to side with the Western Allies or remain neutral.

At 2:00 PM Łubieński met with French Ambassador Léon Noël to discuss the details of a French military response to the German invasion. However, Noël could only state that France would fulfill its obligations to Czechoslovakia. Polish Ambassador Juliusz Łukasiewicz, who had met with French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet in Paris, were likewise told that "France would fulfill all her obligations in due time", and urged Poland to fulfill their obligations in the Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921. Bonnet also appealed for Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations, offering French mediation in a settlement of the Zaolzie question. The Polish ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczyński, telephoned Beck and told him that he had received a personal offer of British mediation from Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in return for Polish neutrality, which was also presented to Łubieński by British Ambassador Sir Howard Kennard at 16:30.

Meanwhile, the Polish General Staff were alarmed when reports indicated that German forces now were only four kilometers from Bohumín, the important railway junction north of Ostrava. Poland had on 28 September learned that on the map presented by Hitler to Chamberlain at Godesberg on 23 September, the northwestern part of Zaolzie (which included significant coal mines and steel industry as well as the important railway junction at Bohumín) was destined to go to Germany. Beck had instructed ambassador Lipski in Berlin to clarify the matter with the German government, warning that it this was necessary in order to avoid a political or military conflict. The result had originally been a German agreement on 28 September not to claim Bohumín, but with the outbreak of war and the proximity of German forces in the area there were now fears that Germany might seize the area. At 4:45 PM Lipski telephoned from Berlin relating his conversation with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, which indicated that Hitler would take on the role of protector of Poland and Hungary. He told Lipski that Poland could be satisfied with the way in which her interests had been safeguarded. Germany, in accordance with its understanding with Poland, would respect Poland's territorial demands on Zaolzie, but only if Poland guaranteed their neutrality and acted quickly in seizing the disputed region in question.

As such, there were several reasons for Beck's drastic step to change policy at a moment's notice, which would eventually tarnish Poland's reputation, and particularly that of Foreign Minister Józef Beck. In the evening of 1 October 1938, a cabinet meeting was held at the Warsaw Castle which Beck proposed military action. Beck claimed that the German invasion had altered the political situation dramatically. Poland should, argued Beck, quickly and quite drastically take a stand by issuing an ultimatum to Prague to cede the Zaolzie region to Poland. Only such a determined step by Poland could save the region from falling under German control. Beck proposed an ultimatum to Prague. While all participants at the meeting agreed in principle with these arguments, but there was a sharp clash to the proposal of presenting the Polish demands as an ultimatum. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Treasury, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, argued for normal diplomatic procedures so as to prevent Poland's identification with Germany, avoid disharmony with Western friends, and avert creating a dangerous pretext for Soviet intervention. In the end, however, Kwiatkowski's protest was overruled, as the majority of the conference members supported Beck's proposal. Thus, the Polish government decided to issue an ultimatum to Prague.

Thus, the Polish government issued an ultimatum to Prague. It was delivered by Polish Minister Papée at 23:40 on 1 October 1938, that is, 17 hours after the outbreak of war. The Polish note rejected the Czechoslovak proposal of negotiations and demanded the immediate cession of the preponderantly Polish areas of Zaolzie and the withdrawal of all Czechoslovak military personnel by 3 October, and a cession of the the Orava territory in the Beskidy Mountains, Spiš and Čadca in the Tatra Mountains by 10 October. An answer was demanded by midnight on 2 October.

President Beneš called for a meeting at the Prague Castle with Prime Minister Jan Syrový and the cabinet at 01:30. General Krejčí, the commander of the Main Headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army (HVOA), was telephoned at 12:45 the headquarters in Račice, where he again urged the government to accept the ultimatum in exchange for Poland remaining neutral and for Poland allowing material assistance as well as consent to Soviet overflight or transit rights for Soviet ground forces Polish territory. At the cabinet meeting the Beneš and the government decided to agree to the ultimatum in return of Polish neutrality and transit rights for Soviet forces if they entered the war. Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta telephoned Ambassador Papée to deliver Prague's reply to the Polish ultimatum at 08:30 on 2 October. Papée telephoned at 09:15 on 2 October transmitting Prague's offer, which Beck discussed with Rydz-Śmigły. The matter was discussed in a cabinet meeting convened at 12:00 Noon, where the Polish government decided that it would agree to remaining neutral, but that they could not give their consent to overflight or transit rights to Soviet troops. Beck subsequently instructed Papée to deliver the Polish response to the Czech offer, which was given to the Czechoslovak foreign ministry at 01:40. However, the Czechoslovak government were unable to reply to the Polish response. At 15:00 the Czechoslovak government and members of the National Assembly evacuated Prague by train towards Hranice, which they reached at 21:20 that evening. Most of the cabinet and the National Assembly continued by car and buses to the provisional capital of Turčiansky Svätý Martin in Slovakia, while Beneš and Syrový telephoned Foreign Minister Krofta, who had remained in Prague to continue the negotiations with the Polish, British, French and Soviet governments. Beneš was informed of the Polish response, but since he could not consult with the cabinet and representatives of the political parties, he instructed Krofta to request a twenty-four hour delay so the cabinet could convene and discuss the matter. Beneš also hoped that, in the meantime, France and the United Kingdom would declare war on Germany following the expiration of the deadline of their ultimatums, thus forcing Poland to show restraint. At 21:50 the Czechoslovak foreign ministry called Papée and requested a 24-hour delay.

Papée telephoned Beck at 22:00 transmitting Prague's offer. Poland was aware that the deadline of the French and British ultimatums to Germany would expire the following morning, making any seizure of the Zaolzie region impossible without British, French and Soviet accusations that Poland had entered the conflict on the side of Germany. Beck, therefore, decided to act immediately and take advantage of the situation and seize Zaolzie, hoping the Czechoslovak government would accept the loss of Zaolzie as a fait accompli and quickly give in to the Polish demands. Thus, at 22:40 Beck informed Papée that the Polish government had rejected the Czech request. This was reiterated to Foreign Minister Krofta by Papée at 23:10, who also informed that Polish forces would seize Zaolzie by force if the Czech government did not accept the ultimatum before midnight. In the meantime, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły ordered General Władysław Bortnowski to initiate Plan B and order the forces of SGO Śląsk to advance into Zaolzie at dawn on 3 October, some five hours before the French ultimatum to Germany expired.

