Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Fall Grün)
From Alternative History
| Invasion of Czechoslovakia | |||||||||||||||||
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 German armour wait for orders to cross the German-Czech frontier, October 1, 1938. | |||||||||||||||||
| Date | October 1, 1938 - March 15, 1939 | ||||||||||||||||
| Location | Czechoslovakia | ||||||||||||||||
| Result | Decisive Axis victory
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The Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1939 (in Czechoslovakia also "Obranná Válka roku 1938-1939"; in Germany, "Feldzug in die Tschechoslowakei," codenamed "Fall Grün," by the German General Staff) was carried out by Nazi Germany and its ally Hungary.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia began October 1, 1938, one day after the signing of the Munich Agreement, and ended March 15, 1939, with Germany and Hungary occupying the entirety of Czechoslovakia. Seeing that Czechoslovakia had failed to comply with the demands of the Munich Agreement, the United Kingdom and France did not declare war on Germany and Hungary, and is seen today as one of the main examples of the definition "Western betrayal".
Following the refusal by the Czechoslovak government on September 30 and a German-staged "Czechoslovak attack" in the morning of October 1, 1938, German forces invaded Czechoslovakia the same day. Initially, the Czechoslovak maintained their tactical and strategic advantage, preventing the Germans to break through the main defensive fortification lines along the border, and as a result the Czechoslovak reserves could be mobilized in time for the main breakthrough of the German forces. The only units to successfully make any significant gains in the first two weeks of the war was the Tenth Army operating in eastern Bohemia.
Despite several Czech tactical victories, the Czech forces defending the border fortifications were exausted by a week of continuous fighting, and were soon forced to retreat, as the Germans was breaking through the defensive lines. On October 14, 1938, the Fourteenth Army through the Czechoslovak border defences in southern Bohemia. On October 15, the Second Army in Silesia broke through the defences in northern Moravia while the Eighth Army broke through the defences in northern Bohemia, and on October 16 the Twelfth Army broke through the defences in southern Bohemia.
On October 18 the Tenth Army broke through the defensive line north of Plzeň, and on October 23 the two spearheads of the Tenth Army rendezvoused at Nezvěstice, 15 km southeast of Plzeň, thus encircling the city. However, after several failed assaults on the city, the operations against Plzeň was temporarily suspended.
On October 20, suffering from low ammunition stockpiles and other supplies, the Hungarians began their invasion of Czechoslovakia, meeting mostly reservists with more obsolete weapons, but the defenders maintained their tactical and organisational superiority over the Hungarians, sometimes with the help of the Slovak nationalistic organisation the Hlinka Guard.
The Soviet Union had already on the opening day of the war, and on October 5, five days after hostilities broke out, the Soviet Union fulfilled their promise to Czechoslovakia by loading a corps on trains heading for Czechoslovakia through Romania. On October 13 the Corps had been unloaded in Užhorod, and began then to march towards the frontline in Moravia.
Following the German breakthrough in southern Moravia, the Germans could take advantage of their armed forces' motorisation and mobility, and by October 20 the Fourteenth Army had advanced at some places more 40 km inland, and the forward elements of the had reached the town of Pohořelice, 25 km southwest of Brno. While the 2. Panzer-Division secured the frontline around Brno, elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had captured the village of Ivančice to the west and the villages of Sokolnice, Šaratice and Otnice to the south.
On October 20, the largest tank battle of the campaign, also known as the Battle of Ivančice, began with German attacks by the 3. Panzer-Division on the Czech defences along the line Čučice - Oslavany - Padochov - Neslovice. On October 22, after two days of heavy fighting, the Czechs initated their counterattack, and they had captured Ivančice by the end of the day. In the following days, the Czech tanks faced numberous German tank attacks, and by October 28 the German divisions were in retreat and the Czechs had reached the villages of Moravský Krumlov – Budkovice - Rokytná - Polánka - Moravské Bránice - Jamolice - Dobřínsko - Dolní Kounice, capturing over 1,500 Germans in the process. However, the situation in Brno forced the Czechs to retreat back to their lines before the counterattack began on October 20, with a smaller force defending Ivančice.
On October 22, the Germans pulled out of Otnice, which was the result of a communication error. On October 23, Czech troops used the German's mistake to their advantage and occupied the village. The division had a shortage of anti-tank weapons, and the ammunition supply was also running out. However, he decided to hold the line along the villages of Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky. Gen.Maj. Joachim Lemelsen, commander of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was furious by the neglect of the company that had occupied Otnice, and ordered the division to take it back. This resulted in the Battles of Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky. In the following days, Czech and Soviet troops successfully defended their positions against numberous German attacks.
At 10.00 on October 20 German motorised units of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) began the assault on Brno, and after 11 days of heavy fighting against Czech and Soviet troops, an act of surrender was signed in the suburb of Štýřice by the commander of the Czech forces defending the city. Brig. Gen. Kudrna accepted all conditions proposed by the Germans, as he was eager to avoid further civilian casualties.
Due to the heavy resistance in both Bohemia and Moravia, the Wehrmacht attempted, on November 20, 1938, a direct offensive against Plzeň and Prague. However, this attack had only limited tank support and was forced to assault extensive Czech defenses. After meeting determined resistance from the 1. rychlá divize “Kazimír” and 18. divize ”Erben”, the German offensive was driven back four days later, with the Germans losing 1,000 men and several dozen tanks.
By early December, the temperatures, so far relatively mild by European standards, dropped as low as twenty degrees Celsius below zero, freezing German troops, who still had no winter clothing, and German vehicles, which were not designed for such severe weather. More than 10,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers. Frozen grease had to be removed from every loaded shell and vehicles had to be heated for hours before use.
In the ensuing months, the fronts were relatively quiet, appart from the numbers of artillery duels and raids on each others positions, as well as air-to-air combat. The winter gave both the Axis and the Czechs a chance to regroup and reorganise their troops. While the Germans only made limited gains in the winter months between November and February, the Hungarians were more lucky with their offensive. In Slovakia, the Hungarians, with German support, captured the Slovak capital Bratislava on November 8, 1938, after heavy fighting.
In central Slovakia the Hungarians also made significant gains, capturing Košice on December 10 and Užhorod on December 21. Nevertheless, the largest battle in eastern Slovakia was the Battle of Michalovce between November 8-13, where Czech soldiers supported by tanks and Hlinka Guards held the line around the village of Michalovce against repeated Hungarian attacks.
On December 28, 1938 the forward elements of the I/14th Infantry Brigade reached the Polish frontier, where they met Polish troops, who were welcomed with great joy.
Although that the Germans and the Hungarians by March 15 had completely overrun Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak government never surrendered. In addition, Czechoslovakia's remaining land and air forces were evacuated to neighbouring Poland and Yugoslavia.
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| Battles: | |||
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The Border - Karlovy Vary - Otročín - Bezděkov - Želetava - Šumperk - Siege of Plzeň - Ivančice - Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky - Brno - Hungarian offensive - Bratislava - Michalovce - Košice - Frühlingserwachen - Olomouc - Siege of Prague | |||
| Contemporaneous Wars: | |||
Contents
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[edit] Prelude to the campaign
Historically, the parts later known as Sudetenland belonged to the regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Since they did not form a single historical region, except as united under the Bohemian crown, it is difficult to distinguish the history of the Sudetenland apart from that of Bohemia and Moravia, until the advent of nationalism and the coining of the term in the 19th century.
