Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Fall Grün)
From Alternative History
| Invasion of Czechoslovakia | |||||||||||||||||
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| Date: | October 1, 1938 - March 15, 1939 | ||||||||||||||||
| Location: | Czechoslovakia | ||||||||||||||||
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Casus belli: | Czechoslovak goverment's refusal to abide by the Munich Agreement | ||||||||||||||||
| Result: | Decisive Axis victory
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 Invasion of Czechoslovakia 
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| Battles: The Border - Ostrava - Karlovy Vary - Otročín - Bezděkov - Želetava - Šumperk - Siege of Plzeň - Ivančice - Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky - Brno - Hungarian offensive - Bratislava - Michalovce - Košice - Frühlingserwachen - Olomouc - Siege of Prague Contemporaneous military operations: Zaolzie - Miskolc bombing - Batarci incident |
The Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939 precipitated the Second World War. It was carried out by Nazi Germany and their ally Hungary, while Poland also carried out their own independent military operations against Czechoslovakia.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia began October 1, 1938, one day after the signing of the Munich Agreement, and ended March 15, 1939, with Germany and Hungary occupying the entirety of Czechoslovakia. Seeing that Czechoslovakia had refused to comply with the demands of the Munich Agreement, the United Kingdom and France did not feel themselves obliged to declare war on Germany and Hungary, and is seen today as one of the main examples of the definition "Western betrayal".
Following the refusal by the Czechoslovak government on September 30 and a German-staged "Czechoslovak attack" in the early hours of October 1, 1938, German forces invaded Czechoslovakia the same day. Initially, the Czechoslovak maintained their tactical and strategic advantage, preventing the Germans to break through the main defensive fortification lines along the border, and as a result the Czechoslovak reserves could be mobilized in time for the main breakthrough of the German forces. The only units to successfully make any significant gains in the first two weeks of the war was the Tenth Army operating in eastern Bohemia.
Despite several Czech tactical victories, the Czech forces defending the border fortifications were exausted by a week of continuous fighting, and were soon forced to retreat, as the Germans was breaking through the defensive lines. On October 14, 1938, the Fourteenth Army through the Czechoslovak border defences in southern Bohemia. On October 15, the Second Army in Silesia broke through the defences in northern Moravia while the Eighth Army broke through the defences in northern Bohemia, and on October 16 the Twelfth Army broke through the defences in southern Bohemia. On October 18 the Tenth Army broke through the defensive line north of Plzeň, and on October 23 the two spearheads of the Tenth Army rendezvoused at Nezvěstice, 15 km southeast of Plzeň, thus encircling the city. However, after several failed assaults on the city, the operations against Plzeň was temporarily suspended. Pressure on the city through artillery bombardements and air raids were upheld however throughout the autumn of 1938 and winter of 1938-1939.
The Soviet Union had already on the opening day of the war, and on October 5, five days after hostilities broke out, the Soviet Union fulfilled their promise to Czechoslovakia by loading a corps on trains heading for Czechoslovakia through Romania. On October 13 the Corps had been unloaded in Užhorod, and began then to march towards the frontline in Moravia.
Following the German breakthrough in southern Moravia, the Germans could take advantage of their armed forces' motorisation and mobility, and by October 20 the Fourteenth Army had advanced at some places more 40 km inland, and the forward elements of the had reached the town of Pohořelice, 25 km southwest of Brno. While the 2. Panzer-Division secured the frontline around Brno, elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had captured the village of Ivančice to the west and the villages of Sokolnice, Šaratice and Otnice to the south.
On October 20, the largest tank battle of the campaign, also known as the Battle of Ivančice, began with German attacks by the 3. Panzer-Division on the Czech defences along the line Čučice - Oslavany - Padochov - Neslovice. On October 22, after two days of heavy fighting, the Czechs initated their counterattack, and they had captured Ivančice by the end of the day. In the following days, the Czech tanks faced numberous German tank attacks, and by October 28 the German divisions were in retreat and the Czechs had reached the villages of Moravský Krumlov – Budkovice - Rokytná - Polánka - Moravské Bránice - Jamolice - Dobřínsko - Dolní Kounice, capturing over 1,500 Germans in the process. However, the situation in Brno forced the Czechs to retreat back to their lines before the counterattack began on October 20, with a smaller force defending Ivančice.
On October 20 German forces began the assault on Brno, and after 11 days of heavy fighting against Czech and Soviet troops, an act of surrender was signed in the suburb of Štýřice by the commander of the Czech forces defending the city. Brig. Gen. Kudrna accepted all conditions proposed by the Germans, as he was eager to avoid further civilian casualties.
On October 20, suffering from low ammunition stockpiles and other supplies, the Hungarians began their invasion of Czechoslovakia, meeting mostly reservists with more obsolete weapons, but the defenders maintained their tactical and organisational superiority over the Hungarians, sometimes with the help of the Slovak nationalistic organisation the Hlinka Guard. However, the Hungarians managed to advance further inland, capturing the Slovak capital of Bratislava by November 10.
Due to the heavy resistance in both Bohemia and Moravia, the Wehrmacht attempted, on November 20, 1938, a direct offensive against Plzeň and Prague. However, this attack had only limited tank support and was forced to assault extensive Czech defenses. After meeting determined resistance from the 1. rychlá divize “Kazimír” and 18. divize ”Erben”, the German offensive was driven back four days later, with the Germans losing 1,000 men and several dozen tanks.
By early December, the temperatures, so far relatively mild by European standards, dropped as low as twenty degrees Celsius below zero, freezing German troops, who still had no winter clothing, and German vehicles, which were not designed for such severe weather. More than 10,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers. Frozen grease had to be removed from every loaded shell and vehicles had to be heated for hours before use.
In the ensuing months, the fronts were relatively quiet, appart from the numbers of artillery duels and raids on each others positions, as well as air-to-air combat. The winter gave both the Axis and the Czechs a chance to regroup and reorganise their troops. While the Germans only made limited gains in the winter months between November and February, the Hungarians were more lucky with their offensive.
In order to break this stalemate, Unternehmen Frühlingserwachen (Operation Spring Awakening) was initiated on March 1, 1939. At dawn, German artillery opened fire on the Czech positions, and after three hours of continuous artillery barrage, German air force dropped thousands of leaflets over the cities of Prague, Plzeň and Olomouc, saying that the Czechoslovak government, the communists, the Soviet Union and others had sent the Czech people into the War, and urged them to capitulate to the Germans. In the meantime, the German Minister in Prague urged the Prime Minister Syrový to capitulate, but he answered that they would do nothing until the matter had been discussed with the cabinet.
After months of fighting a two-front war and having depleted their ammunition stockpiles, the Czech defences collapsed, and the Czech goverment and High Command ordered all units in Moravia and Slovakia to retreat into Poland. Meanwhile, the Germans advanced quickly through the Czech countryside, and by March 7 the defenders at Plzeň had capitulated. On March 8 Olomouc capitulated while most of the remaining Czech and Soviet forces were heading for Poland. By March 11 the Germans were closing on the Czech capital of Prague.
Seeing that the Czechs had no chance to continue the battle without risking the lives of hundreds of thousands civilians in Prague, started negotiations for capitulation with the Germans in the morning of March 13. On March 14 a ceasefire agreement was signed and all fighting halted, and on March 15 a full capitulation of all Czechoslovak Armed Forces was signed in Prague.
On March 15, Germany and Hungary had completely overran Czechoslovakia, although the Czech government never surrendered. In addition, Czechoslovakia's remaining land and air forces were evacuated to neighboring Romania and Poland. Many of the exiles subsequently joined the Polish Army and later the Allied Forces in France and the United Kingdom.
In the aftermath of the Czechoslovak Campaign, a resistance movement was formed, and which was most famously credited for the assassination of SS-Obergruppenführer and Stellvertretender Reichsprotektor (Deputy Protector) of Bohemia and Moravia Reinhard Heydrich on May 27, 1942. Czechoslovakia's fighting forces continued to contribute to Allied military operations throughout the Second World War. Over the course of the war, Czechoslovakia lost over 10% of its pre-war population under an occupation that marked the end of the First Czechoslovak Republic.
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[edit] Etymology
Various names have been applied to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939.
In Czechoslovakia the invasion is also known as the Defensive War of 1938-1939 (Obranná Válka roku 1938-1939). In Germany it is sometimes referred to as the Czechoslovak Campaign (Feldzug in die Tschechoslowakei) or the Czechoslovak-German War of 1938-1939. For the German General Staff, it was codenamed Unternehmen Fall Grün, or Case White. In Hungary it is sometimes referred to as the Campaign in Czechoslovakia (Csehszlováki hadjáratnak) or the Czechoslovak-Hungarian War of 1938-1939 (1938-1939-es csehszlovák–magyar háború). For the German General Staff, it was codenamed Csaba hadművelet, or Operation Csaba.
[edit] Prelude to the campaign
The areas later known as Sudetenland never formed a single historical region, which makes it difficult to distinguish the history of the Sudetenland apart from that of Bohemia, until the advent of nationalism and the coining of the term in the 19th century. It was one of the places that was invaded by Germany.
The regions later called Sudetenland were situated on the borders of the Kingdom of Bohemia, which also consisted of Moravia and other lands (Silesia, Lusatia, etc.). After the extinction of the Přemyslid dynasty, the kingdom was ruled by the Luxemburgs, later the Jagiellonians and finally the Habsburgs. Already from the 13th century onwards the border regions of Czech lands, called Sudetenland in the 20th century, were settled by ethnic Germans, who were invited by the Bohemian kings.
The Habsburgs gradually integrated the Kingdom of Bohemia into their monarchy since the 17th century, and it remained a part of that realm until its dismemberment after World War I. Conflicts between Czech and German nationalists emerged in the 19th century, for instance in the Revolutions of 1848 in the Habsburg areas: while the German-speaking population wanted to participate in the building of a German nation state, the Czech-speaking population insisted on keeping Bohemia out of such plans.
Historically, the parts later known as Sudetenland belonged to the regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Since they did not form a single historical region, except as united under the Bohemian crown, it is difficult to distinguish the history of the Sudetenland apart from that of Bohemia and Moravia, until the advent of nationalism and the coining of the term in the 19th century.
The regions later called Sudetenland were situated on the borders of the Kingdom of Bohemia, which also consisted of Moravia (and later Silesia) and was in turn part of the Holy Roman Empire. After the extinction of the Czech Přemyslid dynasty, the kingdom was ruled by the Luxemburgs, later the Jagiellonians and finally the Habsburgs. Already from the 13th century onwards the border regions of Bohemia and Moravia, called Sudetenland in the 20th century, were settled by Germans, who were invited by the originally Slavic Bohemian nobility.
The Habsburgs integrated the Kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia into their monarchy, and it remained an integral part of that kingdom until the advent of modern nationalism in the 19th century. Conflicts between Czech and German nationalists emerged, for instance in the Revolutions of 1848 in the Habsburg areas: while the German-speaking population wanted to participate in the building of a German nation state, the Czech-speaking population insisted on keeping Bohemia out of such plans.
In the wake of growing nationalism, the name "Sudetendeutsche" (Sudeten Germans) emerged by the early 20th century. It originally constituted part of a larger classification of three groupings of Germans within the Austrian Empire, which also included "Alpendeutsche" (Alpine Germans) in what later became the Republic of Austria and "Balkandeutsche" (Balkan Germans) in Hungary and the regions east of it. Of these three terms, only the term "Sudetendeutsche" survived, because of the ethnic and cultural conflicts within Bohemia.
The end of World War I in 1918 meant the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian multinational state. The Czechs, numbering about 6.7 million people, demanded a state of their own, based on the traditional boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia, which would mean that the new Czech state would have defensible mountain boundaries, as well as including the highly industrialized settlement areas of the Sudeten Germans.
After the Czechoslovak Republic (ČSR) was proclaimed on 28 October 1918, Sudeten Germans, claiming the right to self-determination, demanded that their homeland areas remain with the Austrian State, which had been reduced to the Republic of German Austria. This had been forbidden by the victorious allied powers of the First World War (the Treaty of Saint-Germain) and by the Czechoslovak government, partly with force of arms in 1919. Many Sudeten Germans rejected affiliation with Czechoslovakia because they had been refused the right to self-determination promised by US president Wilson in his Fourteen Points of January 1918. The Sudetenland became part of Czechoslovakia due to the fact it had always formed part of the Kingdom of Bohemia, which was the main portion of Czechoslovakia in the same sense England is the primary home-nation of the UK, and many German-speakers felt themselves to be German-speaking Czechoslovaks rather than Germans or Austrians living in Czechoslovakia.
Sudeten German industry, highly dependent on foreign trade and having close financial links with Germany, suffered badly during the Depression, particularly when banks in Germany failed in 1931. Czechs, whose industry was concentrated on the production of essential domestic items, suffered less. By the mid-1930s, unemployment in the Sudetenland was at about five times the level as that in the Czech lands. Tensions between the two groups resulted. Relations between Czechs and Germans were further envenomed when Sudeten Germans were forced to turn to the Czechoslovak government and the small loans bank (Živnostenská banka) for assistance and these authorities often made the hiring of Czechs in proportion to their numbers in the population a condition for aid. Czech workmen, dispatched by the government to engage in public works projects and border fortification in Sudeten German territories, were also resented.
Though, major resentment to the government in Prague first arose following the resignation of Czechoslovakia's first president and its principal founding father, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, on December 14, 1935. He was succeeded by Edvard Beneš, a strong Czechoslovakist.
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was elected as chancellor of Germany, and shortly after the election, he and his NSDAP consolidated power, assuming full control in 1934. Hitler reinstated the draft in 1935, and begun remobilizing the German armed forces. In March 1936, the Germans marched into the Rhineland, marking the first step of Hitler's expansionist policy.
On March 12, 1938, Nazi Germany annexed Austria with the Anschluss. Immediately after the Anschluss, Hitler made himself the advocate of ethnic Germans living in Czechoslovakia, and many Sudeten Germans threw their support behind Henlein, who supported Hitler's pan-German objectives. They began demanding that the Czech Government ceded the Sudetenland to Germany.
As the previous appeasement of Hitler had shown, the governments of both France and the United Kingdom were set on avoiding war. The French government especially did not wish to face Germany alone, so took its lead from the British government and it’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Chamberlain believed that Sudeten German grievances were just and that Hitler's intentions were limited. Both Britain and France, therefore, advised Czechoslovakia to concede to the SdP's demands.
[edit] May Crisis
On Thursday, May 19, 1938, Sir Nevile Henderson, the Ambassador of the British Empire to Germany, received and passed on to London a report from the British consulate in Dresden that there was "strong reason to believe that German troops are concentrating in southern Silesia and northern Austria" and that military leaves were about to be suspended. Later that day Henderson transmitted a comparable report from Bavaria, adding that "my French colleague has also heard rumors of concentration of troops on the Czech frontier." In Prague the following day, Kamil Krofta, the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, telephoned Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Minister in Prague, to express alarm over reports that German troops were concentrating in Saxony. This was the beginning of the so-called May Crisis.
If these reports were credible, Prague had ample cause to fear that German border demonstrations, or even an invasion, might be in the offing. The first of a series of Czech minicipal elections was to be held on Sunday, May 22, and the Sudetenland was increasingly turbulent. The SdP has broken off negotiations with the Czech Government when Henlein had gone off to Berlin and London, and Henlein himself, shortly after his return, went to Berchtesgaden to meet with Hitler. The Anschluss had shown that Hitler could act impulsively, and he had repeatedly declared that he would not tolerate oppression of the Sudeten Germans. The danger that some incident might trigger an invasion seemed very real, and on the evening of May 20 at Cheb two Sudeten German motorcyclist who failed to heed a Czech policeman's challenge were shot dead. The night the Prague government, responding to the Czech General Staff's demand that five classes of reservists be called for active service, more cautiously called up one class and a number of specialist troops, to reinforce the garrisons in the Sudetenland.
The Wilhelmstrasse, after consulting the OKW, vehemently denied that any hostile concentrations, or even unusual troop movements, had taken place. Nevertheless, when Eisenlohr and his military attaché, Colonel Rudolf Toussaint, went to see the Czech Chief of Staff, General Ludvík Krejčí, they were informed that Prague had "irrefutable proof that in Saxony a concentration of from eight to ten divisions had taken place".
While the British and the French attachés were inable to observe anything out of the way. While the French military attaché concluded that "their Czech friends had, because of the press campaign, deceived themselves to the extent of describing a military situation which existed only intheir imagination", Ribbentrop and State Secretary Ernst von Weizsaecker put the matter much more strongly and flatly accused Prague of fabricating the rumors of German military moves in order to provide an excuse for their own mobilisation.
However, the reports of German troop movements did not all come from Czech sources, and thus it is clear that the troop movements and concentrations had taken place, and this became known to the excellent Czech intelligence service and that under the prevailing tense circumstances, were quite sufficient to justify a state of alert in Prague.
The reasons for the movements that so alarmed Prague were that the Wehrmacht was growing, forming new units, and testing new equipment, and, with the coming of spring, maneuvres and war games were the order of the day. In response to Weizsaecker's inquiry, Keitel, while denying any abnormal movements, disclosed that there was indeed an unusual number of troops at the Königsbrück training ground, about twenty miles north of Dresden, the capital of Saxony, where General Krejčí had claimed to have "irrefutable proof" of a concentration. Furthermore, during the week May 15 to 23, a combined Army and Luftwaffe war game was under way in adjacent Thuringia, where the tactics of ground-air collaboration were being explored with particular reference to the Green and Red (plan for the conquest of France) contingencies.
It must have been events such as these, probably exaggerated or distorted in the description, which were the basis of the reports that came to Prague and to the British and French embassies in Berlin. In Prague the reports interpreted in the light of the Czech General Staff's assessment of the probable German plan of campaign - a shrewd one which, as events later proved, was close to the mark. Badly outnumbered but with strong defences if manned and ready, the Czechs most feared being overwhelmed by a sudden attack before they could mobilise. They reasoned that the Germans would try to achieve surprise "under guise of moves for training purposes" which would bring strong concentrations of troops to the border without the publicity necessarily involved in formal mobilisation. What Prague heard from Saxony, and perhaps fitted elsewhere, fitted the formula too closely for comfort, andthe Czech generals decided that an alert and a partial mobilisation were the least that prudence dictated.
But in fact the German preparations were not nearly so far advanced as the Czechs feared. The revised Green directive, which had not yet even been signed, opened with a renunciation of imminent action. At OKH and in the field only a bare start had been made toward developing the plans and making the preparations for such an operation. In immediate military terms, the May crisis was of no importance, but its diplomatic and psychological repercussions were enormous, for Hitler appeared to have had this bluff called, and that was something which he could could not abide.