The British and French governments had criticized the Polish ultimatum and urged Poland to show restraint. The British, for their part, criticized the tone of the Polish press toward Czechoslovakia and warned Poland against the use of force. The French warned that a Polish military operation against Zaolzie would damage the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921. Meanwhile, the Polish ambassadors in London and Paris, who had stated repeatedly that the rights the Czechoslovak government granted to one of its minorities must also be granted to the Polish minority, countered with the statement that Poland simply were willing to protect the Polish minority in Zaolzie from possible German aggression. At 22:00 on 2 October Beck instructed Łubieński to inform the French and British governments that Poland had rejected the Franco-British appeal for Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations, as well as Neville Chamberlain's personal offer to him of British mediation. An hour later, at 23:00, Łubieński met with British Ambassador Sir Kennard and with French Ambassador Noël; he told them that the Polish government could not accept the British mediation offer 'as it was too late'.

As a result, at dawn on 3 October Polish forces commanded by General Bortnowski invaded the Zaolzie region of Czechoslovakia. The same day President Beneš sent a communiqué to Warsaw agreeing to cede the Zaolzie region in return for Polish neutrality and allowing Czechoslovak forces to escape into Poland to avoid German captivity. After some fighting with Czechoslovak forces the Poles had seized Těšín, the Polish government agreed. As a result, combat activities seized on 5 October, and Poland annexed an area of 869 km² with a population of 258,000 people.

Although they explicitly stated they were not allied with Germany and claimed their actions were to protect the Polish population in the area, the Polish actions against Czechoslovakia resulted in strong British and French governments criticism, while Soviet government condemned the Polish actions and denounced the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact on 5 October. On 5 October Marshal Rydz-Śmigły told Sir Kennard and Noël: "There is no guarantee that the Soviets will really take active part in the war; furthermore, once having entered Polish territory, they will never leave it".

Tripartite alliance negotiations

On 3 October 1938, the Soviet Union, Britain and France began trading suggestions and plans regarding a political and military agreement that would provide guaranteed support against an attack on its territory. That day, Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov outlined a French–British–Soviet mutual assistance pact between the three powers for five to ten years, including military support. The Soviets also insisted that the military agreement described in detail the military assistance that the Soviets, French and British would provide. After further negotiations between the British and French governments and the Soviet ambassadors to the United Kingdom and France, Ivan Maisky and Yakov Surits respectively, French foreign minister Georges Bonnet presented a joint Anglo-French submitted proposal on 5 October. The following day, the Soviet Union also submitted a modification to a French and British proposal with a supplementary letter that specified the states that would be given aid in the event of "direct aggression", which included Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Finland.

Subsequently, the Soviets, British and French began military negotiations in Moscow on 8 October. The French military delegation was headed by General Joseph Doumenc, while the British military delegation was headed by Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam, the British Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The Soviet delegation was headed by People's Commissar for Defense Kliment Voroshilov backed by Chief of Staff Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov and the other military chiefs. The Soviets had agreed to most provisions in the Anglo-French proposal and welcomed the mobilization of the French and British armies. The conversation moved on to what measures the French and British would implement to aid Czechoslovakia and to the possibility of opening a second front. The Russians asked about the strength of the French and British forces, what plans had been made to fight the Germans, and how the western forces would be deployed. Voroshilov demanded a bombing offensive against Germany and a French offensive into Germany at the earliest possible moment. Doumenc, however, pointed out that any French offensive action could only take place after mobilization had been completed. On the 19th day of the mobilization, offensive actions could be carried out, but large-scale offensives would require at least three months of preparations. Doumenc informed Voroshilov, however, that the French Air Force had sent an expeditionary force comprising two bomber squadrons to Czechoslovakia.

The conversation then moved to one of the provisions in Litvinov's supplementary letter that had caused some concern in the French and British governments. The first was the provisions which stated that a political turn to Germany by the Baltic states constituted "indirect aggression", which Britain feared might justify Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany (while France was less resistant to the supplement). The discussion about a definition of "indirect aggression" became one of the sticking points between the parties during the negotiations.

The second was the provision regarding Soviet troop passage through either Romania or Poland. The question of Poland was raised by Voroshilov for the first time on 9 October, when he requested that the British and French secured rights of passage and operations in Poland allowing the Soviet army transit rights through Poland and Romania. The Red Army would require transit through either Poland or Romania to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia and to engage the German Army. Of these options, Poland was far better equipped in double-tracked railway lines - by a factor of ten-to-one - than Romania. Not only were the capacity and the density of the tracks better in Poland, but its location was also vastly more advantageous. Three nearly parallel double-tracked systems ran through the Wilno corridor to Warsaw, while another ran from the northwestern Ukraine and joined the three parallel tracks at Brzéść and Białystok. For transporting Soviet forces to Slovakia, the Soviet had two obvious alternatives: the Tarnopol – Bohumín line and the Kamianets-Podilskyi – Przemyśl – Łupków Pass – Humenné – Prešov line.

The Polish government, on the other hand, feared that once the Red Army entered their territory it might never leave, and that the Soviet government sought to take advantage of the situation and annex disputed territories, the Eastern Borderlands, received by Poland in 1920 after the Treaty of Riga ending the Polish–Soviet War. The British and French contingent communicated the Soviet concern over Poland to their home offices and told the Soviet delegation that they could not answer this political matter without their governments' approval. Voroshilov responded that if the French and British were serious, they would just override the Polish veto, stating that Polish resistance would constitute an alignment with Germany, suggesting that the tripartite agreements should be concluded despite its objections. The British refused to do so because they believed that such a move would push Poland into establishing stronger bilateral relations with Germany.

As a result, the parties waited as British and French officials pressured Polish officials to agree to such terms. The French delegation was particularly alarmed and sent urgent messages back to Paris. On 10 October Bonnet urged Polish foreign minister Beck to agree to give the Soviet transit rights through the corridors in Galicia and Wilno, but neither diplomatic pressure nor represenations to the Polish Chief of Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, had any effect. Beck stressed the old Polish slogan Nic o nas bez nas ("Nothing (is to be decided) about us without us"), but warned that Poland could not participate in the tripartite talks, as this could lead to a serious German reaction. On 11 October Beck informed that Poland was ready to join France and Czechoslovakia and go to war against Germany according to the Franco-Polish Military Convention of 1921 as soon as the French launched their full-scale offensive against the Germans. However, he declared that Zaolzie would remain in Polish hands, as well as declaring that "Poland cannot allow the question of use of its territory by foreign troops to be discussed." He argued that such an agreement would lead Hitler to an immediate declaration of war and that the Soviets could not be relied upon for assistance of any military value. The real fear, however, was that should Soviet forces enter Poland, they might never leave.