The regions later called Sudetenland were situated on the borders of the Kingdom of Bohemia, which also consisted of Moravia (and later Silesia) and was in turn part of the Holy Roman Empire. After the extinction of the Czech Přemyslid dynasty, the kingdom was ruled by the Luxemburgs, later the Jagiellonians and finally the Habsburgs. Already from the 13th century onwards the border regions of Bohemia and Moravia, called Sudetenland in the 20th century, were settled by Germans, who were invited by the originally Slavic Bohemian nobility.
The Habsburgs integrated the Kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia into their monarchy, and it remained an integral part of that kingdom until the advent of modern nationalism in the 19th century. Conflicts between Czech and German nationalists emerged, for instance in the Revolutions of 1848 in the Habsburg areas: while the German-speaking population wanted to participate in the building of a German nation state, the Czech-speaking population insisted on keeping Bohemia out of such plans.
In the wake of growing nationalism, the name "Sudetendeutsche" (Sudeten Germans) emerged by the early 20th century. It originally constituted part of a larger classification of three groupings of Germans within the Austrian Empire, which also included "Alpendeutsche" (Alpine Germans) in what later became the Republic of Austria and "Balkandeutsche" (Balkan Germans) in Hungary and the regions east of it. Of these three terms, only the term "Sudetendeutsche" survived, because of the ethnic and cultural conflicts within Bohemia.
The end of World War I in 1918 meant the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian multinational state. The Czechs, numbering about 6.7 million people, demanded a state of their own, based on the traditional boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia, which would mean that the new Czech state would have defensible mountain boundaries, as well as including the highly industrialized settlement areas of the Sudeten Germans.
After the Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR) was proclaimed on 28 October 1918, Sudeten Germans, claiming the right to self-determination, demanded that their homeland areas remain with the Austrian State, which had been reduced to the Republic of German Austria. This had been forbidden by the victorious allied powers of the First World War (the Treaty of Saint-Germain) and by the Czechoslovak government, partly with force of arms in 1919. Many Sudeten Germans rejected affiliation with Czechoslovakia because they had been refused the right to self-determination promised by US president Wilson in his Fourteen Points of January 1918. The Sudetenland became part of Czechoslovakia due to the fact it had always formed part of the Kingdom of Bohemia, which was the main portion of Czechoslovakia in the same sense England is the primary home-nation of the UK, and many German-speakers felt themselves to be German-speaking Czechoslovaks rather than Germans or Austrians living in Czechoslovakia.
Sudeten German industry, highly dependent on foreign trade and having close financial links with Germany, suffered badly during the Depression, particularly when banks in Germany failed in 1931. Czechs, whose industry was concentrated on the production of essential domestic items, suffered less. By the mid-1930s, unemployment in the Sudetenland was at about five times the level as that in the Czech lands. Tensions between the two groups resulted. Relations between Czechs and Germans were further envenomed when Sudeten Germans were forced to turn to the Czechoslovak government and the small loans bank (Živnostenská banka) for assistance and these authorities often made the hiring of Czechs in proportion to their numbers in the population a condition for aid. Czech workmen, dispatched by the government to engage in public works projects and border fortification in Sudeten German territories, were also resented.
Though, major resentment to the government in Prague first arose following the resignation of Czechoslovakia's first president and its principal founding father, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, on December 14, 1935. He was succeeded by Edvard Beneš, a strong Czechoslovakist.
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was elected as chancellor of Germany, and shortly after the election, he and his NSDAP consolidated power, assuming full control in 1934. Hitler reinstated the draft in 1935, and begun remobilizing the German armed forces. In March 1936, the Germans marched into the Rhineland, marking the first step of Hitler's expansionist policy.
On March 12, 1938, Nazi Germany annexed Austria with the Anschluss. Immediately after the Anschluss, Hitler made himself the advocate of ethnic Germans living in Czechoslovakia, and many Sudeten Germans threw their support behind Henlein, who supported Hitler's pan-German objectives. They began demanding that the Czech Government ceded the Sudetenland to Germany.
As the previous appeasement of Hitler had shown, the governments of both France and the United Kingdom were set on avoiding war. The French government especially did not wish to face Germany alone, so took its lead from the British government and it’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Chamberlain believed that Sudeten German grievances were just and that Hitler's intentions were limited. Both Britain and France, therefore, advised Czechoslovakia to concede to the SdP's demands.
[edit] May Crisis
On Thursday, May 19, 1938, Sir Nevile Henderson, the Ambassador of the British Empire to Germany, received and passed on to London a report from the British consulate in Dresden that there was "strong reason to believe that German troops are concentrating in southern Silesia and northern Austria" and that military leaves were about to be suspended. Later that day Henderson transmitted a comparable report from Bavaria, adding that "my French colleague has also heard rumors of concentration of troops on the Czech frontier." In Prague the following day, Kamil Krofta, the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, telephoned Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Minister in Prague, to express alarm over reports that German troops were concentrating in Saxony. This was the beginning of the so-called May Crisis.
If these reports were credible, Prague had ample cause to fear that German border demonstrations, or even an invasion, might be in the offing. The first of a series of Czech minicipal elections was to be held on Sunday, May 22, and the Sudetenland was increasingly turbulent. The SdP has broken off negotiations with the Czech Government when Henlein had gone off to Berlin and London, and Henlein himself, shortly after his return, went to Berchtesgaden to meet with Hitler. The Anschluss had shown that Hitler could act impulsively, and he had repeatedly declared that he would not tolerate oppression of the Sudeten Germans. The danger that some incident might trigger an invasion seemed very real, and on the evening of May 20 at Cheb two Sudeten German motorcyclist who failed to heed a Czech policeman's challenge were shot dead. The night the Prague government, responding to the Czech General Staff's demand that five classes of reservists be called for active service, more cautiously called up one class and a number of specialist troops, to reinforce the garrisons in the Sudetenland.
The Wilhelmstrasse, after consulting the OKW, vehemently denied that any hostile concentrations, or even unusual troop movements, had taken place. Nevertheless, when Eisenlohr and his military attaché, Colonel Rudolf Toussaint, went to see the Czech Chief of Staff, General Ludvík Krejčí, they were informed that Prague had "irrefutable proof that in Saxony a concentration of from eight to ten divisions had taken place".
While the British and the French attachés were inable to observe anything out of the way. While the French military attaché concluded that "their Czech friends had, because of the press campaign, deceived themselves to the extent of describing a military situation which existed only intheir imagination", Ribbentrop and State Secretary Ernst von Weizsaecker put the matter much more strongly and flatly accused Prague of fabricating the rumors of German military moves in order to provide an excuse for their own mobilisation.
However, the reports of German troop movements did not all come from Czech sources, and thus it is clear that the troop movements and concentrations had taken place, and this became known to the excellent Czech intelligence service and thatm under the prevailing tense circumstances, were quite sufficient to justify a state of alert in Prague.
The reasons for the movements that so alarmed Prague were that the Wehrmacht was growing, forming new units, and testing new equipment, and, with the coming of spring, maneuvres and war games were the order of the day. In response to Weizsaecker's inquiry, Keitel, while denying any abnormal movements, disclosed that there was indeed an unusual number of troops at the Königsbrück training ground, about twenty miles north of Dresden, the capital of Saxony, where General Krejčí had claimed to have "irrefutable proof" of a concentration. Furthermore, during the week May 15 to 23, a combined Army and Luftwaffe war game was under way in adjacent Thuringia, where the tactics of ground-air collaboration were being explored with particular reference to the Green and Red (plan for the conquest of France) contingencies.