Casting about as he was for any stick with which to beat the Czechs, Ribbentrop had summoned Mastny, denounced his governments' circulation of false reports of German troop movements, and threatened that such tactics "could have only one result with the German Government, namely, that these troop concentrations... would take place with lightning speed." The next day (May 21), Henderson found the German Foreign Minister "in a highly excitable and pugnacious mood," complaining that the ambassador had, without previous agreement, released to Reuters the German denials. Ribbentrop threatened as punishment to cut off the British from any further access to military informations, and raged over the incident at Cheb, which had just been reported to him. The Czechs were "mad," he shouted, and "if they persisted in their present attitude they would be destroyed." British efforts to bring them to their senses "had led to no result whatever."
Reports of these interviews, coupled with the continuing rumors of German military moves, caused great concern in London and Paris. In the evening of May 21, Henderson was again in Ribbentrop's office, this time armed with a telegram from Lord Halifax noting with disapproval the German threats of intervention, reminding the German Government of "their responsibilities," and declaring that "His Majesty's Government could not guarantee that they would not be forced by circumstances to become involved" if German aggression should trigger French intervention in pursuance of her treaty obligations. The next day Henderson was back at the Wilhelmstrasse with a personal message from Halifax to Ribbentrop, warning that if Germany resorted to force "it is quite impossible for me to foretell results that may follow, and I would beg him not to count upon this country being able to stand aside..." Meanwhile François-Poncet had made similar representations to Weizsaecker, and in Paris, Prime Minister Daladier invited the German Ambassador to his home in order "to speak frankly as a French ex-serviceman to his German comrade" and to warn him that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia "the French would have to fight if they did not wish to be dishonoured." The result, he declared, could be the "utter destruction of European civilization" and the triumph of "Cossack and Mongol hordes."
A consequence of these reports of troop movements and diplomatic demárches was that Hitler and his government suffered considerable loss of face. Although im fact there had been no intention to take any kind of hostile military action, the contrary was widely believed and reported in the word press, and when nothing happened, it was made to appear that Hitler had backed down when confronted with the Czech call-up of reserves and the British and French warnings. Henderson reported to Halifax on May 28 that there was deep resentment on the part of the German Government because of "ready acceptance all over the world of the theory that Germany concentrated troops with intention of attacking Czechoslovakia and was only restrained by energetic rebuff to Herr Hitler." Furthermore, the episode had given the Czechs welcome (though misleading) encouragement, for the call-up had gone smoothly, had had a calming effect in the Sudetenland, the elections had taken place with no major incidents, and the British and French had given strong diplomatic support.
On May 28 he called a meeting in the winter garden of the Reich Chancellery. Among the attending persons were Keitel, Brauchitsch, Beck and the Führer's civilian aide, Fritz Wiedemann. Hitler declared: "It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off the map." A covering letter signed by Keitel directed that execution of the plan "must be assured as final October 1, 1938, at the latest".
Two days later, on May 30, Hitler finally signed the revised directive for Fall Grün.
Six weeks earlier, when Schuschnigg announced his plabiscite, Hitler would crush Austria by merely clenching his fist. When Prague ordered the call-up, however, he had no such easy road to conquest. A sword would be wanted; the German sword needed to be tempered and sharpened, and that would take time. But from the end of May, Adolf Hitler was determined that it would take as little time as possible.
[edit] The crisis escalates
During the summer of 1938, tensions between the Sudeten Germans and Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia continued to grow, as the Sudeten Germans claimed they were being opressed by the government in Prague. As war loomed over Europe once again, the French and the British wished to prevent the crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia from escalating into full war.
Neither the British or the French wished to risk a full military conflict with Germany over Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1938, and both were supporting a peaceful resolution of the crisis, even if this was at the expense of the democratic Czechoslovakia. Both Lord Halifax and Chamberlain of the UK and Daladier and Bonnet of France urged Czechoslovakia to give in to the Henlein's demands. Especially the French were reluctant to support their ally Czechoslovakia. This went as far as the French Foreign Minister played dirty and misled his own cabinet colleagues. The Soviet Union had pledged to give military assistance to Czechoslovakia only if France also did the same. Now France did not want to involve herself in a war, so, after meeting the Foreign Ministers of Soviet Union and Romania, the French Foreign Minister, Georges-Étienne Bonnet, like most French and British politicians an avid supporter of the appeasement policy, told the Cabinet that the Soviet Union was not willing to provide more than 200 planes and would send only one division of army as help to Czechoslovakia. He also said Romania’s Foreign Minister had declined to allow passage of Soviet troops and planes through her country. Both were lies. In fact, around 500 Soviet military aircraft were already present in Czechoslovakia and Romania had clearly said that the she would fulfil her obligation and, in case of a German invasion, allow passage to Soviet troop and planes. By these deliberate lies French Foreign Minister Bonnet created a situation in which France decided not to honour their commitment to Czechoslovakia.
As the crisis escalated, the British government demanded that Beneš requested a mediator. Not wishing to sever his government's ties with Western Europe, Beneš reluctantly accepted. The British appointed Lord Runciman and instructed him to persuade Beneš to agree to a plan acceptable to the Sudeten Germans. On September 2, Beneš submitted the Fourth Plan, granting nearly all the demands of the Carlsbad Decrees. Intent on obstructing conciliation, however, the SdP held demonstrations that provoked police action in Ostrava on September 7. The Sudeten Germans broke off negotiations on September 13, after which violence and disruption ensued. As Czechoslovak troops attempted to restore order, Henlein flew to Germany and on September 15 issued a proclamation demanding the takeover of the Sudetenland by Germany.
On the same day, Hitler met with Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden and demanded the swift takeover of the Sudetenland by the Third Reich under threat of war. The Czechs, Hitler claimed, were slaughtering the Sudeten Germans. Chamberlain referred the demand to the British and French governments; both accepted. The Czechoslovak government resisted, arguing that Hitler's proposal would ruin the nation's economy and lead ultimately to German control of all of Czechoslovakia. The United Kingdom and France issued an ultimatum, making a French commitment to Czechoslovakia contingent upon acceptance. It was made clear to Beneš that unless the Anglo-French terms were promptly accepted, Czechoslovakia would be on her own, confronting, in the words of Halifax's message to Newton, "a situation for which we would take no responsibility." Pursuant to Newton's instructions to "act immediately at whatever hour," he and Lacroix waited on President Beneš at about two o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, September 21. The British démarche was available in writing; Lacroix delivered his tidings orally, and Beneš insisted on written confirmation that France would not honour her obligations towards Czechoslovakia. Beneš promised an answer by midday.
At six o'clock that morning, Beneš met with the cabinet ministers under Prime Minister Milan Hodža, the head of the political parties represented in the government, and Generals Syrový and Krejčí. The nocturnal visits of Newton and Lacroix had aroused great indignation, and the initial reaction was to reject the Anglo-French proposals, move the civil government offices from Prague to Moravia and Slovakia, and fight it out. But further discussion (in which Beneš did not take an active part) raised doubts. Some, incredulous of the positions taken in London and Paris, wished to send special delegations to the two capitals. Then the two generals were asked to answer the question: "Shall we or shall we not go to war without allies?" The answer was:
- ... considering Germany's preparations, the annexation of Austria, the hostility of Hungary and Poland, and the attitude now revealed on the part of Britain and France, our only capacity, from a military point of view, was a brief and difficult defence. How things would actually develop could not be predicted, but they could not recommend a single-handed war against Gertmany. What the Soviets would do by way of practical military action was not clear. As far as they knew, Moscow had given no precise information of this kind.
According to the Czech chief of military intelligence, General František Moravec, Krejčí was asked how long his forces, without French and British support, could hold out, and he replied: "About three weeks". According to Minister of the Interior, Josef Černý: President Beneš, at the request of the Government and the political representatives, again called the Russian Minister (Alexandrovsky) to ascertain the final standpoint of the Soviet Government; after a prolonged, very emotional discussion with the Minister he informed the meeting that "the Soviets are willing to help Czechoslovakia in case of an attack by Nazi Germany, but only if France, Czechoslovakia's ally, also comes to her rescue." In the face of this news and the adamant attitude of both the French and the British ministers, the Government and all chairmen of political parties, on the recommendation of President Beneš, unanimously accepted the Franco-British proposals.
After the Cabinet had adjourned, and just after Prague's formal acceptance of the Anglo-French termas had been received, Halifax instructed Newton to urge Beneš to withdraw the state police, and asked for his views on the future use of British, "international", and German troops. On its face this was only an inquiry, but the trend of Halifax's thinking was reflected in his accompanying suggestions:
- "I think regular German troops would at least be preferable to Heinleins Freikorps, who would be likely to work off private grudges and to commit outrages on poilitical opponents.
- We may, therefore, have to try to facilitate the entry of German troops at an early date into a defined area and to eliminate all danger of clash with the Czechs. It would, of course, be best if Dr. Beneš himself would suggest that, in districts they will obviously pass to Germany, he no longer desires to retain responsibility for maintenance of order, and that German troops should be employed."
Best perhaps for the convenience of the powers, but not for those inhabitants of the Sudetenland, German or Czech, who did not relish passing under Nazi rule. Their fate seems not to have been in the forefront of the mind of Lord Halifax.
While Halifax was composing the message, Beneš was sending, via Lacroix, an agonised appeal that whatever agreement was reached at Godesberg should ensure that no German troops be allowed across the old frontier until the new one was officially established.
The news of the Czechoslovak capitulation precipitated an outburst of national indignation. In Prague large crowds were marching toward the Hradčany, protesting the capitulation and some calling for a military dictatorship to defend the integrity of the state. General Jan Syrový, the one-eyed hero of the First World War, told them that a dictatorship would do no good: "You do not know the causes which forced the Government to make its decisions. We cannot lead the nation to suicide." But the next morning the Hodža government resigned and was replaced later that day by a new cabinet headed by Jan Syrový. Syrový was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence despite his contradiction. Syrový insisted he was a soldier, not a politician, and that he had no qualification to execute this position. President Beneš told him, that the nation needed him and, if he was a soldier, to take it as an order. In the end, Syrový consented. On September 23 a decree of general mobilization was issued.
At half-past eleven in the morning of September 21, Hitler's Army adjutant, Captain Engel, telephoned to OKW that "the Führer five minutes ago received news that Prague has accepted unconditionally." An hour and a quarter later OKW passed this information to the staff section chiefs, with instructions that preparations for Grün were to be continued, but also plans should now be made for a peaceful entry. Though paying serious heed to the possibility that a blodless resolution of the crisis might be preferable to the losses and uncertainties of war, it is most unlikely that Hitler had made a firm decision, and there was no slackening in execution of the Green program for an attack. The same day the 7th Infantry Division in Bavaria (as well as other units elsewhere positioned along the frontier) were assembling in their preliminary stations the forces were to make the initial assault. The French military and air attachés, well informed by aerial and road reconaissance and consular reports, continues to observe the concentrations of German forces along the border.
There was, however, one respect in which things were not developing in accordance with the original Grün plan. Hitler's decision to form the Sudetendeutsche Freikorps instead of putting the Sudeten German "refugees" into the Army reserves resulted in the creation of an undisciplined, nondescript force eager to display its prowess and settle old scores. There were tempting opportunities for raids across the Czech border, especially in those areas, such as the Aš-Cheb district, which were nearly 100% German and which lay outside the Czech fortifications and would have been indefensible in the event of war. Sudeten control of Aš during the night of September 20-21 may initially have been accomplished locally, but was soon buttressed by the Freikorps and perhaps also by German SS and SA units and extended to Cheb and Františkovy Lázně (Franzensbad). To avoid provocation, the Czechs made no effort to expel the invaders, but warned Britain and France that these incursions greatly increased the danger of clashes with Czech soldiers in the area.
The German Army command was also vastly displeased by these activities. Not only were they of no military value; far worse, they were wholly inconsistent with the purpose of achieving at least an element of surprise in the initial attack on the Czech fortifications. Provocational pinpricks along the frontier were altogether likely to cause the Czechs to mobilise and man the fortifications in full strength, which was just what the Wehrmacht leaders wished to avoid. These problems would vanish, of course, if the crisiss were to be resolved nonmilitarily.
After the Berchtesgaden meeting, Ribbentrop's staff had submitted a memorandum on procedures for conducting a plebiscite, and on the twenty-first the OKW, proceeding on the assumption that the Czechs wouldagree to cession of the Sudeten German districts and plebiscites in the mixed German-Czech districts, compiled a list of twenty-five demands which should be considered for imposition on Prague. These included the immediate withdrawal of all Czech troops and police and the surrender of all fortifications in both types of districts, occupation of the ceded area by German troops, and the plebiscite areas by German police pending the arrival of an international police force, demobilization of the entire Czech Army, prohibition of any future fortification construction, pardon and release of all German and Sudeten Germans imprisoned for espionage, and numerous other equally drastic requirements and restrictions.
[edit] Germany conspires with Poland and Hungary
Meanwhile, Hitler was giving his own primary attention to the Hungarian and Polish minority claims. At Berchtesgaden he had told Chanberlain that "in the long run it would be impossible to ignore these demands," but had given no indication that he would insist on their settlement in connection with the Sudeten problem. Now, however, both he and Göring took steps to persuade the Hungarian and Polish governments of the necessity of pressing their demands immediately and forcefully, if they expected to profit by the Sudeten crisis.
The two countries were not equally bold, for Hungary was much weaker than Poland and was further inhibited by the agreements linking the Little Entente, which would have required Yugoslavia and Romania to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia if she were attacked by Hungary. On September 16, Göring invited the Hungarian Minister, Döme Sztójay, to Karinhall, and sought to allay these fears by giving his personal assurance "that Yugoslavia wouls take no action if Hungary were to march, not on the first day (of the German attack), but say three or four days later." Three days earlier the Yugoslav Minister in Rome, Bosko Cristich, had told Ciano that if Hungary were "the first to take up arms against" against the Czechs, Yugoslavia would be obliged "to keep faith with its pledge to the Little Entente," but "Should Hungary, however, support and follow up a German intervention, Yugoslavia would consider herself freed from all obligation." Göring criticized Hungary for "not doing enough in the present crisis," and urged on Sztójay that his country should demand "in clear terms the detachment of the Hungarian region from Czechoslovakia."
The Poles, on the other hand, needed no persuasion. On the same day, when Göring met with Ambassador Lipski, he found that the Pole had already informed Weizsaecker that “the Polish Government would categorically request” a solution to the Cieszyn situation. Lipski informed Warsaw that Göring was obviously “anxious to separate Slovakia from the rest of Czechoslovakia, in order thus to create a Czech state economically dependent on the Reich.” On September 19, Hitler summoned to Berchtesgaden for the following day and separately requested Lipski to come later the same day. The Hungarians were given the rough edge of the Führer’s tongue and told in to uncertain terms what to do:
- First, the Führer reproached the Hungarian gentlemen for the undecided attitude of Hungary in the present time of crisis. He was determined to settle the Czech question even at the risk of a world war. Germany demanded the entire German area. He was convinced that neither England nor France would intervene. It was Hungary’s last opportunity to join for, if she did not, he would not be in a position to put in a word for Hungarian interest… He presented two demands to the Hungarians:
- (1) That Hungary should make an immediate demand for a plebiscite in the territories she claimed,
- (2) That she should not guarantee any proposed new frontiers for Czechoslovakia.
Imredy apologetically explained his government’s delay by pleading surprise at the speed of Hitler’s program, and promised that he would now demand a plebiscite, make military preparations, and decline any border guarantee until “all Hungarian demands had been satisfied.” Hitler went on to give his guests further indication of his views, and of how he would handle Chamberlain at Godesberg:
- In his opinion, the best thing would be to destroy Czechoslovakia. In the long run, it was quite impossible to tolerate the existence of this aircraft carrier in the heart of Europe… The Führer declared further that he in his opinion, action by the Army would provide the only satisfactory solution. There was, however, a danger of the Czechs submitting to every demand… The Führer stated that Germany would give no guarantees unless every country concerned took its share in them… The Führer then stressed once more that he would put forward the German demands at Godesberg with the starkest realism. If, as a result, disturbances started in Czechoslovakia, he would then start military operations. It would, however, always be preferable if the pretext for this were provided by the Czechs.
The Hungarians departed with this earful, and at four o’clock that afternoon Lipski was received. Unlike the Hungarian delegation, Hitler treated him with complete courtesy and there was no lecturing.
Hitler opened the interchange by declaring that, while he had no definite information about the proposals which Chamberlain would bring to Godesberg, he had reason to think that the principle of Germany’s claims would be honoured. However, there was a report that “the settlement… will be executed not by self-determination (i.e., plebiscite), but by a delineation of frontiers (i.e., cession). Hitler “declared that he preferred a plebiscite and is standing firm on it. He would of course insist on a plebiscite in order to secure votes for people who left the territory after 1918. The status of 1918 must be restored. Otherwise, it would mean acceptance of Czechisation, which has been underway since 1918.” Hitler’s real point was that a plebiscite in which Sudeten Germans who had left the area since 1918 would be included while Czechs who had since entered the area would be excluded, would establish a frontier much more favourable to Germany than a line drawn on the basis of present majorities.
Hitler then told Lipski, as he had the Hungarians, that a forceful occupation of the Sudetenland would be the best option. “Howecer,” Lipski reported, “in case his claims are recognised, it would not be possible for him not to accept them before his people, even if the rest of the Czechoslovak problem remained unsolved.” What, then, should be done about the Polish and Hungarian claims? Lipski replied by stating the geographical bounds of the claimed Cieczyn area, and declaring that Poland was prepared to use military force if necessary. He and Hitler then agreed that neither country would join in guaranteeing the new Czech borders until all the minority claims were satisfied, and the Führer added that Italy should be brought into the guarantor group in order “to counterbalance the French and British guarantees.”
The rest of the talk was desultory and inconclusive. Lipski, under instructions previously received from Warsaw, also endeavoured to raise some nagging problems of German-Polish relations, including Danzig and the Corridor, but he made little progress because “the Chancellor was very much absorbed by his approaching talk with Chamberlain.” After the interview a communiqué was issued which conformed only the fact of the meeting without revealing anything to the discussion.