Fearing the Polish incursion into Zaolzie and Polish refusal to Soviet troop passage had severly damaged Franco-Polish relations, Beck instructed ambassadors Łukasiewicz and the ambassador to the Soviet Union, Wacław Grzybowski, to present a new counter-proposal to Bonnet and Litvinov the following day. Wanting to reassure their French allies, the Polish government would allow Czechoslovak troops to escape into Polish territory and provide transport to France through the port of Gdynia. Poland would also guarantee they would join the war after the Polish Army had mobilized and the French had launched their offensive, but still refused the troop passage. In discussions on 13 October, the Poles informed the French ambassador that they would not approve Red Army troops operating in Poland.

That same day, the British contingent was instructed to bring the military talks to a conclusion, and thus, were permitted to give Soviet negotiators confidential British information. The British contingent stated that Britain currently only possessed six army divisions (of which two were being sent to France), which after mobilization would be expanded to 16 divisions initially, followed by a second contingent of 16 divisions (for a total of 32 divisions) — a sum far less than the 124 Soviet divisions that had been mobilized or were in mobilization. French negotiators had earlier stated that they had 85 divisions available.

Meanwhile in Warsaw, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam met with the Polish High Command to discuss the Soviet transit rights. After getting acquainted with technological condition of the Polish Army, Adam realized that Poland was too weak to oppose the Germans, and during a conference with Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz, he demanded that Poland signed a treaty with the Soviet Union. In response, Śmigły-Rydz stated: "to hand Poland over to the Soviets? I had rather come to terms with Hitler." British and French diplomatic negotiations with Poland were fruitless. British officials distrusted Beck, while French officials openly disliked him. Frustrated with the Polish intransigence, Bonnet told Surits on 15 October that he was willing to support turning over all of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union, regardless of Polish opposition, if that was the price of an alliance with Moscow. Prime Minister Daladier told Surits that "Not only can we not count on Polish support but we have no faith that Poland will not strike us in the back."

German-Polish negotiations

On 5 October, Ribbentrop met with Lipski to congratulate the Polish government's acquisition of Zaolzie and praise Poland's role as a bulwark against communism, and reassured him that Germany would respect Poland's claims to the region. Ribbentrop inquired Lipski for the price for Polish neutrality in the German-French conflict, to which Lipski responded a recognition of the German–Polish frontier as settled, an extension of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Treaty, and a written commitment to the solution of the Danzig question embodying Hitler's oral assurances to Lipski on 5 November 1937. Ribbentrop told Lipski bluntly that a settlement of Danzig was needed as it was disturbing German-Polish relations, and the only solution was the return of Danzig to Germany. Instead, he put forward a proposal for a basic settlement of issues between Poland and Germany which would remove the causes of future strife. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured of retaining railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extraterritorial superhighway and railway line across Pomerania, as well as Polish neutrality in the European conflict. In exchange, von Ribbentrop mentioned that Germany was prepared to extend the Polish-German agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers. As a possible sphere for future cooperation between the two countries, Ribbentrop specified German support for Polish ambitions in Ukraine, joint action in the emigration of Jews from Poland, loans, and a joint policy toward the Soviet Union on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Ribbentrop asked the Lipski to communicate his suggestions to Beck as liked to discuss these matters with him, with the Ambassador's participation. After having contacted Bek, Lipski requested an interview with Ribbentrop on 8 October, where Warsaw in diplomatic, but firm language, rejected all the German proposals and offered no grounds for future discussions.

Soviet–Polish negotiations over transit rights

On 9 October 1938, the Soviet Union invited a Polish delegation to Moscow for negotiations. Beck, the Polish foreign minister, headed the delegation, which also included the Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Wacław Grzybowski. The Soviets condemned the Polish military actions against Czechoslovakia and again demanded Soviet troop passage through Poland on railway lines south of Lwów-Brody-Równe. They also demanded free passage of all Czechoslovak forces who might escape into Poland to avoid German captivity as well as Soviet overflights over northern Poland in order to allow the Red Air Force bomb targets inside German-held East Prussia. The following day, on 10 October, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian foreign ministers, Vilhelms Munters and Stasys Lozoraitis, were given similar ultimatums in Moscow, in which the Soviets demanded Soviet overflights over their territory.

The Soviets continued the mobilization of the Leningrad, Kiev and Belorussian Special Military Districts. After two days of negotiations, Latvia and Lithuania gave in to the Soviet demands of overflight, but Poland refused their ultimatum, arguing that accepting the Soviet demands would make Poland a belligerent country. The parties met again at the negotiating table on 12 October, where the Polish delegation agreed allow Czechoslovak troops to retreat into Poland and guarantee they would join the war against Germany when the French had lanched its offensive against the Germans, but still refused the troop passage.

Anglo-French-Soviet treaty signed, Polish rejection

Having finalized the draft military proposal, British foreign minister Lord Halifax and French foreign minister Georges Bonnet arrived in Moscow on 17 October to conclude a draft proposal for the treaty. After two days of final negotiations, Stalin informed Halifax and Bonnet that the Soviets were ready to sign the pact, which was forwarded to their respective governments. On 20 October, Litvinov, Lord Halifax and Bonnet signed the Anglo-French-Soviet Treaty of 1938, or Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Agreement Between the United Kingdom, the French Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in Moscow. The treaty established a military and political alliance between the Soviet Union, the British Empire and France lasting for 25 years or until the war, whichever occurred later. The treaty contained provisions that pledged the parties to assist each other and not to make a separate peace with Germany. The parties also agreed to offer guarantees to Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland. Poland would also be offered a guarantee provided they agreed to giving transit rights to Soviet forces aimed against Germany.

The following day, the House of Commons voted 366 to 144 to affirm the motion, while in France the Chamber of Deputies voted 503 to 107, with the right-wing and some members of the centre-right dissenting. Regarding the proposed guarantee to Poland, Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that:

“

[...] in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. This assurance will however be only be provided under the condition that the Polish Government provides transit rights to Soviet armed forces through Polish territory and overflights over Polish airspace in order to provide military assistance to the Czechoslovak armed forces against the German aggression.