It must have been events such as these, probably exaggerated or distorted in the description, which were the basis of the reports that came to Prague and to the British and French embassies in Berlin. In Prague the reports interpreted in the light of the Czech General Staff's assessment of the probable German plan of campaign - a shrewd one which, as events later proved, was close to the mark. Badly outnumbered but with strong defences if manned and ready, the Czechs most feared being overwhelmed by a sudden attack before they could mobilise. They reasoned that the Germans would try to achieve surprise "under guise of moves for training purposes" which would bring strong concentrations of troops to the border without the publicity necessarily involved in formal mobilisation. What Prague heard from Saxony, and perhaps fitted elsewhere, fitted the formula too closely for comfort, andthe Czech generals decided that an alert and a partial mobilisation were the least that prudence dictated.
But in fact the German preparations were not nearly so far advanced as the Czechs feared. The revised Green directive, which had not yet even been signed, opened with a renunciation of imminent action. At OKH and in the field only a bare start had been made toward developing the plans and making the preparations for such an operation. In immediate military terms, the May crisis was of no importance, but its diplomatic and psychological repercussions were enormous, for Hitler appeared to have had this bluff called, and that was something which he could could not abide.
Casting about as he was for any stick with which to beat the Czechs, Ribbentrop had summoned Mastny, denounced his governments' circulation of false reports of German troop movements, and threatened that such tactics "could have only one result with the German Government, namely, that these troop concentrations... would take place with lightning speed." The next day (May 21), Henderson found the German Foreign Minister "in a highly excitable and pugnacious mood," complaining that the ambassador had, without previous agreement, released to Reuters the German denials. Ribbentrop threatened as punishment to cut off the British from any further access to military informations, and raged over the incident at Cheb, which had just been reported to him. The Czechs were "mad," he shouted, and "if they persisted in their present attitude they would be destroyed." British efforts to bring them to their senses "had led to no result whatever."
Reports of these interviews, coupled with the continuing rumors of German military moves, caused great concern in London and Paris. In the evening of May 21, Henderson was again in Ribbentrop's office, this time armed with a telegram from Lord Halifax noting with disapproval the German threats of intervention, reminding the German Government of "their responsibilities," and declaring that "His Majesty's Government could not guarantee that they would not be forced by circumstances to become involved" if German aggression should trigger French intervention in pursuance of her treaty obligations. The next day Henderson was back at the Wilhelmstrasse with a personal message from Halifax to Ribbentrop, warning that if Germany resorted to force "it is quite impossible for me to foretell results that may follow, and I would beg him not to count upon this country being able to stand aside..." Meanwhile François-Poncet had made similar representations to Weizsaecker, and in Paris, Prime Minister Daladier invited the German Ambassador to his home in order "to speak frankly as a French ex-serviceman to his German comrade" and to warn him that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia "the French would have to fight if they did not wish to be dishonoured." The result, he declared, could be the "utter destruction of European civilization" and the triumph of "Cossack and Mongol hordes."
A consequence of these reports of troop movements and diplomatic demárches was that Hitler and his government suffered considerable loss of face. Although im fact there had been no intention to take any kind of hostile military action, the contrary was widely believed and reported in the word press, and when nothing happened, it was made to appear that Hitler had backed down when confronted with the Czech call-up of reserves and the British and French warnings. Henderson reported to Halifax on May 28 that there was deep resentment on the part of the German Government because of "ready acceptance all over the world of the theory that Germany concentrated troops with intention of attacking Czechoslovakia and was only restrained by energetic rebuff to Herr Hitler." Furthermore, the episode had given the Czechs welcome (though misleading) encouragement, for the call-up had gone smoothly, had had a calming effect in the Sudetenland, the elections had taken place with no major incidents, and the British and French had given strong diplomatic support.
On May 28 he called a meeting in the winter garden of the Reich Chancellery. Among the attending persons were Keitel, Brauchitsch, Beck and the Führer's civilian aide, Fritz Wiedemann. Hitler declared: "It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off the map." A covering letter signed by Keitel directed that execution of the plan "must be assured as final October 1, 1938, at the latest".
Two days later, on May 30, Hitler finally signed the revised directive for Fall Grün.
Six weeks earlier, when Schuschnigg announced his plabiscite, Hitler would crush Austria by merely clenching his fist. When Prague ordered the call-up, however, he had no such easy road to conquest. A sword would be wanted; the German sword needed to be tempered and sharpened, and that would take time. But from the end of May, Adolf Hitler was determined that it would take as little time as possible.
[edit] The crucial September
During the summer of 1938, tensions between the Sudeten Germans and Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia continued to grow, as the Sudeten Germans claimed they were being opressed by the government in Prague. As war loomed over Europe once again, the French and the British wished to prevent the crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia from escalating into full war.
Neither the British or the French wished to risk a full military conflict with Germany over Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1938, and both were supporting a peaceful resolution of the crisis, even if this was at the expense of the democratic Czechoslovakia. Both Lord Halifax and Chamberlain of the UK and Daladier and Bonnet of France urged Czechoslovakia to give in to the Henlein's demands. Especially the French were reluctant to support their ally Czechoslovakia. This went as far as the French Foreign Minister played dirty and misled his own cabinet colleagues. The Soviet Union had pledged to give military assistance to Czechoslovakia only if France also did the same. Now France did not want to involve herself in a war, so, after meeting the Foreign Ministers of Soviet Union and Romania, the French Foreign Minister, Georges-Étienne Bonnet, like most French and British politicians an avid supporter of the appeasement policy, told the Cabinet that the Soviet Union was not willing to provide more than 200 planes and would send only one division of army as help to Czechoslovakia. He also said Romania’s Foreign Minister had declined to allow passage of Soviet troops and planes through her country. Both were lies. In fact, around 500 Soviet military aircraft were already present in Czechoslovakia and Romania had clearly said that the she would fulfil her obligation and, in case of a German invasion, allow passage to Soviet troop and planes. By these deliberate lies French Foreign Minister Bonnet created a situation in which France decided not to honour their commitment to Czechoslovakia.
As the crisis escalated, the British government demanded that Beneš requested a mediator. Not wishing to sever his government's ties with Western Europe, Beneš reluctantly accepted. The British appointed Lord Runciman and instructed him to persuade Beneš to agree to a plan acceptable to the Sudeten Germans. On September 2, Beneš submitted the Fourth Plan, granting nearly all the demands of the Carlsbad Decrees. Intent on obstructing conciliation, however, the SdP held demonstrations that provoked police action in Ostrava on September 7. The Sudeten Germans broke off negotiations on September 13, after which violence and disruption ensued. As Czechoslovak troops attempted to restore order, Henlein flew to Germany and on September 15 issued a proclamation demanding the takeover of the Sudetenland by Germany.
On the same day, Hitler met with Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden and demanded the swift takeover of the Sudetenland by the Third Reich under threat of war. The Czechs, Hitler claimed, were slaughtering the Sudeten Germans. Chamberlain referred the demand to the British and French governments; both accepted. The Czechoslovak government resisted, arguing that Hitler's proposal would ruin the nation's economy and lead ultimately to German control of all of Czechoslovakia. The United Kingdom and France issued an ultimatum, making a French commitment to Czechoslovakia contingent upon acceptance. It was made clear to Beneš that unless the Anglo-French terms were promptly accepted, Czechoslovakia would be on her own, confronting, in the words of Halifax's message to Newton, "a situation for which we would take no responsibility." Pursuant to Newton's instructions to "act immediately at whatever hour," he and Lacroix waited on President Beneš at about two o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, September 21. The British démarche was available in writing; Lacroix delivered his tidings orally, and Beneš insisted on written confirmation that France would not honour her obligations towards Czechoslovakia. Beneš promised an answer by midday.