[edit] Agreement in Munic
Chamberlain met Hitler in Godesberg on September 22 to confirm the agreements. Hitler however, aiming at using the crisis as a pretext for war, now demanded not only the annexation of the Sudetenland but the immediate military occupation of the territories, giving the Czechoslovakian army no time to adapt their defence measures to the new borders. To achieve a solution, Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini suggested a conference of the major powers in Munich and on September 29, Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain met and agreed to Mussolini's proposal (actually prepared by Hermann Göring) and signed the Munich Agreement accepting the immediate occupation of the Sudetenland. At about 1:30 AM on September 30, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement.
The news of the signing of the Munich Agreement between Hitler and the Western powers reached Czechoslovakia later that day, and in further demonstrations and rallies, Czechs and Slovaks called for president Beneš not to abide by the agreement. After further pressure from both the cabinet under General Syrový and the Czechoslovak population, Beneš declared that they would not abide by the agreement. As a result, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, reassured the Czechoslovak government that the Soviet Union was willing to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance.
Adolf Hitler was furious by the Czech refusal. As the Czechoslovaks in his mind had disobeyed an agreement between Germany, France and the United Kingdom, he could now declare war on Czechoslovakia without risking an escalation of the conflict with the west. As a result, he ordered that the Fall Grün, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, should be initiated the following morning.
[edit] Opposing commanders
[edit] Germany
[edit] Adolf Hitler
The choice between peace and war was clearly down to the Führer Adolf Hitler.
The Führer usurped the control of grand strategy from the German High Command (OKH) even before the war began. He forced the resignation of the general staff, Ludwik Beck, in August 1938, when his lack of confidence in Hitler’s belligerent schemes became apparent. While few of the younger generals were opposed of a war with Czechoslovakia, the senior leadership of the Wehrmacht was not enthusiastic for the campaign, fearing that it would precipitate a war with France and Britain. Most German military leaders at the time thought that the Wehrmacht was not ready for a war with the Western powers. Hitler initial succes at Munich on September 30, 1938 gave him greater credibility, but mistrust remained between the Führer and the senior leadership through 1938. Despite their lack of enthusiasm for the war on Czechoslovakia, they were relieved by the fact that it was Czechoslovakia that had violated an agreement signed by Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom, thus assuring that France and the United Kingdom would not intervene in the conflict and that for the time being, they had only to face the Czechoslovak armies.
Hitler played a traditional role as supreme political leader, leaving the planning for the fighting up mostly to the officer corps. Germany’s military leadership was well respected for its professionalism and training. In spite of prohibitions in the Versailles treaty, Hans von Seeckt re-established a clandestine general staff in 1920. Most of the senior leaders of 1938 had fought in the First World War and were handpicked by Seeckt to serve in the rump Reichswehr after the war. The limitations imposed by the Allies under the Versailles treaty did not deter the Reichswehr from developing innovative new tactics and doctrine; applying the lessons from the recent conflict to the likely shape of future wars. These studies were far more rigorous than elsewhere in Europe. As losers in the last conflict, the Germans had fewer sacred cows to defend.
The Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht managed to institutionalise the development of superior military leaders, especially at the operational and tactical level of war. The professional focus of German officer training led to a limited comprehension and even displain for economic and political issues, which led to a far weaker appreciation of war and logistics at a strategic level. The senior ranks of the army were ambivalent towards Hitler. On the one hand, they rejoiced at his avid support of the military, his rejection of the restrictions of the Versailles treaty and his rejuvenation of German national pride. On the other hand, most were from aristocratic families with traditional conservative or authoritarian politics and, therefore, disdainful for the Nazi upstarts and their radical views. Hitler, the former corporal, attempted to usurp aspects of war planning that had previously been the preserve of the senior military. There were even some half-hearted schemes for a conservative army coup against Hitler, but these were never credible as Seeckt had installed in the officer corps the belief that obedience to the state was their honour. Younger officers were more attuned to Hitler’s schemes, all the more so as Germany scored victory after victory in the late 1930’s at little or no cost. Hitler proved to be an able politician, manipulating the senior leadership of the army by installing pliable officers in senior staff positions. He also ensured the loyalty of his field commanders by exploiting their sense of duty to Germany. The crises of August 1938 led to a considerable turmoil in the ranks of the senior army leaders.
Prior to the outbreak of war, Hitler abolished the old War Ministry and assumed the position of commander in chief. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the armed forces high command, replaced the war ministry.
[edit] Wilhelm Keitel
Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel was the head of the OKW.
Keitel was born on September 22, 1882 in Helmscherode, Brunswick, German Empire, as the son of Carl Keitel, a middle-class landowner, and his wife Apollonia Vissering. After completing his education in Göttingen, he embarked on a military career in 1901, becoming a Fahnenjunker (Cadet Officer), joining the 6th Lower-Saxon Field Artillery Regiment. He married Lisa Fontaine, a wealthy landowner's daughter, in 1909. Together they had six children, one of whom died in infancy. During World War I Keitel served on the Western front with the Field Artillery Regiment No. 46. In September 1914, during the fighting in Flanders, he was seriously wounded in his right forearm by a shell fragment.
Keitel recovered, and thereafter was posted to the German General Staff in early 1915. After World War I ended, he stayed in the newly created Reichswehr, and played a part in organizing Freikorps frontier guard units on the Polish border. Keitel also served as a divisional general staff officer, and later taught at the Hanover Cavalry School for two years.
In late 1924, Keitel was transferred to the Ministry of Defence (Reichswehrministerium), serving with the Troop Office (Truppenamt), the post-Versailles disguised General Staff. He was soon promoted to the head of the organizational department, a post he retained after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. In 1935, based on a recommendation by Werner von Fritsch he became Nazi Germany's chief of the newly-created Armed Forces Office (Wehrmachtamt).
In 1937, Keitel received a promotion to Generaloberst. in the following year, he assumed the position of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) in the wake of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair and the replacement of the Ministry of War (Reichskriegsministerium) with the OKW.
He, along with Jodl, the OKW, Hitler and Schmundt, were the main architects of the final plan for Fall Grün.
[edit] Walther von Brauchitsch
Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch was the head of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres).
Brauchitsch was born on October 4, 1881 in Berlin as the fifth son of an aristocratic cavalry general. He attended Berlin's best school, the Französisches Gymnasium. Brauchitsch was commissioned in the Prussian Guard in 1900. He was an outstanding officer. By World War I, he was appointed to the prestigious General Staff. He also married Elizabeth von Karstedt, a fabulously wealthy heiress to 300,000 acres (1,200 km²) in Pomerania.
In 1933, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power and began to expand the military. Brauchitsch was named Chief of the East Prussian Military District. His specialty was artillery. In 1937, he became commander of the Fourth Army Group.
Like many other German generals, Brauchitsch disliked or opposed much of the Nazi system, but also welcomed the Nazi policy of rearmament and was dazzled by Hitler's personality. He became largely reliant on Hitler as political patron and even for financial help. In February 1938, in the middle of the Munich Crisis, Brauchitsch left his wife Elizabeth after 28 years. He wanted to marry Charlotte Schmidt, the beautiful young daughter of a Silesian judge, and ardent admirer of the Nazis. Hitler set aside his usual anti-divorce sentiments and encouraged Brauchitsch to divorce and re-marry. Hitler even lent him 80,000 Reichsmarks, which he needed since the family wealth was all his wife's. In the same month, Brauchitsch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army, replacing General Werner von Fritsch, who had been dismissed on false charges of homosexuality.
Brauchitsch resented the growing power of the SS, believing that they were attempting to replace the Wehrmacht as the official German armed forces. He had disagreements with Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, and Adolf Hitler had to resolve the dispute between the two.
While the German General Staff had made the first plans for Fall Grün in the autumn of 1937, but because of his distrust of the OKH generals, Hitler decided to exclude them from the early stages of the planning for Czechoslovakia.
Like General Ludwig Beck, Brauchitsch opposed Hitler's annexation of Austria (the Anschluss), although he did not resist Hitler's plans for war. He took no action when Beck asked him to persuade the whole General Staff to resign if Hitler proceeded in his invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In September 1938, a group of officers began plotting against Hitler and repeatedly tried to persuade Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to lead the anticipated coup, but the only assurance he gave them was: "I myself won't do anything, but I won't stop anyone else from acting." After the collapse of the 1938 coup attempt, Brauchitsch ignored all further appeals from Beck and the other plotters to use the army to overthrow Hitler before Germany was plunged into world war.
[edit] Franz Halder
The chief of the general staff was Generaloberst Franz Halder.
Halder was born on June 30, 1884 in Würzburg to General Max Halder. In 1902 he joined the 3rd Royal Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment in Munich. He was promoted to Lieutenant in 1904 upon graduation from War School in Munich, then he attended Artillery School (1906–07) and the Bavarian Staff College (War Academy) (1911–14), both in Munich.
In 1914 during World War I, Halder became an Ordnance Officer, serving in the Headquarters of the Bavarian 3rd Army Corps. In August 1915 he was promoted to Hauptmann (Captain) on the General Staff of the Crown Prince of Bavaria's 6th Infantry Division. During 1917 he served as a General Staff officer in the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, before being transferred to the 4th Army.
Between 1919 and 1920 Halder served with the Reichswehr War Ministry Training Branch. Between 1921 and 1923 he was a Tactics Instructor with the Wehrkreis VII in Munich.
In March 1924 Halder was promoted to Major and by 1926 he served as the Director of Operations (Oberquartiermeister of Operations: O.Qu.I.) on the General Staff of the Wehrkreis VII in Munich. In February 1929 he was promoted to Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel), and from October 1929 through late 1931 he served on the Training staff in the Reichswehr Ministry.
After being promoted to Oberst (Colonel) in December 1931, Halder served as the Chief of Staff, Wehrkreis Kdo VI, in Münster (Westphalia) through early 1934. During the 1930s the German military staff thought that Poland might attack the detached German province of East Prussia. As such, they reviewed plans as to how to defend East Prussia.
After being promoted to Generalmajor (Major-General) in October 1934, Halder served as the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Munich.
Recognized as a fine staff officer and planner, in August 1936 Halder was promoted to Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General). He then became the director of the Manoeuvres Staff. Shortly thereafter, he became director of the Training Branch (Oberquartiermeister of Training, O.Qu.II), on the General Staff of the Army, in Berlin between October 1937 and February 1938. During this period he directed important training maneuvers, the largest held since the reintroduction of conscription in 1935.
On February 1, 1938 Halder was promoted to General der Artillerie. Around this date General Wilhelm Keitel was attempting to reorganize the entire upper leadership of the German Army. Keitel had asked Halder to become Chief of the General Staff (Oberquartiermeister of operations, training & supply; O.Qu.I ) and report to General Walther von Reichenau. However, Halder declined as he felt he could not work with Reichenau very well, due to a personality dispute. As Keitel recognized Halder's superior military planning skills, Keitel met with Hitler and enticed him to appoint General Walther von Brauchitsch as commander-in-chief of the German Army. Halder then accepted becoming Chief of the General Staff of the Army (Oberkommando des Heeres) on September 1, 1938, and succeeded General Ludwig Beck.
A week later, Halder presented plans to Hitler on how to invade Czechoslovakia with a pincer movement by General Gerd von Rundstedt and General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. Instead, Hitler directed that Reichenau should make the main thrust into Prague. Just before Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler, Halder — in an attempt to avoid war — discussed with several other generals the idea of removing Hitler from power. However, on September 29 Chamberlain gave in to Hitler’s demands, and Halder’s plot to remove Hitler died as peace had been preserved. However, seeing that Germany would not risk a war with the West due to the Czechs de jure had violated the Agreement, he focused on serving the German military staff.
[edit] Gerd von Rundstedt
Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt was the commander of the 2nd Army.
Born in Aschersleben, Saxony on December 12, 1875 into an aristocratic Prussian military family, von Rundstedt joined the Army in 1893, then entered Germany's elite militar academy in 1902 – an institution that accepted only 160 new students annually and weeded out 75% of the students through exams. During World War I he rose in rank until 1918 when he was a major and was chief of staff of his division.
Rundstedt lacked interest in political affairs, but his skills catapulted him into senior command positions both under the Weimar Republic and later, Hitler’s Third Reich. After the war, von Rundstedt rose steadily in the small 100,000 man army and in 1932, was appointed commander of the 3rd Infantry Division. Later that year he threatened to resign when Franz von Papen declared martial law and ordered his troops to eject members of the Nazi Party from state government offices. In 1938 he retired after it was understood that Werner von Fritsch - Commander-in-Chief of the German Army (OKH) - was framed by the Gestapo, but Hitler convinced him to stay, which he did.
[edit] Fedor von Bock
Generaloberst Fedor von Bock was the commanding officer of the 8th Army.
Fedor von Bock was born on December 3, 1880 in Küstrin, a fortress city on the banks of the Oder River in the Province of Brandenburg into a Prussian Protestant aristocratic family whose military heritage is traceable to the time of the Hohenzollerns. His father, Karl Moritz von Bock, commanded a division in the Franco-Prussian War, and was decorated for bravery at the Battle of Sedan. His great-grandfather served in the armies of Frederick the Great, and his grandfather was an officer in the Prussian Army at Jena. His mother, Olga Helene Fransziska Freifrau von Falkenhayn von Bock, was of both German and Russian aristocratic heritage. Bock was distantly related to Erich von Falkenhayn.
At the age of eight, Bock went to Berlin to study at the Potsdam and Gross Lichterfelde Military Academy. The education emphasized Prussian militarism, and he quickly became adept in academic subjects such as modern languages, mathematics, and history. He spoke fluent French, and to a fair degree English and Russian. At an early age, and largely due to his father, Bock developed an unquestioned loyalty to the state and dedication to the military profession. This upbringing would greatly influence his actions and decisions when he commanded armed forces during the Second World War. At the age of 17, Bock became an officer candidate in the Imperial Foot Guards Regiment at Potsdam; he received an officer’s commission a year later. He entered service with the rank of Sekondeleutnant.
In 1905, Bock married Mally von Reichenbach, a young Prussian noblewoman. They were married in a traditional military wedding at the Potsdam garrison. They had a daughter, born two years after the marriage. A year later, Bock attended the War Academy in Berlin, and after a year’s study he joined the ranks of the General Staff. He soon joined the patriotic Army League and become a close associate of other young German officers such as Walther von Brauchitsch, Franz Halder, and Gerd von Rundstedt. In 1908, he was promoted to the rank of Oberleutnant.
By the time the First World War began in 1914, Bock was a Hauptmann. He was assigned as a divisional staff officer in von Rupprecht’s army group on the Western Front. Major von Bock was a friend of the Crown Prince of Germany. Two days before the Armistice, he met with Kaiser Wilhelm II at Spa, Belgium, in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Kaiser to return to Berlin to crush the mutiny at Kiel. After the Treaty of Versailles was signed, limiting the German Army to 100,000 troops, Bock stayed on as an officer of the post-treaty Reichswehr, and rose through the ranks. In 1935, Adolf Hitler appointed General von Bock as commander of the Third Army Group. Bock was one of the officers not removed from his position when Hitler reorganized the armed forces during the phase of German rearmament before the outbreak of World War II. He remained a monarchist, and was a frequent visitor to the former Kaiser's estate.
Bock personally despised Nazism, and was not heavily involved in politics. However, he also did not sympathize with plots to overthrow Adolf Hitler, and never filed official protests over the treatment of civilians by the Schutzstaffel. Bock was also uncommonly outspoken, a privilege Hitler extended to him only because he was one of the most valuable German officers.
The tall, thin, narrow-shouldered Bock had a dry and cynical sense of humor; he seldom smiled. His manner was described as being arrogant, ambitious, and opinionated; he approached military bearing with an unbending demeanor. While not a brilliant theoretician, Bock was a highly determined officer. As one of the highest ranking officers in the Reichswehr, he often addressed graduating cadets at his alma mater. His theme was always that the greatest glory that could come to a German soldier was to die for the Fatherland. He quickly earned the nickname “Holy Fire of Kürstin”.
General von Bock commanded the invasion of Vienna in March 1938 for the Anschluss, and then the 8th Army during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
[edit] Walther von Reichenau
General der Artillerie Walther von Reichenau was the commanding officer of the 10th Army.
Born on August 16, 1884 into a Prussian military family, he was a son of a Prussian general and joined the German Army in 1902. During World War I he served on the Western Front. He won the Iron Cross and by 1918 was a captain. Reichenau stayed in the army under the Weimar Republic as a General Staff officer. From 1931 he was Chief of Staff to the Inspector of Signals at the Reichswehr Ministry, and later served with General Werner von Blomberg in East Prussia. His uncle, an ardent Nazi, introduced him to Adolf Hitler in 1932 and Reichenau became a convert, joining the Nazi Party soon after.
When Hitler came to power in January 1933, Blomberg became Minister of War and Reichenau was appointed head of the Ministerial Office, acting as liaison officer between the Army and the Nazi Party. He played a leading role in persuading Nazi leaders such as Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler that the power of Ernst Röhm and the SA must be broken if the Army was to support the Nazi regime. This led directly to the "Night of the Long Knives" of July 1934.
In 1935 Reichenau was promoted to Lieutenant General and was appointed commander in Munich. By 1938, when Blomberg was forced out of the Army command, Reichanau was Hitler's first choice to succeed him, but older leaders such as Gerd von Rundstedt and Franz Halder refused to serve under him, and as a result Hitler backed down in favor of the rest of the German high command. Reichenau's enthusiastic Nazism repelled many of the generals who would not oppose Hitler but who did not care for the Nazi ideology.
[edit] Wilhelm von Leeb
Generaloberst z.V. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb was the commanding officer of the 12th Army.
Born on September 5, 1876 in Landsberg am Lech, he joined the Bavarian Army in 1895 as an officer cadet. After being commissioned in the artillery, he served in China during the Boxer Rebellion. He later attended the Bavarian War Academy in Munich (1907-1909) and served on the General Staff in Berlin (1909-1911). Promoted to captain, he performed a tour of duty as a battery commander in the Bavarian 10th Field Artillery Regiment at Erlangen (1912-1913).
At the outbreak of World War I, von Leeb was on the General Staff of the Bavarian First Army Corps. During the war, he served with the Bavarian 11th Infantry Division. Upon promotion to major, he was transferred to the Eastern Front in the summer of 1916. The following year he was appointed to the staff of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. After the war, von Leeb remained in the German Army. In 1923, he was involved in putting down the Beer Hall Putsch. He then commanded Wehrkreis VII as a lieutenant general before the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Party.
Hitler was not fond of von Leeb due to his anti-Nazi attitudes and religious convictions. However, due to his outstanding credentials, Hitler made him commander of the 12th Army.
[edit] Wilhelm List
General der Infanterie Wilhelm List was the commanding officer of the 14th Army.
The son of a doctor, he was born in Germany on May 14, 1880. He joined the German Army and served throughout the First World War. After the war List joined the right-wing paramilitary group Freikorps.