”

In Warsaw, British ambassador Howard William Kennard and French ambassador Léon Noël met with Beck to present the treaty signed in Moscow along with the proposed guarantee to Poland and the declaration regarding transit rights for Soviet forces through Polish territory. Beck, visibly worried, asked for clarification of the various provisions. Asked by Beck whether they expected a response from the Polish government, Noël replied that the three statesmen had not much time, and that they regarded the treaty as accepted and that the Polish government had until 17:00 to agree to give transit rights to Soviet forces. If the Polish government rejected the declaration, Poland would be left to its fate, and Beck was urged to accept the plan to avoid conflict. Beck felt betrayed by the western powers, particularly France, and announced that he would convene the government to discuss the matter. At 16:00 Beck instructed ambassador Grzybowski to present a counteroffer to the Soviets, while Raczyński and Łukasiewicz were instructed to inform the British and French governments. They agreed to let Czechoslovak troops escape into Polish territory and provide passage to Gdynia, and would also tolerate Soviet overflights. The Poles still refused to provide transit rights to the Red Army, arguing that with the Hungarian invasion of Slovakia meant that a collapse of Czechoslovakia now was a fait accompli. From the Soviet point of view, the negotiations were finished, with Litvinov stating "in view of the changed political situation and the lack of progress in the negotiations, no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation". As a result, the Soviets broke off the negotiations on 22 October.

Shelling of Volochys'k

On 23 October, a border incident was reported near the town of Volochys'k on the Soviet-Polish border. A Soviet border guard post had been shelled by an unknown party resulting, according to Soviet reports, in the deaths of seven and injuries of 12 border guards. The shelling was carried out from the Soviet side of the border by an NKVD unit with the purpose of providing the Soviet Union with a casus belli and a pretext to invade Poland.

Litvinov claimed that it was a Polish artillery attack and demanded that Poland apologize for the incident, move its forces beyond a line 20–25 km away from the border and allow for Soviet troop passage. Poland denied responsibility for the attack, rejected the demands, and called for a joint Polish–Soviet commission to examine the incident. The Soviet Union then claimed that the Polish response was hostile and severed diplomatic relations with Poland on 25 October. In response, Rydz-Śmigły announced the mobilization of the Polish Army.

Opposing forces and plans

Geography

Poland's shared border with the Soviet Union was 1412 km long. By comparison, the border with Germany and its province of East Prussia was more than 20 percent longer, at 1912 km. Neither border contained any major geographical obstacles, making defense very difficult.

In the north there was a flat, plain land with huge forests (e.g., Puszcza Nalibocka — the Wilderness of Naliboki). In addition, a major rail route connecting Moscow to Western Europe extended across the northern portion of the country. The areas major conurbation at the time was Wilno, located in the northeast corner of interbellum Poland.

The centre region of the country was primarily composed of a huge, sparsely populated swamp known as Polesie. This land had no roads and few rail lines. However, it held supreme strategic importance, as its landscape made possible a prolonged, organized defense. Neither Polesie nor the adjacent Volhynia contained any major urban centers.

The south, formerly a portion of the Galicia province of the Austrian Empire, was the most highly developed, with a high density of rail lines, growing industry (e.g., oil fields in Boryslaw), and the well-developed agriculture of Podolia. Lwów, one of the major urban centers of interbellum Poland, was located in this area. In addition, the Soviet border was marked by a natural obstacle — the Zbrucz river.

Virtually all Polish industrial and urban centers were located in the West. This made long-lasting defense possible, as a Soviet force would have taken up to several weeks to reach Upper Silesia, Warsaw, Kraków or Poznań. While devising Plan Wschód, Polish planners assumed cooperation and support would be forthcoming from Romania, which was Poland's main ally in the East.

Poland

During the 1920s and 1930s, the leaders of the Republic focused their efforts on countering the potential threat from the East. Fresh were memories of the Polish-Soviet War and the Battle of Warsaw, which saved both Poland and Europe from the spread of Bolshevik revolution by force. Both the Polish Army and the government in Warsaw were certain that war with the Soviets was inevitable, thus preparations for it (known as Plan East, or Plan Wschód) were far more advanced than preparation for armed conflict with Germany (known as Plan West, or Plan Zachod).

The plan, developed between 1935 and 1938 and headed by Lt. Col. Leopold Okulicki, was based on the notions of Józef Piłsudski, who, until his death in 1935, was sure that war would arrive from the East. Thus most army maneuvers and field fortifications built by Polish Corps of Engineers (especially around Sarny) were held in the east, while Poland's western border was, to a large extent, neglected.

Polish planners were well aware that the Red Army was in many elements superior to their own. Therefore, the main idea was to organize a so-called "resistance in motion", and to try to split Soviet forces south and north of the vast Polesie swamps. Front line armies, located in the vicinity of the border, were to try to delay the advance of the aggressors and to bleed them, while reserves, located mostly in the area of Brześć Litweski and Lublin, were intended to enter the conflict in later stages. The Poles were expecting the Red Army to advance in three directions. Firstly, along the Minsk - Baranowicze - Białystok - Warsaw rail line. Secondly, along the Sarny - Kowel - Lublin line, and finally, in the south along the Tarnopol - Lwów line.

The plan predicted that the Soviets would attack north and south of the Pińsk (Pripet) Marshes, the bulk of the Polish Army was supposed to have been concentrated both in the north and south, with central section of the border left mostly unguarded. The Polish forces were mobilized as follows:

• In the extreme north-east, around the rail nexus of Mołodeczno, was Armia Wilno under the command of Div. Gen. Stefan Dąb-Biernacki. It comprised three infantry divisions (1st Legions Infantry Division from Wilno, 19th Infantry Division, also from Wilno, 29th Infatry Division from Grodno), two cavalry brigades (Wileńska Cavalry Brigade from Wilno, Suwalska Cavalry Brigade from Suwałki), and the 5th Air Corps from Lida.
• South of Armia Wilno was Armia Baranowicze under the command of Div. Gen. Tadeusz Piskor. It comprised four infantry divisions (9th Infantry Division from Siedlce, 20th Infantry Division from Baranowicze, 18th Infantry Division from Łomża, and 28th Infantry Division from Warszawa), two cavalry brigades (Nowogródzka Cavalry Brigade from Baranowicze, Podlaska Cavalry Brigade from Białystok) and the 4th Air Corps from Toruń.
• In the center was Independent Operational Group Polesie under the command of Brig. Gen. Emil Krukowicz-Przedrzymirski. It was composed of three infantry divisions (8th Infantry Division from Modlin, 27th Infantry Division from Kowel, 30th Infantry Division from Kobryń), one cavalry brigade (Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade from Warszawa), the Riverine Flotilla of the Polish Navy and the 3rd Air Corps from Poznań.
• Further south was Armia Wołyń under the command of Div. Gen. Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki. It comprised three infantry divisions (2nd Legions Infantry Division from Kielce, 3rd Legions Infantry Division from Zamość, 13th Infantry Division from Równe), one cavalry brigade (Wołyńska Cavalry Brigade from Równe) and the 2nd Air Corps from Kraków.
• In the extreme south was Armia Podole under the command of Div. Gen. Kazimierz Fabrycy. It comprised five infantry divisions (5th Infantry Division from Lwów, 11th Infantry Division from Stanisławów, 12th Infantry Division from Tarnopol, 22nd Infantry Division from Przemyśl, 24th Infantry Division from Jarosław), two cavalry brigades (Podolska Cavalry Brigade from Stanisławów, Kresowa Cavalry Brigade from Brody) and the 6th Air Corps from Lwów.
• Apart from these units, in all armies there were Border Protection Corps (Polish: Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza, KOP) units and garrisons of the main cities.

The army had also following reserve forces:

• Behind Armia Wilno and Armia Baranowicze was Armia Lida, consisting of three infantry divisions.
• Behind Armia Podole and Armia Wołyń was Armia Lwów, made up of two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade (5th Krakowska Cavalry Brigade from Kraków).
• Far behind the front lines, around the city of Brześć Litewski, was the main reserve, which comprised six infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades (7th Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade from Poznań, 8th Pomorska Cavalry Brigade from Bydgoszcz), an Armored Brigade and the 1st Warsaw Air Corps.

Soviet Union

The operational plan developed by the General Staff of the Red Army.

In Soviet military planning, the assessment of the threat to its territory was based on the assumption that Germany and Poland would attack the Soviet Union simultaneously from the west, while Japan would attack from the east. It was estimated that Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Finland would join the war only if the operations of the Red Army and the Red Navy did not meet with success from the outset.

The guidelines for the Soviet war plans, as proposed by the General Staff, were approved by the Council of People's Commissars (the Soviet government), and the Defence Committee, which was chaired by the Premier, Vyacheslav Molotov. The activities of the Red Army were directed by the Main War Council of the People's Commissariat for Defence, headed by People's Commissar Kliment Voroshilov, while the activities of the Red Navy were headed by the Main War Council of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, headed by People's Commissar Mikhail Frinovsky. It was part of the system that the central committee of the Party and its Politburo voiced their opinions when decisions concerning important policies were made. An important position as far as operative planning was concerned was occupied by the General Staff of the Red Army, under Komandarm 1st class Boris Shaposhnikov, while the chief of the General Staff of the Navy was Flagman 2nd class Lev Galler.

The General War Plan of 24 March 1938 was based on the assumption of a confrontation between two military blocks: on one hand France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; and on the other Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. It was assumed that Italy would exclusively contribute with the Italian Navy; Lithuania will be occupied by Germany and Poland in the first days of the war; while Romania and Turkey could, under certain circumstances, also decide to enter war against the Soviet Union.

It was assumed that Germany would field 14 divisions against France; Germany and Poland would field 33 divisions against Czechoslovakia; and Germany, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland will field 144 divisions and 16 cavalry brigades against the Soviet Union. The Red Army could mobilize 139 divisions and 26 tank brigades; conceived by the Red Army Command, the numerical inferiority had to be compensated by their greater mechanization.

The war plan had two variants: the first involved the deployment of the bulk of the German, Latvian and Polish forces to the north of the Pripet Marshes, while the second involved the deployment of the bulk of the German and Polish armies to the south of the Pripet Marshes. In both cases, a defeat of the enemy frontal attack of Soviet troops on the biggest enemy troops. In the first variant, between 70-82 Soviet divisions and 11 tank brigades would be deployed north of the Pripyat Marshes, and tasked with breaking through a German-Polish-Latvian comprising 88 divisions and three cavalry brigades on a broad front between Święciany – Baranowicze toward Grodno. To the south of the Pripyat Marshes, 38 Soviet divisions and nine tank brigades would be opposed by a Polish force of 40 divisions and 13 cavalry brigades, and were to advance on a narrower front towards. Further north, a special army of 12 divisions would attack Tallinn in Estonia (from Pskov) and Riga in Latvia; while in the Northwesten theatre an operation with 19 divisions and six tank brigades would be carried out against Finland on the Karelian Isthmus to the line Käkisalmi – Viipuri and another one in the North to snatch away the Arctic coast in Petsamo.

In the second variant, between 80 and 86 divisions and 13-15 tank brigades deployed south of the Pripyat Marshes would split the German-Polish force of around 86 divisions and 13 cavalry brigades around Tarnopol and then advance on a broad front towards Kowel, Lublin and Lwów. North of the Pripyat Marshes a Soviet force of 37 divisions and seven tank brigades would attempt to tie down a joint German-Polish formation of 62 divisions and three cavalry brigades on a narrow front between Oszmiana and Nowogródek. In contrast to the northern variant, the second variant included a deeper strike into Poland.

Following the Polish attack on Czechoslovakia, Stalin instructed on 7 October the Chief of the General Staff for the Red Army, Komandarm 1st Class Boris Shaposhnikov, to prepare a plan for an invasion of Poland. Shaposhnikov outlined an plan based on the War Plan of 24 March 1938 with a duration of several months, which advocated for a serious buildup, extensive logistical and fire support preparations, and a rational order of battle, deploying the army's best units.

The Soviets employed two primary offensive axes, each managed by a Front. Each Front commander had at his disposal a mobile group of forces created from cavalry and mechanised troops; a precursor of the cavalry-mechanised groups of the Second World War.

Komandarm 2nd rank Mikhail Kovalyov.

Komandarm 1st rank Semyon Timoshenko.