At six o'clock that morning, Beneš met with the cabinet ministers under Prime Minister Milan Hodža, the head of the political parties represented in the government, and Generals Syrový and Krejčí. The nocturnal visits of Newton and Lacroix had aroused great indignation, and the initial reaction was to reject the Anglo-French proposals, move the civil government offices from Prague to Moravia and Slovakia, and fight it out. But further discussion (in which Beneš did not take an active part) raised doubts. Some, incredulous of the positions taken in London and Paris, wished to send special delegations to the two capitals. Then the two generals were asked to answer the question: "Shall we or shall we not go to war without allies?" The answer was:
- ... considering Germany's preparations, the annexation of Austria, the hostility of Hungary and Poland, and the attitude now revealed on the part of Britain and France, our only capacity, from a military point of view, was a brief and difficult defence. How things would actually develop could not be predicted, but they could not recommend a single-handed war against Gertmany. What the Soviets would do by way of practical military action was not clear. As far as they knew, Moscow had given no precise information of this kind.
According to the Czech chief of military intelligence, General František Moravec, Krejčí was asked how long his forces, without French and British support, could hold out, and he replied: "About three weeks". According to Minister of the Interior, Josef Černý: President Beneš, at the request of the Government and the political representatives, again called the Russian Minister (Alexandrovsky) to ascertain the final standpoint of the Soviet Government; after a prolonged, very emotional discussion with the Minister he informed the meeting that "the Soviets are willing to help Czechoslovakia in case of an attack by Nazi Germany, but only if France, Czechoslovakia's ally, also comes to her rescue." In the face of this news and the adamant attitude of both the French and the British ministers, the Government and all chairmen of political parties, on the recommendation of President Beneš, unanimously accepted the Franco-British proposals.
After the Cabinet had adjourned, and just after Prague's formal acceptance of the Anglo-French termas had been received, Halifax instructed Newton to urge Beneš to withdraw the state police, and asked for his views on the future use of British, "international", and German troops. On its face this was only an inquiry, but the trend of Halifax's thinking was reflected in his accompanying suggestions:
- "I think regular German troops would at least be preferable to Heinleins Freikorps, who would be likely to work off private grudges and to commit outrages on poilitical opponents.
- We may, therefore, have to try to facilitate the entry of German troops at an early date into a defined area and to eliminate all danger of clash with the Czechs. It would, of course, be best if Dr. Beneš himself would suggest that, in districts they will obviously pass to Germany, he no longer desires to retain responsibility for maintenance of order, and that German troops should be employed."
Best perhaps for the convenience of the powers, but not for those inhabitants of the Sudetenland, German or Czech, who did not relish passing under Nazi rule. Their fate seems not to have been in the forefront of the mind of Lord Halifax.
While Halifax was composing the message, Beneš was sending, via Lacroix, an agonised appeal that whatever agreement was reached at Godesberg should ensure that no German troops be allowed across the old frontier until the new one was officially established.
The news of the Czechoslovak capitulation precipitated an outburst of national indignation. In Prague large crowds were marching toward the Hradčany, protesting the capitulation and some calling for a military dictatorship to defend the integrity of the state. General Jan Syrový, the one-eyed hero of the First World War, told them that a dictatorship would do no good: "You do not know the causes which forced the Government to make its decisions. We cannot lead the nation to suicide." But the next morning the Hodža government resigned and was replaced later that day by a new cabinet headed by Jan Syrový. Syrový was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence despite his contradiction. Syrový insisted he was a soldier, not a politician, and that he had no qualification to execute this position. President Beneš told him, that the nation needed him and, if he was a soldier, to take it as an order. In the end, Syrový consented. On September 23 a decree of general mobilization was issued.
At half-past eleven in the morning of September 21, Hitler's Army adjutant, Captain Engel, telephoned to OKW that "the Führer five minutes ago received news that Prague has accepted unconditionally." An hour and a quarter later OKW passed this information to the staff section chiefs, with instructions that preparations for Grün were to be continued, but also plans should now be made for a peaceful entry. Though paying serious heed to the possibility that a blodless resolution of the crisis might be preferable to the losses and uncertainties of war, it is most unlikely that Hitler had made a firm decision, and there was no slackening in execution of the Green program for an attack. The same day the 7th Infantry Division in Bavaria (as well as other units elsewhere positioned along the frontier) were assembling in their preliminary stations the forces were to make the initial assault. The French military and air attachés, well informed by aerial and road reconaissance and consular reports, continues to observe the concentrations of German forces along the border.
There was, however, one respect in which things were not developing in accordance with the original Grün plan. Hitler's decision to form the Sudetendeutsche Freikorps instead of putting the Sudeten German "refugees" into the Army reserves resulted in the creation of an undisciplined, nondescript force eager to display its prowess and settle old scores. There were tempting opportunities for raids across the Czech border, especially in those areas, such as the Aš-Cheb district, which were nearly 100% German and which lay outside the Czech fortifications and would have been indefensible in the event of war. Sudeten control of Aš during the night of September 20-21 may initially have been accomplished locally, but was soon buttressed by the Freikorps and perhaps also by German SS and SA units and extended to Cheb and Františkovy Lázně (Franzensbad). To avoid provocation, the Czechs made no effort to expel the invaders, but warned Britain and France that these incursions greatly increased the danger of clashes with Czech soldiers in the area.
The German Army command was also vastly displeased by these activities. Not only were they of no military value; far worse, they were wholly inconsistent with the purpose of achieving at least an element of surprise in the initial attack on the Czech fortifications. Provocational pinpricks along the frontier were altogether likely to cause the Czechs to mobilise and man the fortifications in full strength, which was just what the Wehrmacht leaders wished to avoid. These problems would vanish, of course, if the crisiss were to be resolved nonmilitarily.
After the Berchtesgaden meeting, Ribbentrop's staff had submitted a memorandum on procedures for conducting a plebiscite, and on the twenty-first the OKW, proceeding on the assumption that the Czechs wouldagree to cession of the Sudeten German districts and plebiscites in the mixed German-Czech districts, compiled a list of twenty-five demands which should be considered for imposition on Prague. These included the immediate withdrawal of all Czech troops and police and the surrender of all fortifications in both types of districts, occupation of the ceded area by German troops, and the plebiscite areas by German police pending the arrival of an international police force, demobilization of the entire Czech Army, prohibition of any future fortification construction, pardon and release of all German and Sudeten Germans imprisoned for espionage, and numerous other equally drastic requirements and restrictions.
Meanwhile, Hitler was giving his own primary attention to the Hungarian and Polish minority claims. At Berchtesgaden he had told Chanberlain that "in the long run it would be impossible to ignore these demands," but had given no indication that he would insist on their settlement in connection with the Sudeten problem. Now, however, both he and Göring took steps to persuade the Hungarian and Polish governments of the necessity of pressing their demands immediately and forcefully, if they expected to profit by the Sudeten crisis.