He remained in the army where he became a tank specialist and eventually became chief of the Army Organization Department. He made gradually progress in the new German Army and in 1930 he was promoted to major general and was appointed head of the Dresden Infantry School.
List had now developed more moderate political opinions and in 1931 he upset Adolf Hitler by disciplining young officers who were supporters of the Nazi Party. In 1935 List was appointed by General Fedor von Bock as commander of the 4th Army Corps. Although List was still privately critical of Hitler he was unwilling to take any actions that would damage his army career. As a result he did not protest against the treatment of Werner von Blomberg and Werner von Fitsch in 1938.
After the Anschluss List was sent to Wien as head of the Army Group in Austria. The following year he took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
[edit] Czechoslovakia
[edit] Edvard Beneš
Edvard Beneš was at the time of the Munich Crisis the President of Czechoslovakia.
He was born into a peasant family in a small village of Kožlany near Rakovník, ca. 60 km west of Prague. He spent much of his youth in Vinohrady district of Prague, where he attended a grammar school from 1896 to 1904. After studies at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Charles University in Prague, he left for Paris and continued his studies at the Sorbonne and at the Independent School of Political and Social Studies (École Libre des Sciences Politiques). He completed his first degree in Dijon, where he received his Doctorate of Laws in 1908. Then he taught for three years at the Prague Academy of Commerce, and after his habilitation in the field of philosophy in 1912, he became a lecturer in sociology at Charles University. He was involved in Scouting.
During World War I he was one of the leading organizers of an independent Czechoslovakia abroad. He organized a Czech pro-independence anti-Austrian secret resistance movement called "Maffia". In September, 1915, he went into exile where in Paris he made intricate diplomatic efforts to gain recognition from France and the United Kingdom for the Czechoslovak independence movement, as he was from 1916–1918 a Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs within the Provisional Czechoslovak government.
On October 28 1918, Czechoslovakia officially proclaimed their independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On November 3, Austria-Hungary capitulated to the Entente, marking the end of the Habsburg monarchy.
From 1918–1935, he was first and the longest serving Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and from 1920–1925 and 1929–1935 a member of the Parliament. He represented Czechoslovakia in talks of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1921 he was a professor and also from 1921–1922 Prime Minister. Between 1923–1927 he was a member of the League of Nations Council (serving as president of its committee from 1927–1928). He was a renowned and influential figure at international conferences, such as Genoa 1922, Locarno 1925, The Hague 1930, and Lausanne in 1932.
He was a member of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (until 1925 called Czechoslovak Socialist Party) and a strong Czechoslovakist, as he did not consider Slovaks and Czechs to be separate ethnicities.
In 1935 he succeeded Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk to become President. On December 14, 1935, he was elected as President, and he was sworn in to the office on December 18.
On September 2, 1938, with rising tensions between the Czech-dominated government and the German-speaking minority in Sudetenland, Beneš submitted the Fourth Plan, granting nearly all the demands of the Carlsbad Decrees. However, this wasn't enough for the Sudeten Germans, and with intent on obstructing conciliation, the SdP held demonstrations on September 7, that provoked police action in Ostrava. Two days later, Heinlein issued a proclamation demanding the takeover of the Sudetenland by Germany.
On September 18, the Czech government refused to accept the proposal to give up the Sudetenland, arguing that Hitler's proposal would ruin the nation's economy and lead ultimately to German control of all of Czechoslovakia. The next day, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain replied to Beneš saying that the British-French proposal is the only way to avoid war, and that the Czech reply places full responsibility for war on the Czechs, and that Britain would not fight for Czechoslovakia. The Czech government decided to capitulate.
However, the Czechoslovak capitulation precipitates an outburst of national indignation. In demonstrations and rallies, Czechs and Slovaks calls for a strong military government to defend the integrity of the state. On September 23, Prime Minister Milan Hodža and his cabinet resigned. A new cabinet, under General Jan Syrový, is installed. A decree of general mobilization is issued
To achieve a solution, Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini suggested a conference of the major powers in Munich and on September 29, Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain met and agreed to Mussolini's proposal (actually prepared by Hermann Göring) and signed the Munich Agreement accepting the immediate occupation of the Sudetenland. At about 1:30 AM on September 30, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement.
In further demonstrations and rallies, Czechs and Slovaks called for president Beneš not to abide by the agreement. After further pressure from both the cabinet under General Syrový and the Czechoslovak population, Beneš declared that they will not abide by the agreement.
[edit] Jan Syrový
General of the Army Jan Syrový was the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence.
Born on January 24, 1888, in the town of Třebíč, he later studied building at the engineer school in Brno. Following his graduation in 1906, he became a one year volunteer in the Austro-Hungarian army. After that, he studied at a technical college in Russia. In 1914, he switched sides to the Russian Army and was one of the first officers to join the Czechoslovak Legion, where he played a big role in planning the military operations.
He participated in the Battle of Zborov between July 1-2 1917, where he lost his right eye. Later, he was in command of the Legion and the anti-bolshevik forces on the Trans-Siberian railway. He returned to Czechoslovakia on July 20, 1920. His war experience earned him recognition, and After the war, he was Chief of Staff of the Czechoslovak Army (1927-1933) and then its General Inspector (1933-1938).
After he started in his new job, which was more of a representational character, he decided to expand his field of responsibility, which caused a unfortunate and long feud between him and the new chief of staff, who refused to give up any part of his power. The whole case had to be solved by president Beneš with a comprimise. Syrovy became with the years first of all a person with a authority with morale and also a symbol for the Czechoslovak army. Thanks to his resemblance of Jan Žižka (c. 1370-1424), who was a Czech general and Hussite leader, the follower of Jan Hus and a hero for the Czech people, he was very popular in the public, and this popularity brought him to the government.
When Milan Hodža's government resigned on September 23, 1938, Syrový was appointed prime minister and minister of national defence despite his contradiction. Syrový insisted he was a soldier, not a politician, and that he had no qualification to execute this position. President Beneš told him, that the nation needed him and, if he was a soldier, to take it as an order. In the end, Syrový consented. Shortly thereafter, he ordered a full mobilization of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.
On September 30, he was the leading political and military figure who persuaded President Beneš to refuse to abide with the agreement.
[edit] Ludvík Krejčí
General of the Army Ludvík Krejčí was Chief of the Czechoslovak Army.
He was born on August 17, 1890, in Tuřanech u Brna, a town near Brno. He was the youngest of eight children of a farmer from an old farmer family. He studied in the High School in Vyškov, and from 1907 in the professional school for forest economy in Písek. After graduation, he joined the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1910. After one-year military service in Brünn he was appointed to an official in the low service of the forest office in Slavonia. Already in July 1914, he was transferred to the 4. Bosnien-Herzegowina-Regiment, where he climbed up the ranks from company commander up to the battalion commander. He fought in Serbia and Montenegro, Albania and later on the Italian and the Romanian fronts. In May, 1917, he was captured by the Russians and already three months later he entered in Borispol the Czechoslovak Legion. As a First Lieutenant of the reserve and with the honouring "Signum laudis" he was one of the highest ranked officer who joined the legion.
In October 1917, he became in Pirjatino first the second-in-command of the 1st battalion of 6. Hanna-Schützenregiments, later the commander of the whole regiment. This regiment was counted as the best in the Czechoslovak Legion and was also present in most fights. His fame began with the victory in the fight in Bachmatsch in the Ukraine in March 1918, where he was the commander. During the next two years Krejčí proved himself in the defence of the Sibirian Magistrale. With this railway line the legionaires should be transported to Vladivostok and from there then to the French battlefield. During the transport to Vladivostok, known as "Sibirian Anabase“, Ludvík Krejčí became commander of one of the units of the 6th Regiment. Later he was promoted (already then colonel) to the commander of the 2nd Division of the Czechoslovak legions in Russia (from Milan Rastislav Stefánik). He commanded the so-called Kungur front in the Urals, after the retreat to the Magistrale the segment Omsk-Novonikolajevsk-Atschinsk. Under his guidance his division came without appreciable losses to Vladivostok. Krejčí even led the transport of the legionaries on the ship "President Grant". He returned to the young Czechoslovak Republic on June 18, 1920. After his return he concluded the War Academy in Paris, then at home he became the commander of the infantry division in Hradec Králové in the rank of the Brigadier General.
Between 1932-33 he was the commander of the Košice Military Command. President Masaryk promoted the capable, honest and experienced officer on November 30, 1933 to the Chief of General Staff of the Czechoslovak armed forces and in March 1934, to the General of the Army. Krejčí was aware of the German threat, which continued to build up its army, navy and airforce, and worked with determination on the strengthening of the defensive possibilities of the Czechoslovak Republic. Under him the army was motorised and a system was built by border defence arrangements (fortresses). Even Adolf Hitler confirmed the effectiveness of this system. During the mobilisation in September 1938, Krejčí was promoted by President Beneš to the Chief of the Army. General Krejčí was one of the many Czechoslovak generals which deeply disapproved the agreement.
[edit] Bohuslav Fiala
Brigadier General Bohuslav Fiala was the Chief of Staff.
He was born on January 29, 1890, in Frenštát pod Radhoštěm. As he wanted in young age to be an officer, he attended the High School in Holešov in the period 1900-1907, and graduated in the Military Academy in Vídeňské Nové Město (Wiener Neustadt) In 1910, he joined the Austro-Hungarian Army, and served in the 35. Infanterie Regiment in Přemyšl. In this unit, he fought as a First Lieutenant the Russian Army Halič, and capitulated with the rest of the troops in the surrounded fortress in Přemyšl in March 1915. In August 1918, Fiala joined the Czechoslovak Legion and served in the 9th Rifle Division. He also worked as a instructor in the Officer School, served as a staff officer and later on as a intelligence officer and as a tactics teacher. He also fought against the bolsheviks at Volga and in Sibiria. In February 1920, he returned to Czechoslovakia as a Captain. In 1921, he attended the War Academy in Praha, and became professor in 1922. He was then sent to the War Academy in Paris in 1923. He returned, and became professor in general tactics in War Academy in Praha. In April 1928 he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel of the General Staff. After a personnel replacement in September 1929 (due to Folout’s spionage controversy) he became Head of III Section, High Command (General Staff). In the summer of 1930 he served for a short time in the Infantry Regiment 11 in Písek and got his old job back in October 1931. The Operational Group (III Section) improved under him, as he filled the ranks in the Operational Group with skilled officers from the War Academy, and together with them made a propose to a complete reorganization and modernization of Czechoslovak army. Between 1932-33, he lead the Infantry Regiment 38 "Beroun", and later on he attended the course for higher leadership in Praha, which he graduated with good grades. In December 1933 he returned to his job in the III Section, after some personnel changes under the new Chief of Staff, general Ludvík Krejčí. In July 1934 he was promoted to Brigadier-General, and was appointed as the first vice chief of staff in October 1935. He was proven as a superb organisator who prepared defence plans for the forthcoming war. He was also one of the closest co-workers to the chief of staff general Krejčí. He kept close contacts with both the French and the Soviet attachés, and got a military defense agreement with France and the Soviet Union, called "Malá dohoda" (Small agreement) Due to the mobilization in September 1938, he was appointed Chief of Staff, as Krejčí now had been appointed chief of the army.
[edit] Karel Husárek
Division General Karel Husárek was responsible for the construction of the Czechoslovak border fortifications.
Born on January 31, 1893, in Čechovice u Prostějova. He attended the Gymnasium in Prostějova, where he graduated some years later. After the gymnasium, he studied civilian engineering in Brno, but had to cancel his studies when the First World War broke out. In August 1914, he volunteerily signed up for a 1-year military service in the Austro-Hungarian Army. He graduated in the Artillery School, and was initially placed in a unit in the fortress in Krakau (Kraków), until he left for the Russian front in the summer of 1915. He was captured in 1916, and joined the Czechoslovak Legion in August 1917. In September 1917, he was promoted to lieutenant and placed to the 5th Rifle Division, where he fought several battles in Siberia against the bolshevists. He was promoted to Major in 1918, and was appointed the chief of staff in the 2nd Rifle Division in the Czechoslovak Legion. In 1919, he was transferred to the Russian Army, where he fought in Siberia and in the Ural mountains under General Radola Gajda. In Novemer 1919, he left Russia, and returned to Czechoslovakia in February 1920. Then he served in Artillery Regiment 4 in Bratislava and in Artillery Regiment 5 in Praha. In September 1924, we attended the War Academy in Paris. While doing this, he also studied politics, and graduated in 1926. When he returned, he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in the staff. In 1927, he became the chief of the general staff in Bratislava, and Between 1932-33, and late on, he attended the course for higher leadership in Praha, which he graduated with good grades, like Fiala. In 1933, he was appointed the commander of the 16th Brigade, and was promoted to Brigadier-General. His good skills brought him to the General staff, where he served as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces. He studied a lot in defence fortifications, and on March 20, 1935, he became the director of the building of the defence fortifications. In July 1936, he was promoted to Division General.
Due to the large amount of work, he resigned in the end of 1937 as the Chief of Army Operations in the General staff, and stayed to build the defences. In November, he elaborated on a detailed defence plan, also known as the ”Husárkův program” (Husárek’s program). He also participated with the expansion of the military cooperation with the Union. In 1938, he tried to speed up the work on finishing the defences on the Czech-Austrian border. He remained in disposal for Krejčí, which became the close coworkers.
On every meeting he attended, he made sure to the politicians that the army was ready, when Germany would go to attack. During the Munich Crisis, he was also the man responsible for the home guard.
[edit] Sergěj Vojcechovský
General of the Army Sergěj Vojcechovský was the commanding officer of the 1st Army.
A Russian national, he was born on October 29, 1883. In 1897 he attended the High School in Veľkých Lukách, where he graduated in 1902. Between 1902 and 1904, he studied i Konštantinovsky Artillery School in Petrograd. Between 1904 and 1909, he served as a artillery officer in different units, and began to study on the studied Nikolajevskaja Staff School in Petrograd, where he graduated in 1912. Between 1912 and 1913, he attended the Aviation School in Moskva (Moscow) where he graduated the next year.
From July 17, 1914 to November 4, 1915, he was the second-in-command of the 69th Infantry Division, and from worked then in the leadership of the 20th Army in Minsk until January 28, 1917. He worked a short period as the Chief of Staff of the 176th Infantry Division, until he was appointed chief of staff of the 126. Infantry Division on the Romanian front, which he held from April 26, 1917 – August 25, 1917. Between August 26 to December 23, 1917, he was the Chief of Staff in the 1st Czechoslovak Rrifle Division. After that, he served as the commander of the 3rd Czechoslovak Rifle Division, a post he held to December 8, 1918. On May 1, 1921, he returned to Czechoslovakia.
Between October 16, 1921 and January 12, 1923, he commanded the 24th Brigade, and from January 13, 1923 and August 30, 1927, he commanded the 9th division. Thereafter, he commanded the ZVV in Brno until Novemer 14, 1935, where he took the command of ZVV near Praha (1st Army)
[edit] Vojtěch Boris Luža
General of the Army Vojtěch Boris Luža was the commanding officer of the 2nd Army.
Born on March 23, 1891 in the town Uherský Brod, he graduated at the Gymnasium in Uherský Brod. In 1909 he graduated at the Brno University of Technology (VUT). He joined like most of the other Czech generals the Austro-Hungarian Army. During the First World War, he fought against the Serbs in April 1916 and was later transferred to the Romanian front. In 1917 he was captured by Russian forces in Dobrogea and joined Czechoslovak Legion. After returning to Czechoslovakia, he attended the War Academy in Paris and in Praha.
Between 1923 and 1929 he was the 1929 Chief of Department III of the General Staff. In 1930 he was appointed Commanding Officer of the 1st Mountain Brigade. Between 1932 and 1935 he was the Commandant of the Military Academy. After having commanded V Corps between 1935 and 1937, he was appointed chief of the military troops in Moravia-Slezsko in 1937. In September 1938, he was appointed the commanding officer of the 2nd Army. He was one of those who refused the demands made in Munich.
[edit] Josef Votruba
General of the Army Josef Votruba was the commanding officer of the 3rd Army.
Born on November 8, 1879, in Mladá Boleslav, he attended the Cadet School in Wien in September 1896, where he graduated in 1899. He was then placed in the 8. Regiment in Praha, and had several jobs there. He graduated on the officer course in Wien in the period 1904 to 1905, and began his studies on the War School. On May 1, 1905, he was promoted to First Lieutenant. He returned to Kroměříž, and had several administrative appointments until placed in the operational staff of the 1st Army on August 1, 1914. Here he worked on plans for operations on the Russian front, including Lublin and Krakau. On March 3, 1915 he was briefly placed in the 46. Division, and 3 weeks later, he was transferred to Balkan to the 58. Division near Bjelina-Višegrad. After Italy joined the war on the Ententes side (the Allies), his division was moved to Istrie. On February 1, 1917, he was promoted to Major. On September 15, 1918, he was transferred to the War Ministry in Wien. On November 11, 1918, the same day that Germany surrendered to the allies, he left the Austro-Hungarian Army. and joined the newly created Czechoslovak army. He was then the ambassador for the Czechoslovak Army and civilian transportation during the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where he also had important cases with documents. Then, he served as the operational planner in Slovakia in the border clashes against Hungary. After peace treaty with Hungary on May 20, 1919, he joined th Czechoslovak army, and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, and went back to Wien to work there again. On December 20, 1922, he was promoted to colonel. He was congratulated by the other officers for his service. He was thought by his fellow officers as standing, living, precise, practical, skilled and prepared to do his work, and was also known to have a unwavering loyalty to his country. He worked in several staff positions until appointed commander of 8. Brigade in Vysoké Mýto. In 1926 he attended the officer course for generals and colonels in Praha. On November 30, 1927, he was appointed commander of 2nd Mountain Brigade in Spišska Nova Ves, a mountain-filled area in Slovakia.On May 1, 1928, he was promoted to Brigadier-General, and on February 28, 1929, he was appointed Deputy Chief of the General staff, right under General Syrový. On December 30, 1930, he was promoted to Division General. From November 11-30, 1930, he attended the officer course for generals in Versailles.
After that, he was appointed commander of the 10th Infantry Division in Banská Bystrica, and was then appointed general officer commanding Bratislava Military Command. On January 1, 1937, he was promoted to General of the Army, and was then appointed commander of the 3rd Army in 1938.
[edit] Lev Prchala
General of the Army Lev Prchala was the commanding officer of the 4th Army.