The Soviet forces, numbering between 450,000 and one million soldiers, 2,500 tanks and 718 armoured cars and 3,800 aircraft, were positioned as follows:

• North of the Pińsk Marshes, the Belorussian Front was under the command of Komandarm 2nd rank Mikhail Kovalyov. Three armies would advance to the line Wilno –Baranowicze, from which the advance would be split into two groups. The right flank would advance through Białystok towards Modlin, while the left flank would advance on Brześć nad Bugiem and then on to the capital Warsaw. The Byelorussian Front had an initial strength of 12 infantry divisions, four cavalry divisions and eight tank brigades, with two tank brigades in reserve.
• South of the Pińsk Marshes, the Ukrainian Front was under the command of Komandarm 1st rank Semyon Timoshenko. Two armies would advance on a broad front and advance to the line Stanisławów – Tarnopol, followed by an advance on the line Przemyśl – Lwów. After securing Przemyśl, the bulk of the forces continue their advance on Lublin and then Warsaw, one corps would advance on the Łupków Pass in order to assist the Czechoslovak Army. A third army would protect the right flank of the front by an advance towards Łuck and Chełm. The Ukrainian Front had an initial strength of seven infantry divisions, six cavalry divisions and nine tank brigades.

While the Latvian and Lithuanian governments on 12 October agreed to Soviet overflights over their territory, the plan allowed for potential future operations against Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland.

Stalin's purges had devastated the officer corps of the Red Army; those purged included three of its five marshals, 220 of its 264 division-level commanders or higher, and 36,761 officers of all ranks. Fewer than half of the officers remained in total. They were commonly replaced by soldiers who were less competent but more loyal to their superiors. The effects of the purge are visible in the ranks of the commanders in the order of battle, with only one Army commander serving in the appropriate rank of the Army General, in this case 2nd Class (Komandarm 2nd rank, Russian: командарм 2 ранга), the rest serving in being Corps (Komcor) and Divisional (Komdiv) Commander rank Russian: комкор, комдив). Furthermore, unit commanders were superseded by a political commissar, who ratified military decisions on their political merits, further complicating the Soviet chain of command. This system of dual command destroyed the independence of commanding officers.

1938: Soviet invasion

Soviet invasion

Soviet forces crossing the Soviet-Polish frontier on 27 October 1938.

On 27 October 1938 at 05:00, Soviet forces invaded Poland with the lead elements of 52 divisions and nine tank brigades, totaling some 450,000 men. Two hours later, Litvinov delivered the following declaration of war to Wacław Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow:

“

On 6 October 1938 the semifascist Polish Government led by Marshal Rydz-Śmigły participated in the dismemberment of our ally Czechoslovakia, in direct violation of Article 2 of the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1932, which has now ceased to operate. Following this, they rejected the S.S.S.R.’s just and equitable demands for troop passage so we could aid our Czechoslovak ally in their war against the German fascists. The Republic of Poland therefore has sided with the fascists government in Berlin. For these reasons the Soviet Government, cannot any longer preserve a neutral attitude towards these facts... In these circumstances, the Soviet Government have directed the High Command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia. — People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Maxim Litvinov, 23 October 1938

”

At 08:15 the first Soviet planes appeared over Warsaw, dropping leaflets urging the citizens to overthrow the Rydz-Śmigły/Beck government. Two hours later, Soviet aircraft bombed Warsaw, Lwów, Przemyśl and Brześć nad Bugiem.

On 1 November 1938, the Soviet Union formed a puppet government called the People's Republic of Poland, which was headed by Bolesław Bierut. From the very outset of the war, working-class Poles stood behind the legal government in Warsaw.

Diplomatic reactions

Polish president Ignacy Mościcki commented that the Soviet attack without a declaration of war violated the Soviet–Polish non-aggression pact of 1932, and also the Covenant of the League of Nations, which the Soviet Union signed in 1934. On 23 October, Beck condemned the Soviet invasion in a speech in the Sejm:

“

Peace is a precious and a desirable thing. Our generation, bloodied in wars, certainly deserves peace. But peace, like almost all things of this world, has its price, a high but a measurable one. We in Poland do not know the concept of peace at any price. There is only one thing in the lives of men, nations and countries that is without price. That thing is honor.

”

However, the western Allies refused to recognize the Soviet Union as an aggressor. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain considered making a public condemnation of the Soviet military action, but in the end issued only a request for both parties to show restraint. This stance represented Britain's attempt at balance: its security interests included supporting the British-French-Soviet alliance andtrade with the Soviets that would support its war effort. Public opinion in Britain was divided between expressions of outrage at the invasion and a perception that Poland had sided with Germany and that Soviet claims region were reasonable. Similarly, French officials urged Poland to grant the Soviets transit rights to assist the Czechoslovak Army.

The invasion produced in Poles a rude awakening to international politics. Poland brought the matter of the Soviet invasion before the League of Nations. In the debates that followed, however, the members states urged both sides to cease hositilies. Romania, with whom Poland had signed a treaty on mutual assistance against aggression and on military aid in 1927 and a guarantee treaty in 1931, had declared their neutrality when hostilites broke out in October 1938, and had been forced on 16 November 1938 to respond to a Soviet ultimatum delivered on 9 November in which they agreed to cede Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, accept an Anglo-French-Soviet guarantee of their independence, and an annulment of Polish-Romanian treaties in order to avoid a military conflict. Dissapointed with the response from France, the United Kingdom and the League of Nations, Poland eventually withdrew from the League on 24 January 1939.

Soviet advance

Timoshenko's Ukrainian Front forces easily broke through on a wide front from Dederkały in the north to Borszczów to the south, encountering reinforced rearguard detachments of the Kresowa and Podolska Cavalry Brigades and the 11th and 12th Infantry Divisions. As a result, Army Podole managed to withdraw relatively intact. By nightfall, the Ukrainian Front's Cavalry Army Group under komkor Elisei Goriachev and the 25th Tank Corps had penetrated the Polish lines to a depth of 40 kilometers, threatening Lwów. The Ukrainian Front breakthrough occurred to the north of Kopyczyńce. The 5th Army under komdiv Fedor Remezov had advanced 10 km facing heavy resistance south of Równe. Komkor Filipp Golikov's 6th Army had managed to penetrate around 30 kilometers before getting bogged down by the 12th Infantry Division around Tarnopol. Meanwhile, the 11th Infantry Division made a tactical withdrawal to take up positions around Stanisławów. The Red Army fought for three days over Tarnopol before the Polish defenders withdrew and abandoned the city.