The two countries were not equally bold, for Hungary was much weaker than Poland and was further inhibited by the agreements linking the Little Entente, which would have required Yugoslavia and Romania to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia if she were attacked by Hungary. On September 16, Göring invited the Hungarian Minister, Döme Sztójay, to Karinhall, and sought to allay these fears by giving his personal assurance "that Yugoslavia wouls take no action if Hungary were to march, not on the first day (of the German attack), but say three or four days later." Three days earlier the Yugoslav Minister in Rome, Bosko Cristich, had told Ciano that if Hungary were "the first to take up arms against" against the Czechs, Yugoslavia would be obliged "to keep faith with its pledge to the Little Entente," but "Should Hungary, however, support and follow up a German intervention, Yugoslavia would consider herself freed from all obligation." Göring criticized Hungary for "not doing enough in the present crisis," and urged on Sztójay that his country should demand "in clear terms the detachment of the Hungarian region from Czechoslovakia."
Chamberlain met Hitler in Godesberg on September 22 to confirm the agreements. Hitler however, aiming at using the crisis as a pretext for war, now demanded not only the annexation of the Sudetenland but the immediate military occupation of the territories, giving the Czechoslovakian army no time to adapt their defence measures to the new borders. To achieve a solution, Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini suggested a conference of the major powers in Munich and on September 29, Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain met and agreed to Mussolini's proposal (actually prepared by Hermann Göring) and signed the Munich Agreement accepting the immediate occupation of the Sudetenland. At about 1:30 AM on September 30, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement.
The news of the signing of the Munich Agreement between Hitler and the Western powers reached Czechoslovakia later that day, and in further demonstrations and rallies, Czechs and Slovaks called for president Beneš not to abide by the agreement. After further pressure from both the cabinet under General Syrový and the Czechoslovak population, Beneš declared that they would not abide by the agreement. As a result, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, reassured the Czechoslovak government that the Soviet Union was willing to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance.
Adolf Hitler was furious by the Czech refusal. As the Czechoslovaks in his mind had disobeyed an agreement between Germany, France and the United Kingdom, he could now declare war on Czechoslovakia without risking an escalation of the conflict with the west. As a result, he ordered that the Fall Grün, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, should be initiated the following morning.
[edit] Opposing commanders
[edit] Germany
[edit] Adolf Hitler
The choice between peace and war was clearly down to the Führer Adolf Hitler.
The Führer usurped the control of grand strategy from the German High Command (OKH) even before the war began. He forced the resignation of the general staff, Ludwik Beck, in August 1938, when his lack of confidence in Hitler’s belligerent schemes became apparent. While few of the younger generals were opposed of a war with Czechoslovakia, the senior leadership of the Wehrmacht was not enthusiastic for the campaign, fearing that it would precipitate a war with France and Britain. Most German military leaders at the time thought that the Wehrmacht was not ready for a war with the Western powers. Hitler initial succes at Munich on September 30, 1938 gave him greater credibility, but mistrust remained between the Führer and the senior leadership through 1938. Despite their lack of enthusiasm for the war on Czechoslovakia, they were relieved by the fact that it was Czechoslovakia that had violated an agreement signed by Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom, thus assuring that France and the United Kingdom would not intervene in the conflict and that for the time being, they had only to face the Czechoslovak armies.
Hitler played a traditional role as supreme political leader, leaving the planning for the fighting up mostly to the officer corps. Germany’s military leadership was well respected for its professionalism and training. In spite of prohibitions in the Versailles treaty, Hans von Seeckt re-established a clandestine general staff in 1920. Most of the senior leaders of 1938 had fought in the First World War and were handpicked by Seeckt to serve in the rump Reichswehr after the war. The limitations imposed by the Allies under the Versailles treaty did not deter the Reichswehr from developing innovative new tactics and doctrine; applying the lessons from the recent conflict to the likely shape of future wars. These studies were far more rigorous than elsewhere in Europe. As losers in the last conflict, the Germans had fewer sacred cows to defend.
The Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht managed to institutionalise the development of superior military leaders, especially at the operational and tactical level of war. The professional focus of German officer training led to a limited comprehension and even displain for economic and political issues, which led to a far weaker appreciation of war and logistics at a strategic level. The senior ranks of the army were ambivalent towards Hitler. On the one hand, they rejoiced at his avid support of the military, his rejection of the restrictions of the Versailles treaty and his rejuvenation of German national pride. On the other hand, most were from aristocratic families with traditional conservative or authoritarian politics and, therefore, disdainful for the Nazi upstarts and their radical views. Hitler, the former corporal, attempted to usurp aspects of war planning that had previously been the preserve of the senior military. There were even some half-hearted schemes for a conservative army coup against Hitler, but these were never credible as Seeckt had installed in the officer corps the belief that obedience to the state was their honour. Younger officers were more attuned to Hitler’s schemes, all the more so as Germany scored victory after victory in the late 1930’s at little or no cost. Hitler proved to be an able politician, manipulating the senior leadership of the army by installing pliable officers in senior staff positions. He also ensured the loyalty of his field commanders by exploiting their sense of duty to Germany. The crises of August 1938 led to a considerable turmoil in the ranks of the senior army leaders.
Prior to the outbreak of war, Hitler abolished the old War Ministry and assumed the position of commander in chief. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the armed forces high command, replaced the war ministry.
[edit] Wilhelm Keitel
Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel was the head of the OKW.
Keitel was born on September 22, 1882 in Helmscherode, Brunswick, German Empire, as the son of Carl Keitel, a middle-class landowner, and his wife Apollonia Vissering. After completing his education in Göttingen, he embarked on a military career in 1901, becoming a Fahnenjunker (Cadet Officer), joining the 6th Lower-Saxon Field Artillery Regiment. He married Lisa Fontaine, a wealthy landowner's daughter, in 1909. Together they had six children, one of whom died in infancy. During World War I Keitel served on the Western front with the Field Artillery Regiment No. 46. In September 1914, during the fighting in Flanders, he was seriously wounded in his right forearm by a shell fragment.
Keitel recovered, and thereafter was posted to the German General Staff in early 1915. After World War I ended, he stayed in the newly created Reichswehr, and played a part in organizing Freikorps frontier guard units on the Polish border. Keitel also served as a divisional general staff officer, and later taught at the Hanover Cavalry School for two years.
In late 1924, Keitel was transferred to the Ministry of Defence (Reichswehrministerium), serving with the Troop Office (Truppenamt), the post-Versailles disguised General Staff. He was soon promoted to the head of the organizational department, a post he retained after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. In 1935, based on a recommendation by Werner von Fritsch he became Nazi Germany's chief of the newly-created Armed Forces Office (Wehrmachtamt).
In 1937, Keitel received a promotion to Generaloberst. in the following year, he assumed the position of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) in the wake of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair and the replacement of the Ministry of War (Reichskriegsministerium) with the OKW.
He, along with Jodl, the OKW, Hitler and Schmundt, were the main architects of the final plan for Fall Grün.
[edit] Walther von Brauchitsch
Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch was the head of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres).
Brauchitsch was born on October 4, 1881 in Berlin as the fifth son of an aristocratic cavalry general. He attended Berlin's best school, the Französisches Gymnasium. Brauchitsch was commissioned in the Prussian Guard in 1900. He was an outstanding officer. By World War I, he was appointed to the prestigious General Staff. He also married Elizabeth von Karstedt, a fabulously wealthy heiress to 300,000 acres (1,200 km²) in Pomerania.