Born on March 23, 1892, he attended the gymnasium in Frýdek between 1902-1911, followed by four semesters in German lawyer studies in the University of Wien between 1911-1914. Between 1912-1913, he also attended the Army School in Terst for infantry officers. Then he signed up for a one-year volunteerily service in the 32. Infanterie Regiment.
As part of the mobilization in April 1914, he was placed in the 13. Infanterie Regiment. From June 1914 to March 12, 1915, he served as a squad commander, but got wounded and was sent to hospital. Then he served as a officer in the machinegun troops, until he got captured by the Russians on June 19, 1916. He was kept in captivity to June 15, 1917, and between August 6 and September 15, 1917, he attended the officer course in Borispol. After that, he served in the 8th Czechoslovak Regiment in the machinegun unit, and fought later in Vladivostok. He was briefly the commander of the 3rd Czechoslovak Division, until he was sent as representative for the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia.
He returned on August 14, 1920. From September 23, 1920 to November 1, 1921, he was the ambassador in Paris, and when his job in the embassy was finished, he went to the War Academy in Paris. From 1923-1925, he was the commanding officer of the 1st Mountain Brigade in Ružomberok. From 1931 to 1933, he was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff in Praha, and was then appointed commanding officer of the 4th Army.
[edit] Hungary
[edit] Miklós Horthy
Though officially a monarchy, Hungary had since 1920 been ruled by the Regent Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya.
Horthy was born on June 18, 1868, on his family estate of Kenderes in central Hungary (then part of Austria-Hungary). The son of well-to-do landowners, Horthy’s upbringing was highly disciplined, leading to his entry into the Austro-Hungarian Naval Academy in 1882 as a cadet. Graduating as a midshipman after four years, Horthy travelled the world extensively before being appointed Aide-de-Camp to Emperor Franz Josef I in Wien, in 1909. Horthy was to remain by the Emperor’s side until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, when as a Ccaptain he was briefly given command of a battleship before taking over the armoured cruiser “Novara“, which he was to command for the next three year of the war. Wounded at the naval battle of Otranto in 1917, Horthy went on convalescent leave before taking over command of the dreadnought “Prinz Eugen”. (In a strange twist of fate, Horthy’s wife Magda, while her husband was serving as Regent of Hungary, was asked by Hitler to christen Germany’s own battlecruiser “Prinz Eugen” in 1938).
In February 1918, Horthy was promoted to Rear-Admiral and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet, a position he held until the end of the war. Upon the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Horthy retired to his estate at Kenderes. His respite was shortlived; with Béla Kun and his Red Terror running amok in Hungary Horthy was asked to form a national army on behalf of the opposition that was in the process of forming a counter-revolutionary government in Szeged. Horthy was appointed Minister of Defence in this Ggovernment, and in July 1919, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Communist Government was overthrown, and Admiral Horthy entered Budapest at the head of his troops, on a white horse, to the acclaim of the population.
On March 1, 1920, the Hungarian Parliament elected Horthy to the position of Regent of the Realm. As Regent, Horthy was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Hungary’s Armed Forces as well as Head of State, and it was with Horthy’s authorization that Hungary entered the war on German side, as he supported any attack on Czechoslovakia to take back the areas lost to Slovakia and Ruthenia. Like Czechoslovakia, the generals in service in 1938 mainly served in the Austro-Hungarian Army during the First World War.
[edit] Hugó Sónyi
The Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Army at the time of the Munich Crisis was General of the Infantry Hugó Sónyi.
He was born in the Austrian town of Wölkersdorf on March 2, 1883, the son of a Hungarian state railways inspector. The family name at that time was Solarcz, and it was not until after the First World War that the future General changes his name to Sónyi. After four years of training in Budapest, Sónyi began his military career in the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1901, reaching the rank of Captain by the outbreak of the First World War.
The end of the conflict saw him with the rank of Major, and not wishing to end his career in the Army, Sónyi accepted an appointment in the Hungarian Red Army, as commander of 29th Infantry Brigade. This service did not prevent his acceptance into the National Army that was formed following the fall of the Communist regime, and promotions came quickly: Lieutenant-Colonel in 1920, Colonel in 1921 and Major-General in 1927. Most of this period was spent in various administrative appointments in the Ministry of Defence. In 1929, Sónyi was appointed commander of an Infantry Brigade of the 1st Mixed Brigade, and he took temporary command of the Mixed Brigade itself in 1933. The following year saw his appointment to command the 7th Mixed Brigade and a promotion to Lieutenant-Field Marshal (Altábornagy, equal to Lieutenant-General).
On September 5, 1936, Hugó Sónyiwas elevated to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, accompanied by a promotion to General of Infantry (Gyalogsági tábornok, equal to three-star general), a position he retained also during the Munich Crisis.
[edit] Henrik Werth
The Chief of the General Staff was Lieutenant-Field Marshal Henrik Werth.
The son of humble German parents, Henrik Werth was born in Rezsöháza, on December 26, 1881. His military training as a cadet began in 1897 in Wien, and by the end of World War I, Werth had recieved rapid advances to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, most unusual for an Austro-Hungarian Army that was usually biased against Hun-garians, and a testament to his capabilities. During the period of the Soviet Hungarian Republic, Werth continued his career in the Army, serving as Chief of Staff of the Red Army I. Corps, even acting as its commander for a brief period, before becoming commander of the 7th Infantry Division. Following the fall of the Republic, Werth joined the new National Army, being promoted to Colonel in 1920 and Major-General in 1926. During this time, Werth taught at the General Staff Academy, and upon his promotion to Lieutenant-Field Marshal he served as commander of the 4th Mixed Brigade until 1936 when he reached the mandatory retirement age of 55. Werth was called back from retirement in September 1938 to become Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
[edit] Vilmos Nagy
Major-General Vilmos Nagy was the commander of the 1st Corps.
The son of a mining engineer, Vilmos Nagy was born in Parajd on May 30, 1884. After graduating from the Ludovika Military Academy in 1905, Nagy furthered his military training at the General Staff Academy, and entered World War I as a staff officer attached to the High Command, but in August 1919 was appointed to Admiral Horthy’s Defence Ministry with a promotion to Major following shortly thereafter.
After four years in the secret General Staff (1920-1924) and a promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel, Nagy was attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (General of Infantry Pál Nagy, though no relation) before becoming Aide-de-Camp to the Ministry of Defence, General of Cavalry Count Károly Csáky with the rank of full Colonel.
During 1927-1931, Vilmos Nagy served as Chief of Staff of the 1st Mixed Brigade in Budapest, before being appointed Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time, General of Infantry Kamilló Kápáthy. In May 1933, Nagy returned to the 1st Mixed Brigade as commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, where he served until May 1935, gaining a promotion to Major-General in the progress (May 1934).
As a General, Nagy was appointed to the Military Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Defence, becoming its Chief less than a year later, in January 1936. Ten months later he was transferred to command the 1st Mixed Brigade, with a promotion to Lieutenant-Field Marshal in May 1937. When the Mixed Brigade was upgraded to become the I. Army Corps in October 1938, Nagy remained as its Commanding General.
[edit] Milán Temessy
Major-General Milán Temessy was the commander of the 2nd Corps.
Born in 1885, he also served in the Austro-Hungarian Army in the First World War. In 1937, he was appointed Commanding Officer of the 2nd Mixed Brigade. When the Mixed Brigade was upgraded to become the II. Army Corps in October 1938, Temessy remained as its Commanding General.
[edit] László B. Kiss
Major-General László B. Kiss was the commander of the 3rd Corps.
Born in 1883, he served in the Austro-Hungarian Army in the First World War. In 1938, he took over the command of the 3rd Mixed Brigade after Vezérezredes (Lieutenant-Field Marshal) Gusztáv Jány. When the Mixed Brigade was upgraded to become the III. Army Corps in October 1938, László Kiss remained as its Commanding General.
[edit] András Littay
Major-General András Littay was the commanding officer of the 7th Corps.
Born in Szabadka on August 15, 1884, András Lichteneckert (he was not to adopt the name Littay until after the First World War) was the son of a restaurant owner.
He attended the prestigious Hungarian Ludovika Military Academy during the period 1902-1905, and the General Staff Training School between the period 1909-1911. As a Captain, Littay fought through World War I and while serving in the Hungarian Red Army, he was appointed Quartermaster of the Army. Following the overthrow of the Communist regime, he served as a staff officer in the Ministry of Defence until 1923, recieving promotions to Major (1919) and Lieutenant-Colonel (1921) along the way. After a thirty-month spell as operations instructor at the General Staff Academy, during which time he was promoted to Colonel (in 1925), Littay returned to the Defence Ministry to work in the Training Department. Between 1926-1930, he headed this Department, before being appointed to a field command, that of the 2nd Infantry Regiment. During 1931-1935, Littay served as the commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Mixed Brigade and later the 1st Infantry Brigade of the 4th Mixed Brigade, becoming Major-General in 1934. During 1935-1936, he held the post of Commandant of the General Staff Academy, whereupon he was appointed to command the 7th Mixed Brigade, which in 1938 was redesignated VII. Army Corps.
[edit] Gusztáv Jány
Also worth to be mentioned is Lieutenant-Field Marshal Gusztáv Jány, as he was probably the General with the highest profile.
He was Born in Rajka on October 21, 1883, the son of the company clerk Sándor Hautzinger. Following graduation from the Ludovika Military Academy (1905) and the General Staff School (1911), Jány fought in the Austro-Hungarian Army during World War I, and emerging as a Captain, served as Chief of Staff of the Szekely Division of the Red Hungarian Army until 1919, when he was interned by the Romanians. During his internment, he recieved a promotion to Major. Returning to Hungary some six months later, Jány joined the new army and in 1923 was appointed an instructor at the Ludovika Military Academy as a Lieutenant-Colonel.
Promotion to full Colonel followed in 1925, and he was then transferred as Chief of Staff of the 2nd Mixed Brigade in 1928, a position he was to occupy for over three years. In 1931, Jány returned to the Ludovika Academy as its Commandant. He remained there until August 1936, recieving his promotion to Major-General in November 1934. In late 1936, Janý was appointed commander of the 3rd Mixed Brigade, with promotion to Lieutenant-Field Marshal in November 1937. In 1938, he served as the Chief of the Military Chancellery and Adjutant-General during the absence of the long-time holder of that position, Colonel-General Lajos Keresztes-Fischer, who was filling as Chief of the General Staff. He was a brave soldier (Even that he had left the Mixed Brigade, he was reguarly present in the front lines, and was wounded as a result) and was also a loyal and selfless patriot of Hungary.
[edit] Opposing plans and political situations
[edit] Germany
The entire border between Czechoslovakia and Germany had the length of more than 2000 km through mountainous, heavily forested terrain, from the Orlické Mountains through the Giant Mountains (Krkonoše or Riesengebirge), the Ore Mountains (Krušné hory or Erzgebirge) and through the Bohemian and Bavarian forest. So the territory of Bohemia and Moravia were surrounded from three sides. Strategically, Czechoslovakia was unfortunately positioned. However, access to the ČSR was only possible some border areas only with a few, mostly poorly maintained roads. At the Bavarian border to the ČSR only 12 road crossings existed, partly as dirt tracks through heavily wooded hills. The forested frontier areas were therefore no basis for beneficial use of motorised units, as they were bound to the roads and transportation for deployment were only possible with sufficient railway links. Therefore, offensive operations were only suitable in the Moravian lowlands, in the areas around Aš and Cheb as well as parts of Lower Austria.
In the autumn of 1936 the Imperial War Ministry (Reichskriegsministerium) decided to review the seriousness of the possibility of a war with the Wehrmachtstudie between 1936 and 37. It was for reasons of confidentiality only worked up in the military district III (Berlin) and the corresponding air district II from November 1936 to January 1937 and should be handled alongside military deployment and deployment plans and the economic and administrative mobilization.
Initial air attacks carried out by the Russians should be expected, as they were allied with the ČSR and France. After the German deployment instructions had defended the western border, the Wehrmacht should then dismantle Czechoslovakia through an offensive action. These plans were connection with the military exercise from the early summer of 1935. As the Wehrmacht expected a war on several fronts due to the Franco-Czech-Russian assistance treaty, they would have to take out the weakest link in the tripple alliance, which they estimated was Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the bulk of the army with 21 infantry divisions and 3 armuored divisions were dispositioned along Bohemian-Moravian front, in order to prevent an escape into Slovakia. 9 divisions should defend the western frontier. Only 3 divisions should defend Silesia, the space around Küstrin and Pomerania. The 21 Landwehr divisions were expected be ready earliest after at least 4 weeks of the receipt of the X-command, after which they could begin replacing troops.
The Wehrmachtstudie looked for the following deployment:
- The Third Army (AOK B) with its headquarters in Müncheberg should defend the eastern border.
- The Sixth Army (AOK C) should defend the western border.
- The First Army (AOK F) with its headquarters in Oppeln should attack Czechoslovakia from Silesia in the direction of Pardubice.
- The Second Army (AOK G) with its headquarters in Schweidnitz should attack Czechoslovakia from Silesia in the direction of Olomouc.
Heeresgruppe Süd consisted of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Armies.
- The Fourth Army (AOK D) with its headquarters in Schwandorf, should attack Czechoslovakia in the direction of Prague.
- The Fifth Army with its headquarters in Linz, consisting of 2 Austrian, 4 Italian and 1 German division, should attack in the direction of České Budějovice.
- The Eighth Army with its headquarters located in Vienna, consisting of 4 Austrian infantry divisions and the Austrian "Schnelle Division", should attack in the direction of Brno.
In addition to this, a last army was located in Hungary.
- The Ninth Army, with its headquarters located north of Budapest, consisting of 9 Hungarian infantry brigades and 2 Hungarian cavalry divisions, should attack Czechoslovakia in the direction of Žilina.
The concept of an coalition war brought problems because claims of allies on equipment should be rejected, but Concurrent invasion as an important prerequisite to success. Without the participation of Italian, Austrian and Hungarian units the destruction of the Czech army would not be possible.
On November 5, 1937, Hitler met with the Minister of War Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Army General von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Erich Raeder and the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe General Hermann Göring, whos summary was later named the Hossbach Memorandum. He spoke of Germany's objectives in the world, which included to secure and preserve racial community. He also announched his plans for an expansion of Germany over the next five years, and into Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular. Those in attendance who voiced their opposition were removed from their positions within five months. Among them were von Blomberg and von Fritsch, the events surrounding them became known as Blomberg-Fritsch Affair. Hitler used the situation to transfer the duties of the Ministry of War (Reichskriegsministerium) to a new organization — the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) — and Wilhelm Keitel, who became the new head of the OKW on 4 February 1938. This weakened the traditional Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH) which was now subordinated to the OKW.
Fall Grün (Case Green) was one of the two major portions (the other being Fall Rot) of Blomberg's 1937 directive, and while the OKH had ignored the part of the directive directed toward Austria (Sonderfall Otto), it had done some work on Grün during the autumn of 1937, with inspiration from earlier army studies. On December 21, 1937, The German General Staff's strategy plan, Fall Grün, had been completed, anticipating an aggressive war with Czechoslovakia.
The plan in outline, contemplated the concentrations of four armies (3rd, 6th, 9th and the 11th) and an independent corps against Czechoslovakia, while the western front was to be covered with 3 weak armies, and the Polish frontier by a fourth. This deployment embodied the concept, previously adopted, that in the face of a hostile coalition, the Wehrmacht's best strategy would be to effect speedy defeat of the weaker antagonist, and then to confront the stronger.
Because of his distrust of the OKH generals, Hitler decided to exclude them from the early stages of the planning for Czechoslovakia. His first confidants were Keitel and Schmundt, and shortly after his birthday celebration the latter made notes of the Führer's exposition to Keitel of the prospects for Grün.
- A. Political Possibilities
- 1. A strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky with no cause or justification won't do. The result would be: hostile world opinion, which can lead to a critical situation...
- 2. Action after a period of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
- 3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g., assassination of the German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).
- B. Military Conclusions
- 1. Preparations are to be made for political possibilities 2 and 3. Case 2 is less desirable since Grün (Czechoslovakia) will have taken precautions.
- 2. The loss of time from transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavoidable but must be held to a minimum - must not prevent a lightning-swift blow.
- 3. "Seperate thrusts" are to be made immediately in order to penetrate the enemy fortified lines at numerous points and in operationally favorable directions... Simultaneous attacks by Army and Air Force.
- The Air Force will support the individual columns. (E.g., dive bombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications, thereby isolating the garrisons.)
- 4. Politically the first four days of military action are decisive. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must show the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw allies into the project (division of spoils!) and demoralise Grün.
- Therefore, bridge the time gap between the first penetration and commitment of forces being brought to the front by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorised army (e.g., via Plzeň and Prague)...
Meanwhile the OKW offices had completed a draft of a general directive for Grün, which was transmitted to Hitler under cover of a letter from Keitel dated May 20, 1938. He reminded Hitler that the Blomberg directive of June 1937 would expire and a new one be due on October 1, 1938; immediately, however, the Green section needed revision because of the incorporation of Austria "and the newly suspected intentions of the Czech general staff." The draft, Keitel noted, had not yet been discussed with the commanders-in-chief of the three services, and would not be until its fundamental ideas had been approved by Hitler.
The German military preparations and exercises had resulted in the partial mobilisation of the Czechoslovak Army, and Hitler had to go for the less desirable option of the two scenarios due to the deterioration of the situation, seeing that the ČSR now was partially mobilising its armed forces. Shortly after the outbreak of the May Crisis, Hitler entrusted his idea of the timing of the assault to his adjutant Schmundt on May 22:
- On October 1 the border fortifications should be occupied through a "Trojan horse" tactic, as proposed by the Sudeten German Freikorps.
- On October 2 camouflaged security forces between the border and the fortifications (assault units of the SS-Verfügungtruppe and the SS-Totenkopfverband) should then follow.
- On October 3 motorised reconnaissance units (11 were part of the fast divisions) and machinegun battalions (14 were motorised blockade units) should follow by crossing the German-Czech frontier.
- On October 4 divisions with close to the frontier, possibly only with its peacetime strength, cross the German-Czech frontier and a motorised unit along with the 2nd Panzer Division advance into the "heart of Czechoslovakia".
This idea, however, was quite naive and relied upon a lightning-swift attack, but following the May Crisis the Czechoslovak Army was now suspecting a German attack at any time in the forseeable future.
At the height of the May Crisis Hitler recieved Keitel's draft of Grün, and soon Schmundt was telegraphing more questions to OKW, some of which Zeitzler answered on May 23. Then came a telegram from Schmundt with information which Hitler wished to have conveyed to Keitel, and in part to Brauchitsch:
- (1) Inform General Keitel: The Führer is going into Grün in detail. Basic ideas unchanged. Surprise factor to be more emphasized. Conference with parties concerned will take place after return at the latest. Conference here not foreclosed.