It quickly became clear that the Red Army was suffering from poor leadership and tactics, as well as inadequate cooperation between arms logistical support. Frontal attacks resulted in heavy losses, and the poor state of the tanks resulted in numerous breakdowns due to technical failures. Poor weather conditions also slowed down the Soviet advance. The Reserve Army Lwów, commanded by Brigadier General Władysław Bortnowski, was on the 25 October ordered to reinforce the Polish defences in front of Stanisławów and Lwów. Bortnowski ordered the Krakowska Cavalry Brigade and the 10th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade to take up positions north of Stanisławów near the town of Brzeżany.

January – June 1939: Stalemate

Peace negotiations

In November 1938, the British and French governments urged both the Soviet Union and Poland to initiate peace negotiations. Poland, however, kept refusing to agree to provide transit rights to the Red Army, while the Soviet government refused to negotiate with the Polish government and likewise refused all offers of peace mediation between the Polish and Soviet governments. The latter explained its stance with the fact that it had signed a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with the Polish People’s Government, i.e. Bierut's government.

Immediately after the start of the war, Poland asked Romania to act as a mediator. The country did make a mediation offer, but it was rejected by the Soviet Union. The Romanian government then urged Poland to cease hostilities and accept the Soviet demands. Next, the Polish government turned to France. Drawing on ambassador Léon Noël's report, Robert Coulondre, the French ambassador to Moscow, asked Litvinov on 5 January about the Soviet Union’s stance on Poland's unofficial negotiation offer. Litvinov, however, stated that it was too late.

At the end of January, Polish representatives in the diplomatic circles in Romania and the Baltic countries started receiving intelligence that the Soviet Union was ready to initiate discussions with the Polish government. On 26 January, the Soviet Union notified the Polish government of a possibility for peace. This information was conveyed by Litvinov during a meeting with Romanian ambassador to the Soviet Union Nicolae Dianu on 26 January. The following day, Foreign Minister Beck received information that the Soviet government considered an agreement with the Polish government. However, before possible peace negotiations could be initiated, Poland had to agree to provide transit for Soviet trooops through Polish territory, accept the Anglo-Fremch-Soviet guarantee, and cede certain territories. The message conveyed via Romania also included the Soviet government’s statement that the promises it had made to Bierut's government did not apply to the Polish government.

The decision whether to accept or refuse the Soviet proposal for peace negotiations was deliberated upon by the Polish government during the night of 28–29 January 1939. The outcome of the vote was 11–6 in favour of rejecting the offer, with Śmigły-Rydz, Beck and Mościcki all voting against. Śmigły-Rydz then informed British ambassador Sir Howard William Kennard and French ambassador Léon Noël that while Poland could not accept ceding territory to the Soviet Union nor give the Red Army transit rights, as this would jeapordize Polish independence. The Soviet government subsequently broke off the negotiations and renewed their offensive on 5 February 1939.

Polish negotiations with Germany

Poland's situation worsened in October 1938 as the Soviet Union invaded Poland, while the British and French governments requested Poland to show restraint and circumspection and allow Soviet troop passage. When the British and French offensive actions against the Germans failed to materialize, it only increased Polish apprehension that Poland would be forced to seek an alignment with Germany. While Polish negotiations with France and the United Kingdom continued, Lipski met with Ribbentrop on 1 November to discuss the outbreak of hostilities between Poland and the Soviets. During the meeting, inquired about the German demands in return for economic and military assistance against the Soviets. Ribbentrop responded that the return of Danzig to Germany, the highway and a railway through western Poland to connect East Prussia with the main German territory, and Polish accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact were prerequisites for any German assistance. A few days later, on 3 November 1938, Poland noted to the Germans that Danzig was to remain independent, and that Poland was not interested in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact. Despite Germany's vehemont protests, the Polish government allowed the majority of the Czechoslovak soldiers to leave the country from Gdynia to France, in an effort to appease the French governments.

On 10 November 1938 Beck was invited to Berlin where he met with Ribbentrop and Hitler. In a friendly manner, Hitler stressed the importance of a territorial settlement for the two countries' future and as a prerequisite for any military assistance against the Soviets. He warned that Poland should realize that there was no middle course. Poland could either remain a national state, working for a reasonable relationship with Germany, or be led by a Communist government which would be absorbed by the Soviet Union. The return of Danzig with an extra-territorial rail and road connection and Polish accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact were prerequisites for any German assistance, in return, Germany would guarantee the border and also regard the Ukrainian question from a purely Polish angle. Hitler informed that Germany was willing to make special concessions to Poland that would include nothing "contrary to her military traditions and her national honour". The next day, Beck told Ribbentrop that there was no possibility of an agreement along these lines. Ribbentrop again raised the question of Polish adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact, stressing a common military action against the Soviet Union. Beck, though adamant in his refusal to compromise on Polish rights in Danzig, was seriously alarmed, and on his return to Warsaw proved more amenable to the demands from the Germans.

After returning home on 12 November, he informed President Mościcki and Marshal Rydz-Śmigły about his conversation. The following day the cabinet meeting was held at the Warsaw Castle to discuss the German offer. Beck stated that Poland could not be on Germany‘s side in a European war, a sentiment shared by the army and the majority of Polish public opinion. Accepting the German offer would effectively mean the end to Polish independence. However, he also voiced his concern that the Polish army could not hold the Soviet onslaught indefinitely without French and British support, which now seemed impossible due to the Anglo-French-Soviet Treaty. Tadeusz Kasprzycki, the Minister of Military Affairs, proposed to the government that it abandon its neutral stance and join the Axis as soon as possible in the hope that Germany would protect Poland against its "greedy Soviet neighbour". In the end, the majority of the conference members supported Beck's proposal to politely refuse the German offer but keeping the option open for future negotiations with Berlin, should negotiations with Britain and France be unsuccessful. Lipski was instructed by Beck to inform Ribbentrop on 13 November that Danzig was to remain independent, and that Poland was not interested in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact.

By December the Soviet advance had been stopped in front of Lwów and Białystok, as Polish counterattacks near Słonim, Złoczów and Brzeżany had inflicted substantial losses on the invaders. As a result, when Ribbentrop arrived in Warsaw on 3 December 1938 to speak with Polish leaders regarding the German wish to annex Danzig and to have Poland sign the Anti-Comintern Pact, Beck and Rydz-Śmigły still rejected the German offer.