In 1933, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power and began to expand the military. Brauchitsch was named Chief of the East Prussian Military District. His specialty was artillery. In 1937, he became commander of the Fourth Army Group.
Like many other German generals, Brauchitsch disliked or opposed much of the Nazi system, but also welcomed the Nazi policy of rearmament and was dazzled by Hitler's personality. He became largely reliant on Hitler as political patron and even for financial help. In February 1938, in the middle of the Munich Crisis, Brauchitsch left his wife Elizabeth after 28 years. He wanted to marry Charlotte Schmidt, the beautiful young daughter of a Silesian judge, and ardent admirer of the Nazis. Hitler set aside his usual anti-divorce sentiments and encouraged Brauchitsch to divorce and re-marry. Hitler even lent him 80,000 Reichsmarks, which he needed since the family wealth was all his wife's. In the same month, Brauchitsch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army, replacing General Werner von Fritsch, who had been dismissed on false charges of homosexuality.
Brauchitsch resented the growing power of the SS, believing that they were attempting to replace the Wehrmacht as the official German armed forces. He had disagreements with Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, and Adolf Hitler had to resolve the dispute between the two.
While the German General Staff had made the first plans for Fall Grün in the autumn of 1937, but because of his distrust of the OKH generals, Hitler decided to exclude them from the early stages of the planning for Czechoslovakia.
Like General Ludwig Beck, Brauchitsch opposed Hitler's annexation of Austria (the Anschluss), although he did not resist Hitler's plans for war. He took no action when Beck asked him to persuade the whole General Staff to resign if Hitler proceeded in his invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In September 1938, a group of officers began plotting against Hitler and repeatedly tried to persuade Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to lead the anticipated coup, but the only assurance he gave them was: "I myself won't do anything, but I won't stop anyone else from acting." After the collapse of the 1938 coup attempt, Brauchitsch ignored all further appeals from Beck and the other plotters to use the army to overthrow Hitler before Germany was plunged into world war.
[edit] Franz Halder
The chief of the general staff was Generaloberst Franz Halder.
Halder was born on June 30, 1884 in Würzburg to General Max Halder. In 1902 he joined the 3rd Royal Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment in Munich. He was promoted to Lieutenant in 1904 upon graduation from War School in Munich, then he attended Artillery School (1906–07) and the Bavarian Staff College (War Academy) (1911–14), both in Munich.
In 1914 during World War I, Halder became an Ordnance Officer, serving in the Headquarters of the Bavarian 3rd Army Corps. In August 1915 he was promoted to Hauptmann (Captain) on the General Staff of the Crown Prince of Bavaria's 6th Infantry Division. During 1917 he served as a General Staff officer in the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, before being transferred to the 4th Army.
Between 1919 and 1920 Halder served with the Reichswehr War Ministry Training Branch. Between 1921 and 1923 he was a Tactics Instructor with the Wehrkreis VII in Munich.
In March 1924 Halder was promoted to Major and by 1926 he served as the Director of Operations (Oberquartiermeister of Operations: O.Qu.I.) on the General Staff of the Wehrkreis VII in Munich. In February 1929 he was promoted to Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel), and from October 1929 through late 1931 he served on the Training staff in the Reichswehr Ministry.
After being promoted to Oberst (Colonel) in December 1931, Halder served as the Chief of Staff, Wehrkreis Kdo VI, in Münster (Westphalia) through early 1934. During the 1930s the German military staff thought that Poland might attack the detached German province of East Prussia. As such, they reviewed plans as to how to defend East Prussia.
After being promoted to Generalmajor (Major-General) in October 1934, Halder served as the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Munich.
Recognized as a fine staff officer and planner, in August 1936 Halder was promoted to Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General). He then became the director of the Manoeuvres Staff. Shortly thereafter, he became director of the Training Branch (Oberquartiermeister of Training, O.Qu.II), on the General Staff of the Army, in Berlin between October 1937 and February 1938. During this period he directed important training maneuvers, the largest held since the reintroduction of conscription in 1935.
On February 1, 1938 Halder was promoted to General der Artillerie. Around this date General Wilhelm Keitel was attempting to reorganize the entire upper leadership of the German Army. Keitel had asked Halder to become Chief of the General Staff (Oberquartiermeister of operations, training & supply; O.Qu.I ) and report to General Walther von Reichenau. However, Halder declined as he felt he could not work with Reichenau very well, due to a personality dispute. As Keitel recognized Halder's superior military planning skills, Keitel met with Hitler and enticed him to appoint General Walther von Brauchitsch as commander-in-chief of the German Army. Halder then accepted becoming Chief of the General Staff of the Army (Oberkommando des Heeres) on September 1, 1938, and succeeded General Ludwig Beck.
A week later, Halder presented plans to Hitler on how to invade Czechoslovakia with a pincer movement by General Gerd von Rundstedt and General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. Instead, Hitler directed that Reichenau should make the main thrust into Prague. Just before Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler, Halder — in an attempt to avoid war — discussed with several other generals the idea of removing Hitler from power. However, on September 29 Chamberlain gave in to Hitler’s demands, and Halder’s plot to remove Hitler died as peace had been preserved. However, seeing that Germany would not risk a war with the West due to the Czechs de jure had violated the Agreement, he focused on serving the German military staff.
[edit] Gerd von Rundstedt
Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt was the commander of the 2nd Army.
Born in Aschersleben, Saxony on December 12, 1875 into an aristocratic Prussian military family, von Rundstedt joined the Army in 1893, then entered Germany's elite militar academy in 1902 – an institution that accepted only 160 new students annually and weeded out 75% of the students through exams. During World War I he rose in rank until 1918 when he was a major and was chief of staff of his division.
Rundstedt lacked interest in political affairs, but his skills catapulted him into senior command positions both under the Weimar Republic and later, Hitler’s Third Reich. After the war, von Rundstedt rose steadily in the small 100,000 man army and in 1932, was appointed commander of the 3rd Infantry Division. Later that year he threatened to resign when Franz von Papen declared martial law and ordered his troops to eject members of the Nazi Party from state government offices. In 1938 he retired after it was understood that Werner von Fritsch - Commander-in-Chief of the German Army (OKH) - was framed by the Gestapo, but Hitler convinced him to stay, which he did.
[edit] Fedor von Bock
Generaloberst Fedor von Bock was the commanding officer of the 8th Army.
Fedor von Bock was born on December 3, 1880 in Küstrin, a fortress city on the banks of the Oder River in the Province of Brandenburg into a Prussian Protestant aristocratic family whose military heritage is traceable to the time of the Hohenzollerns. His father, Karl Moritz von Bock, commanded a division in the Franco-Prussian War, and was decorated for bravery at the Battle of Sedan. His great-grandfather served in the armies of Frederick the Great, and his grandfather was an officer in the Prussian Army at Jena. His mother, Olga Helene Fransziska Freifrau von Falkenhayn von Bock, was of both German and Russian aristocratic heritage. Bock was distantly related to Erich von Falkenhayn.
At the age of eight, Bock went to Berlin to study at the Potsdam and Gross Lichterfelde Military Academy. The education emphasized Prussian militarism, and he quickly became adept in academic subjects such as modern languages, mathematics, and history. He spoke fluent French, and to a fair degree English and Russian. At an early age, and largely due to his father, Bock developed an unquestioned loyalty to the state and dedication to the military profession. This upbringing would greatly influence his actions and decisions when he commanded armed forces during the Second World War. At the age of 17, Bock became an officer candidate in the Imperial Foot Guards Regiment at Potsdam; he received an officer’s commission a year later. He entered service with the rank of Sekondeleutnant.