- (2) Return probably beginning of next week. Inform Generals Brauchitsch and Keitel:
- (A) The Führer suggested holding exercises in taking fortifications by surprise attack. I informed him that... Army is planning such an exercise in September. Führer thinks that is too late. He himself will discuss it with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
- (B) The Führer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pushing the fortification work in the West.
The new draft for Green, largely the work of General Alfred Jodl, was divided into six sections. The first was entitled "political prerequisites":
- It is not my intention to destroy Czechoslovakia through military action in the near future without provocation. Therefore inevitable political developments inside Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially possible opportunity that may never occur.
The second and third sections merely paraphrased Hitler's instructions to Keitel a month earlier. A period of diplomatic clashes or a serious incident (preferably the latter) would be a necessary prelude to an attack, and success during the first four days would be crucial in order to discourage hostile intervention and bring Hungary and Poland into the game. The fourth and fifth sections outlined the Wehrmacht's operations, and were largely modeled on the plans previously sketched by OKH. The mass of ground and air strength would be concentrated against Czechoslovakia, with only light screening forces on the western and eastern fronts. Simultaneous surprise assaults on the ground and in the air were to penetrate the Czech fortifications and open the way for mechanised troops to "thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia." For the Luftwaffe, the prime mission was destruction of the Czechoslovak Air Force, especially its fields and bases, so as to deny them to the Russians and the French. Czech industrial installations were, as far as possible, to be spared so as to be available for continuing the war if necessary. A sixth section stressed the necessity of expanding the German war economy.
All in all, the OKW draft did not carry matters much beyond the point at which Hitler had left them with Keitel a month earlier. Nor is there any indication that Hitler had as yet perceived any means of accelerating the tempo. But now, as in the case of Austria, events occured within the boundaries of the intended victim which set things on a quicker course which was a lead, in four months, directly to the Munich crisis.
On May 30, Hitler finally signed the revised directive for Fall Grün. The military provisions were not significantly altered, except for the addition of a seventh section stipulating that "all preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be handled by OKW." The opening paragraphs, dealing with the political preconditions, had undergone an ominous modification, and now read:
- It is my unalterable decision to destroy Czechoslovakia by military action within the foreseeable future. It is the responsibility of the political leadership to determine or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment. An inevitable development of conditions in Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating an unexpectedly favorable opportunity, which may perhaps not recur, may cause me to take early action. The proper choice and decisive and full use of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.
[edit] Military disposition in September 1938
During June, July and most of August the principal Grün activities were planning, training of the regular units for special assault operations, and construction of the western border defences (Westwall). During late August and September the calling-up of reserves, filling out the divisions to combat strength and forming new ones, creations of new commands, and deployment of troops were carried out at an increasing tempo.
The seven other armies were immediately subordinate to OKH. Two were given purelt defensive roles in the east. In East Prussia, was to be reconstituted as the Third Army, and on the other side of the Polish Corridor in West Prussia and Pomerania, the Fourth Army would guard against the unlikely possibility of a Polish attack. In another surprising selection, Hammerstein was called from retirement to assume this command.
The five remaining armies were to be deployed in an arc around Bohemia and Moravia, from the German-Polish border on the north to the Austro-Hungarian border on the south.
The definitive plan for Fall Grün was the following:
- The Second Army, under the command of GenObst. Gerd v. Rundstedt, with its headquarters located in Cosel, included the II., IV. and VIII. AK consisting of 9 infantry divisions (3rd, 4th, 8th, 12th, 18th, 24th, 28th, 30th and the 32nd), the 3rd Panzer Division and the SS-Inf.Regt. “Germania”. It was based in Upper Silesia. Their orders were to break through the Czechoslovak defences in northern Moarvia and strike southward across the narrow waist of Czechoslovakia towards Olomouc, and then rendezvous with the 14th marching into Czechoslovakia from the south.
- The Eighth Army, under the command of GenObst. Fedor v. Bock, with its headquarters located in Freiburg/Schlesien, it was concentrated in the Dresden area, north of Prague. It included the III. AK consisting of 4 infantry divisions (14th, 19th, 23rd and 31st) and one motorised division (20th). Their orders were to advance from Hirschberg-Waldenburg through the Landeshuter valley towards Vysoké Mýto-Svitavy-Náchod and then join the 2nd Army after they had broken through the Czech defences in northern Moravia. In the area of Svitavy the independent 4th Corps - with headquarters in Herrnhut - consisting of the 4. And 14. Infantry Divisions, were planned to attack in the direction of Železné Město (Eisenstadt). It should captivate enemy forces and secure the right flank of the 8th Army. The Grenzabschnittkommando 4 with the headquarters in Schweidnitz, consisting of four Grenzwachtregimenten, should secure the area between Görlitz to the eastern bank of the Lužická Nisa River (Lausitzer Neiße). The Grenzabschnittkommando 5 had similar tasks between Görlitz and the tip of Aš.
- The Tenth Army, under the command of Gen.d.Art. Walther v. Reichenau, with its headquarters located in Schwandorf, was concentrated along the western frontier of Bohemia, northeast of Nürnberg. It included the XII., XIV and XVI. AK consisting of the 10th and the 17th Infantry Divisions, 2nd and 13th motorised Infantry Divisions, the 1st Panzer Division, the 1st Light Division and the SS-Inf.Regt. “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”. Their orders according to Hitler's idea as a motorized army were to advance from the area of Northern Bavaria towards the Czech capital Prague through Plzeň.
- The Twelfth Army, under the command of GenObst.z.V. Wilhelm v. Leeb, with its headquarters located in Passau, was concentrated along the southeastern frontier of Bavaria and the Austrian border north of Linz. It included the V., VII. and IX. AK consisting of 8 infantry divisions (5th, 7th, 9th, 15th, 16th, 25th, 27th and 45th) and the 1st Mountain Division, as well as a motorised regiment. Their orders were to advance into southern Bohemia and as well support the operations of the Fourteenth Army with advancing towards Brno after the breakthrough in southern Moravia had succeeded.
- The Fourteenth Army, under the command of Gen.d.Inf. Wilhelm List, with its headquarters located in Vienna, was concentrated in Austria. It included the XVII. and the XVIII. AK consisting of the 44th Infantry Division, the 2nd and the 3rd Mountain Division, the 29th motorised Infantry Division, the 2nd Panzer Division, the 4th Light Division and the SS-Inf.Regt. “Deutschland”. Their orders were to break through the defences in southern Moravia and then advance towards Brno. Then they should link up with the 2nd Army advancing from the north, thus making a pincer. This would prevent the Czech forces in Bohemia from retreating into Slovakia.
[edit] Hungary
Of the countries bordering the ČSR, Hungary had particular interests in parts of their territory. For years they had wanted a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, which included the unification of the Hungarian-populated parts of the ČSR, if not the whole of Slovakia, with Hungary.
But the attitude of its neighbours decisively influenced Hungary's attitudes towards an action against the ČSR. The ČSR, Yugoslavia and Romania formed the "Little Entente" in 1920 and 1921, an alliance with the purpose of common defense against Hungarian irredentism and the prevention of a Habsburg restoration. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country. Even in peacetime status the superiority of the Yugoslav army with 148,000 men in 16 divisions and the Romanian army with 225000 men in 24 divisions oppressive, although the Hungarian army in the summer of 1938 had achieved a peace strength of 85,000 men.
One could not exclude that an Hungarian aggression against ČSR would enable the contracts of the "Little Entente" and would lead the two countries into war against Hungary. Since 1937 Hungary had wished at least to reach the level of neutrality of Yugoslavia, for then to waiver of a border revision and thus be entitled to the Hungarian minorities living there. But for this Yugoslavia was not ready.
The first contacts for joint operations against the ČSR arose during the visit of Göring to the Hungarian Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös de Jákfa in Budapest in June 1935. A few days later the Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, General Somkuthy, visited the German War Minister von Blomberg and the Chief of the Staff Ludwig Beck. Even then the continuation of the discussion between the interests of Hungary's revision of its neighbors and Germany's economic interests with the same states were clear. And so the Hungarians Blomberg recommended waiving revisions, only Hungary was an action against the ČSR. Amazingly the Hungarian General described Czechoslovakia, the most well-equipped and well-trained nation of the "Little Entente", as "our most vulnerable enemy." Despite intensive Hungarian wishes they came no closer to a agreement on German-Hungarian military cooperation. However the OKH included in the 1936 war games that Hungary would participate in an attack on ČSR with a strength of 12 brigades and two cavalry divisions.
In September 1937, War Minister v. Blomberg took up discussions with the Hungarian Minister of Defence during his visit of the German Autumn Manouevres about the prospects of their common war goals against ČSR. The following spring the Hungarian envoy v. Stojay said that these talks were "somewhat dull." Ribbentrop knew the intentions of Hitler and behaved cautiously. On March 31 the Hungarian envoy asked the the Foreign Office, when "the general staff meetings for possible joint actions" against the ČSR would begin. Although the Germans wanted not to be specific on the matter, Göring recommended in early June the Hungarian envoy for Hungary's early participation in a war between Germany and the ČSR. The chief of OKW Gen. D. Art Keitel, who visited Budapest on June 14, would clarify things further.
When the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff in the spring of 1938 met with his with his Czechoslovak colleagues in Brno, the Hungarian Chief of General Staff v. Rácz saw this as proof of the effectiveness of the alliance between the two countries. And in early May, the heads of operational departments of the "Little Entente" gathered to discuss possible reactions against Hungary. The Yugoslavs did not wish to enter a conflict against Germany, because they expected that Italy would enter the war on the side of Germany. On August 23 a conference between the "Little Entente" and Hungary took place in the Yugoslav town of Bled. Here Hungary and the "Little Entente" (including the ČSR) aknowledged eachother's armed forces and renounced the use of armed force on the condition that the questions of each ethnic minorities would be satisfactorily resolved. Hungary were very demanding towards Czechoslovakia. The result of the conference in Bled had unsettled the German Foreign Office there. Such a stance would make Hungary neutralize against ČSR, and they meant that "a relaxation in favor of Czechoslovakia would be undesirable for us (Germany)."
At the same time the Hungarian Regent Admiral Miklós Horthy visited Berlin and Kiel. There were several partial parallel meetings. In an interview with Hitler Horthy presented the idea of "restoring the old Hungary in a big war in a few years with the help of German troops". Hitler was not interested, saying "that neither wishes nor claims (of Hungary)," and "whether it wants to participate (in the action against ČSR) or not lies with them." Finally Horthy concluded that Hungary would be prepared to intervene two weeks after a war had begun - provided by the unrealistic condition that the powers of the "Little Entente" were not active and prepared to intervene in the conflict on the side of Czechoslovakia.
However, despite the discussions between Horthy and Hitler, the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister remained cautious. They were unsure whether Yugoslavia would remain neutral in case of Hungarian aggression against Czechoslovakia, and they knew the Hungarian rearmament program needed at least a period of 1-2 years to prepare for war. Therefore the Hungarian General Staff returned to discussions over the military readiness and the military stockpiles of the armed forces. In meetings between the German and Hungarian ministers there was no clarity about the timing of a Hungarian intervention in a German-Czech conflict.
The talks requested by the General Staff were finally initiated on 6 September between the new Chief of the General Staff Halder and the Hungarian General Staff. Halder was doing at the express wish of Hitler no hints about the timing of the action. The attitude to win allies was strange, and the Hungarians were not better than Mussolini, who claimed they were not ready for a major European war. No wonder that Jodl already two days later noted that Hungary was "was at least in a good mood." In any event, the Hungarians were on the Reich Party Congress in "a angry mood, ...because the previous talks in Berlin had ended with no results."
When the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visited Hitler again on September 20, Hitler criticized Hungary for their "indecisive attitude." Two days later the British envoy to Hungary in Budapest warned against a military action. Even Ciano exhorted on September 26 Hungaryto show maximum restraint towards the ČSR, so that the Yugoslavs would not be obliged to abide by the agreements of the "Little Entente" to support Czechoslovakia.
But despite this, the Hungarians mobilised between 200,000 and 350,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped men on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders, ready to invade Czechoslovakia in case of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia. After Munich, the Hungarians had remained poised threateningly on the Slovak border. They reportedly had artillery ammunition for only 36 hours of operations, and were clearly engaged in a bluff, but it was a bluff the Germans had encouraged, and one that they would have been obliged to support militarily if the much larger, better trained and better equipped Czechoslovak Army chose to fight. The Czechoslovak army had built 2,000 small concrete emplacements along the border wherever there was no major river obstacle.
The Hungarians had in total mobilised 21 brigades. In the north of the country they had dispositioned the 1st Corps northwest of Budapest, the 2nd Corps northeast of Budapest and the 3rd Corps Moskolc in space. The 6th Corps, positioned around Debrecen, opposed Romania and the 5th Corps north of Szeged.
The Yugoslavs and Romanians announced their military intervention in case of a Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia. The French military attaché in Bucharest assured the chief of the Romanian General Staff Div. Gen. Ştefan Gh Ionescu, that the powers of the Little Entente powers would intervene in case of a Hungarian attack on the ČSR. The Yugoslav army would in this case initiate an offensive on in a northerly direction towards Szeged with cooperation of the left wing of the Romanian Army, and then head to join the 3rd Czechoslovak army positioned in Slovakia. The Yugoslavs had in September 1938 a wartime strength of 1.2 million men and the Romanians a wartime strength of 1.5 million, which is both excessive values. Because of this threat in case of war, Hungary would intervene immediately or within 48 hours, perhaps even within 14 days.
However, another problem emerged: in case Hungary should join the Germans in the attack on Czechoslovakia, a casus belli would be needed as a pretext for a Hungarian declaration of war. This conclusion was made due to the fact that territorial claims alone might not be sufficient for an attack on Czechoslovakia. In September 1938 Leutenant Colonel Homlok of the Hungarian General Staff proposed to Colonel Helmuth Groscurth of the Abwehr, that german planes should drop Czech bombs on Hungarian territory, after some of the czech airfields have been captured, in order to create a false flag operation.
[edit] Czechoslovakia
Due to the unfavourable strategic position of Bohemia and Moravia had against Germany, Czechoslovakia could only maintain a defensive strategy, and so they tried to offset this through a system of fortifications in line with the French Maginot Line. Undoubtedly the "front continu" played a role through which they wanted to stop an invasion. The spatial distribution of the Czech arms industry with central points in Plzeň, Prague and Brno demanded a defence strategy, that could put the opponents forces to a halt at the border.
The expansion of the fortifications of the Czech-German border was decided by the Parliament of Czechoslovakia in 1932, and construction began in 1935. The fortifications were to be completed in ten to fifteen years. Like France, ČSR spent a large part on their defence budget on the construction of the border fortifications. It is calculated that until 1938 the actual expenditure of the fortifications had been 2.5 billion Kč. However, this was only a tenth of the sum that France had paid for the construction of the Maginot Line, even though its borders were ten times as long. The Czechoslovak border fortifications and the Maginot Line were in scope, depth and technical equipment uncomparable. With the line of deployment at this fortification system, the Czechoslovak General Staff renounced the necessity of an mobile operational doctrine.
On March 20, 1935, the ministry of defence appointed General Karel Husárek as the head of the construction of the Czechoslovak border defences (Ředitelství opevňovacích prací, ŘOP). With significant participation of French experts, the concept of the border fortifications included several lines of fortifications along the country's borders consisting of "Heavy Objects", which were isolated Infantry Blockhouses and Forts inspired by the French Maginot Line, and "Light Objects", designated vz.36 (the so-called French type) and a more modern vz. 37, besides a system of obstacles (barbed wire, Czech hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and also natural obstacles). The "Heavy Objects" were armed with cannons and several machineguns, manned by 900 men. The heavy bunkers were armed with 3000 artillery pieces, not counting mortars or anti-tank cannons. However, the fortifications could not always be built as the foremost defensive line because of the heavy vegetation. Furthermore, a defensive line had been built around the capital Prague, and a defensive line running west and northwest of Plzeň.
If the invaders succeeded in breaking through the defence lines and into the vastness of space of the relatively flat Bohemia, all three arms centres would be threatened. A fight could, when a timely withdrawal had succeeded, then only be carried out in the mountainous regions of Slovakia, which lacked larger industrial infrastructure.
As the heavy fortifications required one year of planning and three to four years for construction, the development of the entire fortifications in the autumn of 1938 still not completed, and only about 20% of the heavy objects and 70% of the light objects had been completed.
The plan was to construct 1,300 heavy fortifications (so called "Heavy Objects") and 16.000 light fortifications. These were to be distributed around the borders Czechoslovakia shared with Germany, Hungary and Poland. Between 1935 to 1938, 9 artillery forts, 265 infantry casemates and nearly 9,500 light pillboxes had been completely constructed and armed. Of the heavy objects, 7 were constructed in southern Moravia against Austria (this was calculated because of the Austrian neutrality in a case of emergency), 11 in the whole of Slovakia and the rest in northern Moravia and Bohemia. Of the light pillboxes, 3,003 had been built in Western and Southern Bohemia, 1,852 in Northern Bohemia, 1,000 in Southern Bohemia, 1,195 in Northern Bohemia and 1,492 in Slovakia.
Subsequently, the OKH observed the lack of armoured domes in the sections between the Oderské vrchy (Odergebirge - Oder Mountains) to the southwest of Opava (Troppau), compared with those located at the tip of Glatzer, both sides Náchod and in the western part of the Krkonoše mountains (Riesengebirge in German) which were completed. The remaining sections of the Silesian front were not fully defendable. Weak points existed at the Jeseniky Mountains to the Krkonoše mountains. At the Saxonian front there was only one fortified extension east of the Elbe River, but west of the river there were a system of three fortified positions. A breakdown depth of about 2 km was believed only to exist in the second line of fortified positions. Positions with anti-tank cannons were not present. At the Bavarian consisted of the front part of the vast fortifications armed with heavy machineguns. Also here the defences lacked anti-tank cannons.
In the section of Zlatá Koruna (Goldenkron) only some few artillery and tank positions existen. The depth of the fortified line was low here, not exceeding 300 meters. Only at various prioritised location the depth of the line reached 6 km. Opposing the former Austrian border, some of the facilities had not been completed because of the short time available. Some of them were only in the first stage of construction, and the few fully completed bunkers had only been concreted and were not armed with armed turrets.