On 5 January 1939 Beck was invited to meet Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin again to discuss the conditions for Poland to join the Axis Powers. Hitler congratulated Beck for having stopped the Soviet invasion and stated that Germany were willing to pursue a common Eastern policy with Poland in which the interests of both countries in warding off Bolshevism could effectively be realized. Hitler promised Beck help in return for Polish accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact, an extension of the 1934 Non-Aggression Treaty and the return of Danzig to Poland, promising that "Germany would do everything in its power to help Poland" and would recognise Polish-German frontiers and Polish claims to Soviet territory in the Ukraine, in exchange for a share of Ukrainian raw materials and agricultural products. Ribbentrop expressed that if Poland continued to not agree with German demands for Danzig and if Poland continued to resist signing the Anti-Comintern Pact, then the present German-Polish friendship would deteriorate. However, after seven hours of talks, Beck was adamant that Poland could not join the war on the side of Germany nor agree to the return of Danzig or sign the Anti-Comintern Pact. As Beck returned to Warsaw, Poland's intransigence was now annoying Hitler, but Ribbentrop and Göring both persuaded Hitler that negotiations should continue. Hitler, in his mammoth 30 January Reichstag speech, referred to the German-Polish friendship "as one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."

July 1939 – May 1940: Stalemate, Poland joins the Axis Powers

Polish accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact

In February 1939 the Red Army, having reorganised and adopted different tactics, renewed their offensive overcame the Polish defences. Despite this, Beck and Rydz-Śmigły continued to resist German pressure for several months longer. However, the military fortunes of Poland's main guarantor — France — crumbled in the summer of 1939 with the surrender of the Third French Republic on 5 July 1939 and the retreat of British forces from continental Europe. With their other ally Romania having given in to Soviet demands in November, Beck and Rydz-Śmigły grudgingly realized that the Polish government now had to turn to Germany in hopes of military assistance and a guarantee.

On 7 July 1939, Lipski met with Ribbentrop to discuss the German prerequisites in return for military and economic assistance. That evening, the German government responded in a communication that it aimed not only for the restoration of Danzig but also the Polish Corridor as well as territories corresponding to the Poznań and the Pomorskie Voivodeship (which had not previously been part of Hitler's demands) in addition to Polish accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact and the safeguarding of the German minority in Poland. An exchange of minority populations between the two countries was also proposed. In return, Germany would recognise the new Polish-German frontiers as final and Polish claims to Soviet territory in the Ukraine, as well as provide military equipment and establish a German military mission to train and rebuild the Polish military. When Ribbentrop the following morning read the 16-point German proposal to the Polish ambassador, Lipski indicated that Poland was favorably disposed to negotiations, but noted that he needed to consult with his advisers and government and requested a copy of the proposals for transmission to the Polish government, which Ribbentrop consented.

The decision whether to accept or refuse the German offer was deliberated upon by the Polish government at the Warsaw Castle from 8–10 July 1939. Beck presented the 16-point German proposal and the foreign situation and the problems related to Polish accession, and Rydz-Śmigły portrayed the poor military situation. The French capitulation had altered the political situation dramatically, as Poland had lost their main guarantor and ally, and now was on the verge of losing its independence. Beck concluded that since siding with the Soviet Union was unacceptable, Beck argued that the drastic measure of accepting the German proposal was the only option to partially preserve the Polish state and its independence. There was a sharp clash to the proposal by the centrist cabinet members Władysław Sikorski, Wincenty Witos, Jan Stańczy and Józef Haller. Meanwhile, on 9 July, Ribbentrop stated in a phone conversation with the German amassador to Poland, Hans-Adolf von Moltke, that Germany was ready to recognise its respect of Polish sovereignty and territorial integrity in a special note, which could be publicised by the Polish government. This message was conveyed by Moltke to Beck, who also warned that the situation made it seem that it was in the best interest for Poland to decide on its accession as fast as possible. After consultations with the British ambassador, the cabinet decided that the military situation was hopeless and overruled the protest by the other cabinet members. The majority of the conference members supported Beck's proposal, with the outcome of the vote being 11–6 in favour of accepting the offer of accession, but that certain limitations and reserves were to be demanded from Germany. In response, the centrist ministers Sikorski, Witos, Stańczy and Haller resigned.

On 11 July 1938 Beck and President Mościcki travelled to Vienna. After having agreed to some amendments, the pact was signed at the Belvedere Palace on 12 July 1939, the main signatories being Ribbentrop and Mościcki. An official banquet was held. The German side had accepted the demands that had been made regarding adjusting the territories to be ceded to Germany, which included retaining a Polish harbour in and transit to Gdynia.

On the morning of 14 July 1939, German troops entered Danzig, Poznań and Polish Pomerania, annexing an area of 71,057 km² with a population of 5.9 million people. The following day, Hitler visited Danzig, where he proclaimed the establishment of Reichsgau Danzig-West Prussia and Reichsgau Posen. The territorial concessions of 1939 produced deep sorrow and resentment among Poles, and hastened the decline in popularity of the regime. Three days after the annexation, on 18 July, Poland renounced the 1921 Franco-Polish alliance. The same day, President Ignacy Mościcki resigned from office, and in accordance with article 13 of the April Constitution of 1935, he was succeeded by his appointed successor Marshal Rydz-Śmigły. Rydz-Śmigły subsequently appointed General Władysław Bortnowski as the new commander-in-chief of the Polish Army and the General Inspector of the Armed Forces. The following day, the government of Felicjan Składkowski resigned on 18 July and a new government under Adam Koc was sworn in, a coalition government comprising the Camp of National Unity (OZN) and the fascist Falanga National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo Radykalny-Falanga', ONR-Falanga) led by Bolesław Piasecki. Koc's government withdrew the country from the League of Nations (23 July 1939), and announced the desire to join the Anti-Comintern Pact (three days later). On 2 August 1939, Poland signed the Anti-Comintern (Axis) Pact, tying Poland militarily to Germany, Italy, and Japan.

On 20 July 1939, Hitler issued Directive No. 11, which ordered the creation of a German military mission comprising 10 divisions to enter Poland. The following day, the chief of the German high command (OKW), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, announced that Wehrmacht troops were being dispatched to Poland "to assit the Polish government in defeating the Bolshevik invasion." Later that month German troops entered the country ostensibly to train and rebuild the Polish military. Between July and December 1939, more than 1 million German troops entered Poland.

See also

• Eastern Front (WFAC)