In 1905, Bock married Mally von Reichenbach, a young Prussian noblewoman. They were married in a traditional military wedding at the Potsdam garrison. They had a daughter, born two years after the marriage. A year later, Bock attended the War Academy in Berlin, and after a year’s study he joined the ranks of the General Staff. He soon joined the patriotic Army League and become a close associate of other young German officers such as Walther von Brauchitsch, Franz Halder, and Gerd von Rundstedt. In 1908, he was promoted to the rank of Oberleutnant.
By the time the First World War began in 1914, Bock was a Hauptmann. He was assigned as a divisional staff officer in von Rupprecht’s army group on the Western Front. Major von Bock was a friend of the Crown Prince of Germany. Two days before the Armistice, he met with Kaiser Wilhelm II at Spa, Belgium, in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Kaiser to return to Berlin to crush the mutiny at Kiel. After the Treaty of Versailles was signed, limiting the German Army to 100,000 troops, Bock stayed on as an officer of the post-treaty Reichswehr, and rose through the ranks. In 1935, Adolf Hitler appointed General von Bock as commander of the Third Army Group. Bock was one of the officers not removed from his position when Hitler reorganized the armed forces during the phase of German rearmament before the outbreak of World War II. He remained a monarchist, and was a frequent visitor to the former Kaiser's estate.
Bock personally despised Nazism, and was not heavily involved in politics. However, he also did not sympathize with plots to overthrow Adolf Hitler, and never filed official protests over the treatment of civilians by the Schutzstaffel. Bock was also uncommonly outspoken, a privilege Hitler extended to him only because he was one of the most valuable German officers.
The tall, thin, narrow-shouldered Bock had a dry and cynical sense of humor; he seldom smiled. His manner was described as being arrogant, ambitious, and opinionated; he approached military bearing with an unbending demeanor. While not a brilliant theoretician, Bock was a highly determined officer. As one of the highest ranking officers in the Reichswehr, he often addressed graduating cadets at his alma mater. His theme was always that the greatest glory that could come to a German soldier was to die for the Fatherland. He quickly earned the nickname “Holy Fire of Kürstin”.
General von Bock commanded the invasion of Vienna in March 1938 for the Anschluss, and then the 8th Army during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
[edit] Walther von Reichenau
General der Artillerie Walther von Reichenau was the commanding officer of the 10th Army.
Born on August 16, 1884 into a Prussian military family, he was a son of a Prussian general and joined the German Army in 1902. During World War I he served on the Western Front. He won the Iron Cross and by 1918 was a captain. Reichenau stayed in the army under the Weimar Republic as a General Staff officer. From 1931 he was Chief of Staff to the Inspector of Signals at the Reichswehr Ministry, and later served with General Werner von Blomberg in East Prussia. His uncle, an ardent Nazi, introduced him to Adolf Hitler in 1932 and Reichenau became a convert, joining the Nazi Party soon after.
When Hitler came to power in January 1933, Blomberg became Minister of War and Reichenau was appointed head of the Ministerial Office, acting as liaison officer between the Army and the Nazi Party. He played a leading role in persuading Nazi leaders such as Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler that the power of Ernst Röhm and the SA must be broken if the Army was to support the Nazi regime. This led directly to the "Night of the Long Knives" of July 1934.
In 1935 Reichenau was promoted to Lieutenant General and was appointed commander in Munich. By 1938, when Blomberg was forced out of the Army command, Reichanau was Hitler's first choice to succeed him, but older leaders such as Gerd von Rundstedt and Franz Halder refused to serve under him, and as a result Hitler backed down in favor of the rest of the German high command. Reichenau's enthusiastic Nazism repelled many of the generals who would not oppose Hitler but who did not care for the Nazi ideology.
[edit] Wilhelm von Leeb
Generaloberst z.V. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb was the commanding officer of the 12th Army.
Born on September 5, 1876 in Landsberg am Lech, he joined the Bavarian Army in 1895 as an officer cadet. After being commissioned in the artillery, he served in China during the Boxer Rebellion. He later attended the Bavarian War Academy in Munich (1907-1909) and served on the General Staff in Berlin (1909-1911). Promoted to captain, he performed a tour of duty as a battery commander in the Bavarian 10th Field Artillery Regiment at Erlangen (1912-1913).
At the outbreak of World War I, von Leeb was on the General Staff of the Bavarian First Army Corps. During the war, he served with the Bavarian 11th Infantry Division. Upon promotion to major, he was transferred to the Eastern Front in the summer of 1916. The following year he was appointed to the staff of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. After the war, von Leeb remained in the German Army. In 1923, he was involved in putting down the Beer Hall Putsch. He then commanded Wehrkreis VII as a lieutenant general before the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party.
Hitler was not fond of von Leeb due to his anti-Nazi attitudes and religious convictions. However, due to his outstanding credentials, Hitler made him commander of the 12th Army.
[edit] Wilhelm List
General der Infanterie Wilhelm List was the commanding officer of the 14th Army.
The son of a doctor, he was born in Germany on May 14, 1880. He joined the German Army and served throughout the First World War. After the war List joined the right-wing paramilitary group Freikorps.
He remained in the army where he became a tank specialist and eventually became chief of the Army Organization Department. He made gradually progress in the new German Army and in 1930 he was promoted to major general and was appointed head of the Dresden Infantry School.
List had now developed more moderate political opinions and in 1931 he upset Adolf Hitler by disciplining young officers who were supporters of the Nazi Party. In 1935 List was appointed by General Fedor von Bock as commander of the 4th Army Corps. Although List was still privately critical of Hitler he was unwilling to take any actions that would damage his army career. As a result he did not protest against the treatment of Werner von Blomberg and Werner von Fitsch in 1938.
After the Anschluss List was sent to Wien as head of the Army Group in Austria. The following year he took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
[edit] Czechoslovakia
[edit] Edvard Beneš
Edvard Beneš was at the time of the Munich Crisis the President of Czechoslovakia.
He was born into a peasant family in a small village of Kožlany near Rakovník, ca. 60 km west of Prague. He spent much of his youth in Vinohrady district of Prague, where he attended a grammar school from 1896 to 1904. After studies at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Charles University in Prague, he left for Paris and continued his studies at the Sorbonne and at the Independent School of Political and Social Studies (École Libre des Sciences Politiques). He completed his first degree in Dijon, where he received his Doctorate of Laws in 1908. Then he taught for three years at the Prague Academy of Commerce, and after his habilitation in the field of philosophy in 1912, he became a lecturer in sociology at Charles University. He was involved in Scouting.
During World War I he was one of the leading organizers of an independent Czechoslovakia abroad. He organized a Czech pro-independence anti-Austrian secret resistance movement called "Maffia". In September, 1915, he went into exile where in Paris he made intricate diplomatic efforts to gain recognition from France and the United Kingdom for the Czechoslovak independence movement, as he was from 1916–1918 a Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs within the Provisional Czechoslovak government.
On October 28 1918, Czechoslovakia officially proclaimed their independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On November 3, Austria-Hungary capitulated to the Entente, marking the end of the Habsburg monarchy.