The peacetime strength of the Czechoslovak regular army in 1937 comprised 171,000 men in 17 infantry divisions and 4 fast (rychlé) divisions. The average division strength was therefore - under deducting 10,000 men serving in the air forces and other forces and army troops - with barely 7,000 men. In the May Crisis the strength of the peacetime force had grown to 320,000 men. For the full mobilization case, the field army should consist of 972,747 men including 43,474 officers.
The general mobilization, ordered on September 23, 1938, would according to plan yield 1,280,000 men, comprising 38 divisions - 34 infantry divisions and 4 fast divisions. One of the regular infantry divisions was motorized (lorry-borne), another was in the process of being motorized. The mobile divisions, like the French divisions légères de cavalerie of that period, were composed basically of a tank brigade and a cavalry brigade.
Czechs had also four division-sized formations of low-quality infantry (skupiny) manning the extensive border fortifications. Along them were 138 battalions of uniformed men (border guards, customs officials, railway guards, etc.), also manning the border fortifications fortifications. These 138 battalions could be counted as the equivalent of 14-15 infantry divisions.
The general mobilization in Czechoslovakia alone yielded 1,280,000 trained soldiers, and this number did not include all the reservists, since only 18 classes of the First Reserve (I. záloha) and specialists from the Second Reserve (II. záloha) were called up. The bulk of the Second Reserve was left undisturbed - apparently for lack of weapons.
The Czech military disposition on September 30, 1938 was as follows:
- The I. armáda ”Havlíček”, under the command of Arm. Gen. Sergěj Vojcechovský, with its headquarters located in Kutná Hora, was concentrated in Bohemia with 9 infantry divisions divided into 4 corps, with 1 infantry division in reserve. Their task was to defend Bohemia as well as defending the industrial centres in the capital Prague and Plzeň. Their task also included defending České Budějovice.
- The II. armáda ”Jirásek”, under the command of Arm. Gen. Vojtěch Boris Luža, with its headquarters located in Olomouc, was concentrated in northern Moravia with 3 infantry divisions divided into 2 corps as well as border defence and border fortification units, with 1 infantry division in reserve. Their task was to defend the northern Moravian border and prevent the Germans from making a pincer movement. Though the Czechs relied upon the massive border fortifications in the area, the units of the division were considerably weak.
- The III. armáda ”Štefánik”, under the command of Arm. Gen. Josef Votruba, with its headquarters located in Kremnica, was concentrated in Slovakia with 4 infantry divisions divided into 3 corps, with with 2 infantry divisions and 1 fast division in reserve. Their task was to defend Slovakia from an expected Hungarian advance as well as a German attack into southern Moravia and/or Bratislava
- The IV. armáda ”Neruda”, under the command of Arm. Gen. Lev Prchala, with its headquarters located in Brno, was concentrated in southern Moravia with with 5 infantry divisions and 1 fast division divided into 4 corps as well as fortification units, with 2 infantry divisions and 1 fast division in reserve. Their task was to defend southern Moravia between České Budějovice and the confluence of the Danube and Morava rivers from a German attack and prevent them from making a pincer move.
The reserves of the Main Headquarters were under direct command of the Army High Command under the Chief of Army, General of the Army Ludvík Krejčí. It comprised 9 infantry divisions and 1 fast division.
[edit] Opposing forces
[edit] Germany
The German Army was one of the most modern and well-equipped army in existence in September 1938, and had an organisation and command structure was very efficient of its time. While being one of the most motorised armed forces at that time, it's motorisation is often exaggerated, as horses were still the primary means of transportation for most infantry divisions. Its airforce (Luftwaffe) was the most modern and one of the largest airforces in the world. It enjoyed a numerical advantage over the Czechs, enjoying an overall 2:1 numerical superiority.
Despite the advantages and the might of the Wehrmacht, Germany was only moderately prepared for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Stocks of ammunition and replacement vehicles, for example, were low, and Hitler's move was regarded as a military gamble as well as a political one. The German economy had for years geared toward production of military equipment and supplies, and was capable of creating an army that could successfully invade its neighbours only if the campaign was not a long one. The German economy was never fully mobilized for war and was burdened by heavy militarisation, and urgently needed foreign currency.
The peacetime strength of the German Army (with the former Austrian Army included) in the summer of 1938 yielded 650,000 men, and thus was smaller than the expected number of 830,000 men (not counting the Austrian Army) made in 1936. The German field army yielded in the autumn of 1938 2,105,000 men following the mobilisation plan of 1937/38, also including border and fortification troops comprsing 184,000 men as well as 538,000 men from the RAD ( Reichsarbeitsdienst, Reich Labour Service) without military training. The 21 Landwehr divisions comprised 300,000 men. The troops defending East Prussia and the Western Front comprised 250,000 men. Thus, the German Army had around 900,000 men as well as 60,000 men from the former Austrian Army and border troops at their disposal against Czechoslovakia.
In the summer of 1938, the German standing Army (Heer) comprised forty-six regular divisions.
- 34 infantry divisions
- 4 motorised infantry divisions
- 3 mountain divisions
- 3 Panzer divisions
- 2 light divisions
- 2 independent armoured brigades
- 1 cavalry brigade
The reserve components were very small. Not only did Germany (like France) experience the "white years" from 1915 to 1918 when the birthrate was very low, but also, owing to the Versailles restrictions, there was no conscription from 1919 to 1935. Accordingly, the greater part of the male population under the age of thirty-five had had no military training, and the veterans of the First World War had had none since 1918 and were past the usual age for front-line service. In 1938 most of the traned reserves were needed to bring the regular divisions to combat strength, and only eight additional divisions for the front line were formed from reserve components, while twenty-one Landwehr (overage) divisions, useful primarily for rear-area or static defence assignments, were formed from the thirty-five- to forty-five-year age group.
For higher command purposes in peacetime, the forty-seven regular divisions were distributed among eighteen corps commands, and the corps in turn were subordinated to five group commands; these last were the highest field headquarters, and their commanders-in-chief reported directly to OKH. In wartime, the group commands would become "army group" of "army" headquarters, and the corps might remain such or be upgraded to "army" level. For Grün, command of the field Army was to be distributed among one army group and ten armies.
The German armoured forces in October 1938 were planned to comprise 3,328 tanks, but due to economic and industrial shortcomings with the production of the Pz.Kpfw. III and IV tanks, the German Army had only 2,606 tanks at their disposal in September 1938. Despite having a 4.86:1 numerical superiority in armoured forces, around 88% of them were already obsolete at the time of the Munich Agreement.
The German armoured forces consisted of:
- 1468 Pz.Kpfw. I light tanks
- 823 Pz.Kpfw. II light tanks
- 59 Pz.Kpfw. III medium tanks
- 76 Pz.Kpfw. IV infantry support tanks
- 180 Pz.BfWg. I and III commander's tanks
However, the most overlooked innovation in the German reforms was the widespread application of radio to command and control the troops in combat. Radio enabled Panzer units to coordinate their actions with neighbouring units and their supporting arms, making combined arms warfare possible.
The armoured and light divisions was planned to use operational doctrine developed during and after the First World War, coupled with older concepts such as Vernichtungsgedanken. In accordance with the ideas of Heinz Guderian, German tanks and mechanized support units (motorized artillery, etc.) were used in massive, mechanized spearhead (Schwerpunkt) attacks, serving as highly mobile units to punch holes in the enemy line and isolate selected enemy units, which the infantry would then encircle and destroy while the armored and mechanized forces pushed forward to repeat the process, eventually breaking through enemy frontlines and then dispersing, causing confusion in the rear areas and severing lines of supply and communication.
Less mobile mechanized infantry and regular infantry (who, along with their horse-drawn artillery support, vastly outnumbered their mechanized comrades) would then in theory follow-up the panzer divisions' penetration into enemy territory. The Heer was closely supported by the Luftwaffe, especially by dive bombers that attacked and disrupted the enemy's supply and communications lines and spread panic and confusion in its rear, thus further paralyzing the enemy's defensive capabilities. Mechanization was the key to this German tactic first revealed in the September Campaign and nicknamed blitzkrieg (lightning war) by contemporary journalists, who found the name fitting because of the unprecedented speed and mobility that were its underlying characteristics.
Aircraft (particularly fighter and ground attack aircraft) played a major role in the fighting. Bomber aircraft purposely attacked cities and civilian targets causing huge losses amongst the civilian population in what became known as terror bombings. The Luftwaffe forces consisted of 1,180 fighter aircraft (mainly Bf 109s), 290 Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers and 290 conventional bombers (mainly of the Heinkel He-111 and Dornier Do-17. In total, Germany had 2,850 aircraft (~2,000 of them can be considered militarily modern) with most of them deployed to participate in Fall Grün.
The German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, was also the best force of its kind in 1938. It was a ground-cooperation force designed to support the army, but its planes were superior to nearly all foreign types. In the rearmament period from 1935 to 1939, the production of German combat aircraft steadily mounted, and the standardization of engines and airframes gave the Luftwaffe an advantage over its opponents.
[edit] Hungary
The condition of the Hungarian Armed Forces was in stark contrast to that of both Germany and Czechoslovakia. Because of the small army imposed on them after World War I, the Hungarians had had to concentrate on raising the quality rather than the number of their troops, resulting in a small, but highly professional cadre. Their air force, motorised and cavalry brigades had all been substantially re-equipped with modern German and Italian equipment in the mid-1930's, and the pick of them had been assembled for the invasion of Ruthenia and the subsequent thrust into eastern Slovakia, both of which they conducted with speed and efficiency.
The parts of the Treaty of Trianon relevant to this study abolished general military service (conscription) and set the total strength of the Hungarian Army at no more than 35,000 volunteers of all ranks. This force was limited in its mission to the maintenance of internal order and the guarding of the national borders. Heavy armaments were limited to 105 light cannons and 140 trench mortars. Even these consisted of reserve stocks from the First World War, and were not of the best, being inferior material which the K.u.K. (Kaiserliche- und Königliche, i.e. the Imperial Austrian) Army had doled out to the second-line Hungarian Army.
The Treaty also proscribed the most minute organizational details:
- the officer corps was numerically fixed at 1,750 men;
- the armaments industry was totally dismantled;
- stockpiling for and equipment of the army was exactly described;
- the maintenance of an air force was forbidden;
- the creation of a tank force was also strictly forbidden;
- the production of anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, heavy artillery, etc. was not allowed;
- only the manufacture of light weapons such as pistols and rifles was allowed.
Hungary was allowed 12 armoured cars used for internal security duties, consisting of several Italian Bianchi and Fiats and German Erhardt M-17s. The rest were more modern Vickers, built especially in England for Hungary, which were added 1926.
An Allied Commission was established to watch over the compliance with the Treaty’s terms. The 52 member Commission consisted of representatives from the USA, England, France and Italy. As even the wear and tear of equipment was predetermined under the terms of the Treaty, it proved to be extremely difficult to establish and maintain an effective field force, let alone stockpile equipment for a larger army – which was exactly the object of the Treaty.
During the 1920’s and 1930’s, Hungary made consistent attempts and used ingenuous means to circumvent the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. With regards to the military restrictions, she was only partially successful. Although officers and NCOs were kept on the active lists in far greater numbers than the small Hungarian Army warranted, Hungary was initially not able to overcome the arms and equipment limitations imposed by the Treaty. The newly created and enlarged nations in the Balkans were eager to keep Hungary weak, especially as the owed their present status to the parcelling of Hungarian territories. They willingly and ably assisted the Control Commission to make certain that the Trianon Treaty was adhered to. A severe handicap was the very nature of Trianon Hungary itself. The flat countryside, as well as the concentration of nearly all the industry around Budapest made production of forbidden equipment next to impossible during the 1920’s.
Early attempts to avoid the constricting terms of the treaty, therefore, were foiled by the “Small Entente”. This was the name given to the alliance between the ČSR, Yugoslavia and Romania, sponsored by France, with the object of maintaining the status quo in the Danube Basin, of preventing the resurrection of the House of Habsburg Monarchy, and of warding off Hungarian claims relating to its one-time territories. Naturally, this interest extended to keeping the Hungarian Army weak. After 1926 the importance of the Small Entente diminished, and it virtually ceased to exist after 1928, as the Control Commission had been dissolved on March 31, 1927.
After control was relaxed somewhat, Hungary began in 1927 – surreptitiously – to expand her army and her armaments industry slightly, to prolong the basic training period for the lower ranks, and to perfect the training of the officers.
In 1927 the army was reorganized. It still very much reflected the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Trianon.
There were now seven mixed brigades:
- 1. (Budapest);
- 2. (Székésfehérvár);
- 3. (Szombathely);
- 4. (Pécs);
- 5. (Szeged);
- 6. (Debrecen);
- 7. (Miskolc);
and two cavalry brigades:
- 1. (Budapest);
- 2. (Nylregyháza).
The armed forces now slowly began to expand. The infantry and cavalry were reorganized, some heavy artillery batteries were added to the artillery corps, and a few airplanes were bought from Italy in secret. The manufacture of airplane engines was also started on a small scale.
There was also a small force of Border Guards and the Danube Flotilla consisting of vessels awarded by the peace treaty. In spite of the prohibition against conscription, the able-bodied male population was called up on reaching military age and passed through a form of military basic training, while a thorough pre-military training scheme was enacted for all boys, known as the Youth Organization (Levente). All these expedients, however, still left Hungary in a state of vast military inferiority, both actual and potential, compared with her neighbours. At this time, Hungary had about 35,000 men under arms as allowed for by the Treaty of Trianon.
After 1928, it was obvious that it might soon be possible to pay less attention to the limitations imposed on Hungary’s armed forces by the Treaty of Trianon and the “Small Entente”.
After several minor reorganizations, it became clear that a long-range plan was called for. The first of these plans was known as the Elöd Plan of October 24, 1932.
The Elöd Plan provided for:
- The raising of 21 infantry divisions (each with 9 infantry battalions and 12 artillery batteries);
- The mobile units to be increased in quantity, combining them into larger units;
- Border Guard units to be increased and strengthened;
- The modernization of all equipment.
The objectives were only slowly achieved. The Small Entente was still a looming shadow, even if it no longer had a fierce bite.
Over the next six years the Hungarian Army was slowly built up again. Standardization of equipment and training was inadequate. Most equipment was still left over from World War I, and from various other sources. By buying from Italy in 1935, Hungary was able to obtain weapons not allowed to be produced within its own borders. Initially, there was much controversy within the military as to the source of weapons to be bought for Hungary, but the political and economic ties, as well as Italian membership in the victorious dictating nations of Trianon, decided the matter in favour of the Italians.
Made bold by these unsanctioned purchases of armaments, as well as by the German rearmament programs begun after Adolf Hitler came to power, the Hungarian government announced a five-year plan on March 15, 1938 for the rearmament and industrial expansion of Hungary, as well as an increase in the size of the armed forces.
The old Elöd Plan was revised by the Huba Army Expansion and Mobilization Plan, enacted March 5, 1938 as part of the Army Reform Plan. It set the development of the Hungarian Army in three stages:
- Huba I (to become effective on April 1, 1940)
- Huba II (to become effective on March 1, 1941)
- Huba III (to become effective on March 1, 1942)
Political and military events were to influence this timetable to some extent, but without drastically altering the aims of the Plan. Major stumbling blocks in the path of the Elöd Plan were the equipping of all units with heavy weapons, the creation of the armoured and motorised units, as well as acquiring of sufficient modern aircraft. The Huba Plan emphasized increasing the size of the armoured and motorised units troops, expanding and strengthening the Border Guards, and generally modernising the organisation, administration and order of battle of the Hungarian Army itself.
In the spring of 1938 the organisation of the Armed Forces was still governed by the Elöd Plan, in which a Field Corps was supposed to have a mobilised strength of 36,000 men, and an infantry brigade 9,000 men. A study by the Honvéd Ministry regarding general mobilisation, concluded that the personnel requirements for 266 infantry battalions could, in an emergency, only be fulfilled after December 1938. The material requirements would take longer. The international situation in 1938 made it desirable to the Hungarian Government that the pace of the rearmament be increased so that the organisation of the Armed Forces correspond to the guidelines laid down by the Huba Plan.
To allow a relatively uninterrupted mobilisation, the Huba Plan specified that the units of the Border Guard be the first to be strengthened to allow time for the mobilisation within Hungary without exterior interruption. The mobile troops were also to be strengthened to have a highly mobile, rapid reaction force available in case the enemy broke through the Border Guard units. Accordingly, the 1st Mobile Brigade was quickly built up to full strength, and provided with almost its full complements of supply elements. (These were usually only provided to units upon mobilisation). This would enable the 1st Mobile Brigade to be ready to move within 12 hours of receiving mobilisation orders.
The continuing tensions in the international situation caused the cadre of the 2nd Mobile Brigade to be raised in 1938, also with its full complement of weapons, personnel and services, while the heavy infantry weapons allotted to the infantry brigades were further increased.
Also in 1938, the Armed Forces Act as passed to provide the necessary manpower. The Act also entitled the Government to proclaim a state of national emergency, and upon doing so, could assume certain emergency powers, the important of which were:
- to restrict the right of assembly and combination,
- to place under police supervision, or to intern, any person whose conduct rendered such measures desirable,
- to susped provisionally the application of certain laws, in particular those restricting the output of labor,
- to control wages, profits and prices,
- to block stocks of commodities
On October 1, 1938, the seven mixed brigades (created in 1927) were used as the basis for the expansion of the Hungarian Army. Each brigade had been located in a specific region of Hungary. This region was redesignated as a Corps, and received the number of the mixed brigade (I - VII). In these corps-sized administrative areas, the headquarters of each Corps was in the same location as that of the old mixed brigades. In effect, the brigades became corps. It was planned that each corps should have three brigades. Two brigades were to be based the regular army regiments, while the thurd was to be raised from the Border Guard units within the corps.
Although this was theoretically possible at the time from a future manpower point of view, there had been barely enough equipment to supply the original seven brigades, let alone 24 new ones. What in fact happened is that each Corps only set up two active brigades, while the third brigade existed only on paper.
The peacetime strength of the Hungarian Army in 1938 comprised 85,000 men in 14 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry brigades and 2 motorised brigades. In late-September 1938 Hungary had supported Hitler by mobilizing between 200,000 and 350,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped men on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders, ready to invade Czechoslovakia in case of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia. After Munich, the Hungarians had remained poised threateningly on the Slovak border. They reportedly had artillery ammunition for only 36 hours of operations, and were clearly engaged in a bluff, but it was a bluff the Germans had encouraged, and one that they would have been obliged to support militarily if the much larger, better trained and better equipped Czechoslovak Army chose to fight.