From 1918–1935, he was first and the longest serving Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and from 1920–1925 and 1929–1935 a member of the Parliament. He represented Czechoslovakia in talks of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1921 he was a professor and also from 1921–1922 Prime Minister. Between 1923–1927 he was a member of the League of Nations Council (serving as president of its committee from 1927–1928). He was a renowned and influential figure at international conferences, such as Genoa 1922, Locarno 1925, The Hague 1930, and Lausanne in 1932.
He was a member of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (until 1925 called Czechoslovak Socialist Party) and a strong Czechoslovakist, as he did not consider Slovaks and Czechs to be separate ethnicities.
In 1935 he succeeded Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk to become President. On December 14, 1935, he was elected as President, and he was sworn in to the office on December 18.
On September 2, 1938, with rising tensions between the Czech-dominated government and the German-speaking minority in Sudetenland, Beneš submitted the Fourth Plan, granting nearly all the demands of the Carlsbad Decrees. However, this wasn't enough for the Sudeten Germans, and with intent on obstructing conciliation, the SdP held demonstrations on September 7, that provoked police action in Ostrava. Two days later, Heinlein issued a proclamation demanding the takeover of the Sudetenland by Germany.
On September 18, the Czech government refused to accept the proposal to give up the Sudetenland, arguing that Hitler's proposal would ruin the nation's economy and lead ultimately to German control of all of Czechoslovakia. The next day, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain replied to Beneš saying that the British-French proposal is the only way to avoid war, and that the Czech reply places full responsibility for war on the Czechs, and that Britain would not fight for Czechoslovakia. The Czech government decided to capitulate.
However, the Czechoslovak capitulation precipitates an outburst of national indignation. In demonstrations and rallies, Czechs and Slovaks calls for a strong military government to defend the integrity of the state. On September 23, Prime Minister Milan Hodža and his cabinet resigned. A new cabinet, under General Jan Syrový, is installed. A decree of general mobilization is issued
To achieve a solution, Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini suggested a conference of the major powers in Munich and on September 29, Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain met and agreed to Mussolini's proposal (actually prepared by Hermann Göring) and signed the Munich Agreement accepting the immediate occupation of the Sudetenland. At about 1:30 AM on September 30, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement.
In further demonstrations and rallies, Czechs and Slovaks called for president Beneš not to abide by the agreement. After further pressure from both the cabinet under General Syrový and the Czechoslovak population, Beneš declared that they will not abide by the agreement.
[edit] Jan Syrový
General of the Army Jan Syrový was the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence.
Born on January 24, 1888, in the town of Třebíč, he later studied building at the engineer school in Brno. Following his graduation in 1906, he became a one year volunteer in the Austro-Hungarian army. After that, he studied at a technical college in Russia. In 1914, he switched sides to the Russian Army and was one of the first officers to join the Czechoslovak Legion, where he played a big role in planning the military operations.
He participated in the Battle of Zborov between July 1-2 1917, where he lost his right eye. Later, he was in command of the Legion and the anti-bolshevik forces on the Trans-Siberian railway. He returned to Czechoslovakia on July 20, 1920. His war experience earned him recognition, and After the war, he was Chief of Staff of the Czechoslovak Army (1927-1933) and then its General Inspector (1933-1938).
After he started in his new job, which was more of a representational character, he decided to expand his field of responsibility, which caused a unfortunate and long feud between him and the new chief of staff, who refused to give up any part of his power. The whole case had to be solved by president Beneš with a comprimise. Syrovy became with the years first of all a person with a authority with morale and also a symbol for the Czechoslovak army. Thanks to his resemblance of Jan Žižka (c. 1370-1424), who was a Czech general and Hussite leader, the follower of Jan Hus and a hero for the Czech people, he was very popular in the public, and this popularity brought him to the government.
When Milan Hodža's government resigned on September 23, 1938, Syrový was appointed prime minister and minister of national defence despite his contradiction. Syrový insisted he was a soldier, not a politician, and that he had no qualification to execute this position. President Beneš told him, that the nation needed him and, if he was a soldier, to take it as an order. In the end, Syrový consented. Shortly thereafter, he ordered a full mobilization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.
On September 30, he was the leading political and military figure who persuaded President Beneš to refuse to abide with the agreement.
[edit] Ludvík Krejčí
General of the Army Ludvík Krejčí was Chief of the Czechoslovak Army.
He was born on August 17, 1890, in Tuřanech u Brna, a town near Brno. He was the youngest of eight children of a farmer from an old farmer family. He studied in the High School in Vyškov, and from 1907 in the professional school for forest economy in Písek. After graduation, he joined the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1910. After one-year military service in Brünn he was appointed to an official in the low service of the forest office in Slavonia. Already in July 1914, he was transferred to the 4. Bosnien-Herzegowina-Regiment, where he climbed up the ranks from company commander up to the battalion commander. He fought in Serbia and Montenegro, Albania and later on the Italian and the Romanian fronts. In May, 1917, he was captured by the Russians and already three months later he entered in Borispol the Czechoslovak Legion. As a First Lieutenant of the reserve and with the honouring "Signum laudis" he was one of the highest ranked officer who joined the legion.
In October 1917, he became in Pirjatino first the second-in-command of the 1st battalion of 6. Hanna-Schützenregiments, later the commander of the whole regiment. This regiment was counted as the best in the Czechoslovak Legion and was also present in most fights. His fame began with the victory in the fight in Bachmatsch in the Ukraine in March 1918, where he was the commander. During the next two years Krejčí proved himself in the defence of the Sibirian Magistrale. With this railway line the legionaires should be transported to Vladivostok and from there then to the French battlefield. During the transport to Vladivostok, known as "Sibirian Anabase“, Ludvík Krejčí became commander of one of the units of the 6. Regiment. Later he was promoted (already then colonel) to the commander of the 2nd Division of our legions in Russia (from Milan Rastislav Stefánik). He commanded the so-called Kungur front in the Urals, after the retreat to the Magistrale the segment Omsk-Novonikolajevsk-Atschinsk. Under his guidance his division came without appreciable losses to Vladivostok. Krejčí even led the transport of the legionaries on the ship "President Grant". He returned to the young Czechoslovak Republic on June 18, 1920. After his return he concluded the War Academy in Paris, then at home he became the commander of the infantry division in Hradec Králové in the rank of the Brigadier General.
Between 1932-33 he was the commander of the Košice Military Command. President Masaryk promoted the capable, honest and experienced officer on November 30, 1933 to the Chief of General Staff of the Czechoslovak armed forces and in March 1934, to the General of the Army. Krejčí was aware of the German threat, which continued to build up its army, navy and airforce, and worked with determination on the strengthening of the defensive possibilities of the Czechoslovak Republic. Under him the army was motorised and a system was built by border defence arrangements (fortresses). Even Adolf Hitler confirmed the effectiveness of this system. During the mobilisation in September 1938, Krejčí was promoted by President Beneš to the Chief of the Army. General Krejčí was one of the many Czechoslovak generals which deeply disapproved the agreement.
[edit] Bohuslav Fiala
Brigadier General Bohuslav Fiala was the Chief of Staff.
He was born on January 29, 1890, in Frenštát pod Radhoštěm. As he wanted in young age to be an officer, he attended the High School in Holešov in the period 1900-1907, and graduated in the Military Academy in Vídeňské Nové Město (Wiener Neustadt) In 1910, he joined the Austro-Hungarian Army, and served in the 35. Infanterie Regiment in Přemyšl. In this unit, he fo