The terms of the Treaty of Trianon severely limited the amount and type of equipment the fledgling army was allowed. The treaty forbidded Hungary modern mobile troops and tank units, artillery pieces over 105 mm in caliber and an air force. Their army's equipment consisted mostly of surplus arms and equipment, most of them dating from or before the First World War. However, the Hungarians managed to save four 305 mm 11.M and 16.M howitzers and some aircrafts in farms and other locations. In secret the Hungarians continued to work on expanding, modernising and rearming the army and the air force in secret.
In 1938, the Hungarian Army, though still inferior both in numbers and in the number and the quality of equipment, had managed to rearm itself considerably with both Italian and German equipment.
In 1936, the Hajmáskér Mobile Group (Hajmáskéri gépkocsizócsoport) was raised using the Armoured Vehicle group, consisting of a motorised infantry battalion, a tank battalion (with three companies of 16 35M Ansaldo tankettes each, bought from Italy in 1935), motorised artillery battalion (with 3 batteries of light howitzers) a motorised pioneer company, a motorised signal platton and motorised logistic services. In 1936 Hungary received 30 CV.33 and 20 CV. 3/35 tankettes from Italy, and a further 100 CV.33 tankettes in 1937. Another two CV. 3/35 of the former Austrian Army were acquired from Germany following the Anschluss. These were renamed 35.M Ansaldo in Hungarian service. The Hungarians were well aware at that time these vehicles did not meet the criteria of modern combat vehicles, but used them widely until the army was re-equipped with more modern vehicles.
They also bought more 105 mm light field howitzers from Italy and corresponding 3-ton halftrack towing vehicles from Germany.
In early 1938, the artillery had a peace time strength of 92½ batteries, of which only 15% were motorised. The corps had 63 horse-drawn light field gun batteries with 100 mm and 105 mm equipment (mostly 14/a.M) as well as 7 horse-drawn batteries with 14.M 149 mm equipment. The two motorised brigades and the two cavalry brigades had 3 batteries each, for a total of 12 motorised batteries.
Starting with the Army reorganisation in 1938, artillery battalions were no longer kept covert, and assumed their proper numbering within the peacetime order of battle. GHQ artillery received numbers over 100. The batteries of the bicycle battalions were also converted to German 105 mm LeFH 18 howitzer, renamed 37.M in Hungarian service. The Border Guard was reinforced by 11 batteries with four 75 mm 15/35.M moutnain guns each.
Italian and German concepts to modernise Hungary's Air Defence Forces were used by the Head of the LüH (Légügyi Hivatal, Air Department) Dr. György Rákosi, himself a commander of a air force squadron during the First World War. In 1937 the framework of the future fighter element of the Hungarian Air Force was created with the establishment of the 1st Fighter Regiment (1. Vadász Ezred) quickly followed by the 2nd Fighter Regiment. Dur to a shortage of aircrafts available only one group (Vadász Osztály) could be formed for each regiment. These were equipped with Italian Fiat CR. 32 fighter aircrafts.
To meet its bomber requirements the Air Force had, in 1936, finally opted for the Junkers Ju-86K-2 bomber powered by the WM-built Gnôme-Rhône 14K, and successive orders were to result in a total of 66 bombers of this type being acquired. The first recipient of the Ju-86K-2 was the 3rd Bomber Regiment (3. Bombázó Ezred, its 1st Group (3./I Bombázó Osztály) starting to form on the type in 1937, its 2nd Group (3./II Bombázó Osztály) being equippoed with the Caproni Ca-101 ans still known officially as the first Airmail Group (1. Légiposta Osztály).
Following the Anschluss on March 12, 1938, it was believed that Hungary would probably fall within the German sphere of influence. Germany, anxious to strengten its presence in the area, proposed that the Luftwaffe should help the Hungarian government with its expanding air arm and undertook to assist in the reorganisation, modernisation and expansion of the Hungarian Air Force. The Hungarian government, attempting to force a rapid expansion of its military aviation, decided to accept the offer.
As matters stood, after the retirement of Colonel István Petróczy and until the appointment of his successor Valdemár Kenese, the clandestine air armt had been commanded by Army officers with little if any aviation experience. Of the seven commanders of the Air Force between 1920 and 1938, only three had an aviation background; the rest were regular army men because no senior Air Force officers were available to fill the position. Generalmajor Alexander Löhr was sent to Hungary to head up this mission. He had been Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Air Force (Österreichische Luftstreitkräfte) until the Anschluss, and was a highly experienced and energetic officer, and the seconding of General Löhr as an adviser to the Hungarian Air Force was of intererst.
The small Luftwaffe mission sent to Hungary included flying and technical instructiors, specialists in tactics and organisation, as well as other personnel. It arrived in Hungary to direct and staff both the flying schools and the operational units. The Luftwaffe mission recommended reorganising existing training facilities and establishing new schools. The mission also acted as advisers to air staffs ajnd individual operational units.
[edit] Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak Army was fairly strong in numbers and was one of the most modern and well-equipped army in existence in September 1938, and had as well a very efficient organisation and command structure. Due to tensions over Sudetenland between Germany and Czechoslovakia starting in May 1938, most of the army was already mobilized in September 1938.
The peacetime strength of the Czechoslovak regular army in 1937 comprised 171,000 men in 17 infantry divisions and 4 fast (rychlé) divisions. The average division strength was therefore - under deducting 10,000 men serving in the air forces and other forces and army troops - with barely 7,000 men. In the May Crisis the strength of the peacetime force had grown to 320,000 men. For the full mobilization case, the field army should consist of 972,747 men including 43,474 officers.
The general mobilization, ordered on September 23, 1938, would according to plan yield 1,280,000 men, comprising 38 divisions - 34 infantry divisions and 4 fast divisions. One of the regular infantry divisions was motorized (lorry-borne), another was in the process of being motorized. The mobile divisions, like the French divisions légères de cavalerie of that period, were composed basically of a tank brigade and a cavalry brigade.
Czechs had also four division-sized formations of low-quality infantry (skupiny) manning the extensive border fortifications. Along them were 138 battalions of uniformed men (border guards, customs officials, railway guards, etc.), also manning the border fortifications fortifications. These 138 battalions could be counted as the equivalent of 14-15 infantry divisions.
The general mobilization in Czechoslovakia alone yielded 1,280,000 trained soldiers, and this number did not include all the reservists, since only 18 classes of the First Reserve (I. záloha) and specialists from the Second Reserve (II. záloha) were called up. The bulk of the Second Reserve was left undisturbed - apparently for lack of weapons.
While the Czechoslovak Armed Forces was had a large and efficient arms production, and produced most of its small arms, artillery, vehicles and aircraft themselves. The main arms manufacturers were the Škoda Works (Škodovy závody), ČKD (Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk), ČZ (Česká zbrojovka) and ZB (Zbrojovka Brno).
Numbers of weapons of the Czechoslovak army on September 1938:
- 1,280,000 soldiers
- 217,000 horses
- 26,000 motor vehicles
- 207,200 pistols
- 1,536,000 hand grenades
- 864,500 rifles
- 34,500 light machineguns
- 7,100 heavy machineguns (ČZ vz. 24)
- 1,600 heavy machineguns (ZB vz. 37)
- 600 anti-tank guns (37 mm and 47 mm guns)
- 230 anti-aircraft guns (20 mm VKPL vz. 36)
- 90 anti-aircraft guns (80 mm)
- 140 anti-aircraft guns (83,5 mm FlaK vz. 22)
- 900 mortars (80 mm)
- 200 mortars (90 mm)
- 240 mountain guns (75 mm)
- 270 light guns (80 mm)
- 600 light howitzers (100 mm)
- 100 heavy guns (105 mm)
- 340 heavy howitzer (150 mm)
- 15 heavy armoured cars (OA vz. 27)
- 51 light armoured cars (OA vz. 30)
- 70 Tč vz. 33 tankettes
- 50 LT vz. 34 light tanks
- 300 LT vz. 35 light tanks
- 50 LT vz. 38 light tanks (the export to Iran was cancelled when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia)
The Czechoslovak Air Force was considerably large, though smaller in size compared with the Luftwaffe. Although its pilots were highly trained, the Czechoslovak Air Force lacked modern fighter aircraft, and the Germans had gross numerical superiority. The Czechoslovak Air Force consisted on September 1938 of:
- 445 Avia B-534 fighter aircrafts (370 Avia B-534 and 75 Bk-534)
- 300 Letov Š-328 light bombers
- 100 light reconnaissance aircraft (mainly Aero A-100/Ab-101)
- 60 Avia B-71 light bombers
- 50 MB 200 heavy bombers.
In total, Czechoslovakia had 880 operational out of 955 aircraft against 3,194 aircraft of the Luftwaffe, of which 2,850 being deployed for Fall Grün. Of these between 600 and 700 of them were first line aircraft, of which 520 were operational. 445 of these were fighter aircraft of the type Avia B-534 and Bk-534 biplanes armed with four 7.92 mm machineguns (Bk-534 had two machineguns and a 20 mm Oerlikon automatic cannon) and with a maximum speed of 405 km/h. Introduced in 1935, the B-534 was well ahead of its contemporaries in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. It was fast and elegant, and in the 1937 airshow in Zurich it was second only to Germany's Messerschmitt Bf-109. However, in 1938 it was becoming obsolete.
The Czechoslovak Air Force also consisted of 60 Avia B-71 light bombers. Produced under license from the Soviet Union, its design was very advanced, but lacked refinement, much to the dismay of crews and maintenance personnel. The Avia B-71 (known in the Soviet Union as the SB-2) was the first modern stressed-skin aircraft produced in quantity in the Soviet Union and probably the most formidable bomber of the mid-1930s. Sixty aircraft were to be flown to Czechoslovakia by mid-1938. The planned licensed production program took a decidedly leisurely course, despite the increasingly dangerous political situation. Though it only could have a bomb payload of 600 kg, it had a maximum speed of 450 km/h, thus being faster than the fighter aircrafts of the Czechoslovak Air Force.
The Czechoslovak Air Force also consisted of 50 Bloch MB-200 heavy bombers. While having only a maximum speed of 285 km/h, they could have a bomb payload of 1,200 kg.
[edit] Weaknesses
Though the Czechoslovak Armed Forces were well-trained and well-equipped, it had some serious weaknesses as well. One of them were the heterogeneous structure of the population of Czechoslovakia. The tensions among the different ethnic groups in Czechoslovakia largely arose because of the more numerous Czechs dominated the central government and other national institutions, all of which had their seats in the capital Prague.
In 1938, Czechoslovakia had a population of 14,8 million, of them only around 7 million were Czechs. In the armed the forces only 52% of the soldiers were Czechs, while 22% were Germans, 15% were Slovaks and 5% were Hungarians.
The most serious ethnic problem in Czechoslovakia was the Germans living in Sudetenland. The 126,000 Sudeten Germans serving in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces would likely not follow the orders to fight the invading Germans, as they felt opressed by the goverment in Prague and considered the Germans to be liberators.
Problem also arose between the Czechs and the Slovaks. As a consequence of the Czech's political dominance was that they also dominated the army officer corps, and a side effect of their virtual industrial monopoly was that they also monopolised the key technical arms of the armed forces: the air force, the armoured force and the artillery. This imbalance was partly inherited, because in 1915 there had been 52 Czech regular officers in the Austro-Hungarian Army for every Slovak officer (2%) - a situation that was probably little altered when Czechoslovakia gained independence in 1918. However, post-independence Slovak advancement had been slow. In 1938 only 395 (4.9%) of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces' regular Warrant Officers were Slovaks. This was already a serious under representation, but it grew worse higher up the command structure, where only 435 (3.4%) of the regular officers, and 3 (1.1%) of the general staff officers were Slovaks. At the very top, only one of 139 generals was a Slovak (Div. Gen. Rudolf Viest).
This implied that some Slovak advancement had taken place since 1918 but that, although Slovaks supplied the manpower of about four active divisions in 1938, they still provided officers and NCOs barely sufficient to command one. The absence of a Slovak upper class, and the smallness of the evolving Slovak middle class, from which group's officer corps elsewere were drawn, provided some justification for this situation, but couldn't alter the fact of serious Slovak under-representation.
Slovak under-representation was also evident amongst reservists. The biggest single source of reserve officers in Czechoslovakia was schoolteachers, and the already noted shortage of Slovak teachers fed through into under-representation in the reserve officer corps. The most distinctive feature of Slovakia's military contribution to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces was that all the country's mountain troops were raised in the province, through which ran the Carpathian Mountains.
[edit] The Soviet Union as Czechoslovakia's ally
The Soviet Union had been an ally of Czechoslovakia since the Assistance Treaty from 1935, but already during the May crisis they had shown themselves to be more than cautious with their support. Their role in the further course of the Sudeten crisis offers a broad band of controversial hypotheses. The English historian Wheeler-Bennet was convinced that the Soviet Union had observed fully with their obligations to the Czech government. According to Haslam a joint conference between the Soviet Union and the Western powers and the ČSR and general staff meetings with Hitler had prevented an aggression, and therefore there was no necessity for the Soviets to intervene actively.
The Soviet Union was not a “bourgeois” state. When they went from the Trotskyist policy of World Revolution which they did not have in mind to the Stalinist policy of Socialism in One State, the ultimate goal was clear. In 1925, Stalin stated about the role of the USSR in a future war that the Soviet Union wouldn't get involved in a conflict until the strength balance had been clarified. This stand was still in effect 13 years later during the Sudeten Crisis.
The USSR had since the beginning of the Five Year Plans made significant progress in the quantity of formations as well as quality of the equipment. The peacetime forces counted in 1937 1,433,000 men with 98 infantry divisions and 30 cavalry divisions and had a war time strength to 10,157,000 men.
Noteworthy of the Five Year Plans was the increased production of weapons. While only 750 light tanks were produced in 1930, 3,139 pieces were produced in 1937, including medium and heavy tanks. At the end of 1937, the Soviet Union had 12,500 tanks at disposal.
For the Soviet Union, the alliance with France and the ČSR was quite useful, as they expected that in case of a German aggression an attack on Poland by Germany would be quite likely. This would result in a German-Soviet confrontation line. France and CSR would in such a situation be a direct militarical aid because both countries shared borders with Germany. So was the French-Soviet treaty a tool that the USSR could benefit from in case of a German attack. In the case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, the allies had to create create conditions so the Soviet could intervene on the side of the ČSR.
The crucial problem with the involvement of the Soviet Union in a common conflict against was the problem with marching through Poland. This issue was discussed Moscow in 1934 between French and Soviet officials during the preparations of the pact, but no solution was found. The Soviets knew that Poland, of historical reasons, would never let Soviet troops march through Poland. They assumed that the USSR would occupy territories lost to Poland in 1921, especially after the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the Sudeten Crisis.
As the Soviets expected that the Poles would under no circumstances let Soviet troops cross their territory, was the only option left to march across Romanian territory, but the russians had territorial claims on Bessarabia and Bukovina since they fell under Romanian control following the First World War.
Therefore the Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu sought in 1936 for a treaty with the Soviet Union for the rights of passage of Soviet troops, but limited to through the territory of Bukovina. He was of the opinion that the Soviet Union, in case of an emergency, they would consider it as their interests to march through Romanian territory, even without any concessions of the disputed territories. However, the technical requirements for such an operation would be bad, because there was only a single railway connection available by the Soviet Union that led through Bukovina to the ČSR. It was impossible to transport significant amount of troops to Czechoslovakia in the short time necessary for a German attack to succeed.
The refusal of Romania to allow Soviet troops passage through Bessarabia on a broad front, which restricted them only to pass through Bukovina, decreased the value of the Soviet intervention on land significantly. On September 14, the Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen met with his Soviet colleague, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov, in Geneva, where Litvinov said that 100,000 men of the Red Army with 750 artillery pieces and 350 tanks could be prepard to be transported to Czechoslovakia within six days after the outbreak of war, with the train passing through Romania. This was confirmed by Romania in a note on 24 September. Romania also declared itself ready to accept Soviet aircraft to fly over their territory at an altitude of 3,500-4,000 m and operate 25 km from the Polish border. But the Soviet Union responded by referring to their plan known to the League of Nations and thus refused to accept the Romanian offer.
According to the Soviets, they could transport 250,000 to 300,000 men to Czechoslovakia by air and land. They even claimed that they could transport, if the transfer began at 1800 hours on September 25 and ended on 6 October, 301,196 soldiers and 32,271 machineguns by air and an additional 70,000 men by rail. This had never been done before without logistical preparations, and thus was pretty much thought to be exaggerated.
Another way of the USSR to help the ČR, was the support by air. The German propaganda had since the signing of the Franco-Soviet Treaty no chance to be warned against aircraft transfers to Czechoslovakia. Fully fantastic figures were not only common in the official propaganda of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels', but also in the diplomatic channels. Neither were there specific airfields for the Soviet aircraft in the ČSR, but the number did exceed 100 until September 1938.
However, in the tense month of September, the Soviets began to increase the military presence in Czechoslovakia. The same report (of September 9, 1938) spoke of 650 Soviet airplanes already in Czechoslovakia, with another 300 requested. It is probable that the number of Soviet aircraft actually in Czechoslovakia was around 550 (as the Czech sources claim) rather than the claimed 650, but the Soviets promised to supply Beneš with additional airplanes in case a conflict with Germany should break out. It is conceivable that, in event of war, that Soviet “volunteers” would have operated interceptor aircraft over Czechoslovakia so as not to fall into unfriendly hands in a case of emergency.
On March 17, 1938, five days after the Anschluss of Austria, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov stated that the USSR would fully stand by their obligations to Czechoslovakia would, but on the condition that France would do likewise. And in the crucial final phase, Moscow would take the matter to the League of Nations and "abide by the decision" if the French would not fulfil their commitments.
When Beneš complained that this would take too long, Alexandrovsky brought further word that, if Czechoslovakia submitted a plea to Geneva that would be enough to warrant Soviet aid.
But all this was of little importance, for Beneš had already decided against going to war with the Soviet Union as the only ally. As he viewed it, his country would then be regarded as a "Soviet satellite," there would be domestic difficulties with the Agrarians and other conservatives, and Poland and Hungary, together with "reactionary circles in the West" might join forces in a "war to the death against Bolshevism," and side with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union.
The military preparations of the USSR covered only the two western military districts (Belarus and Ukraine) in accordance of the "special military districts" by 1 September, which had been established by the Supreme Military Council on June 26. In Ukranian military district, two army groups were mobilised. In the area in Kamenets-Podolski and Vinnitsa the 4th Cavalry Corps, 25th Armored Corps and the 17th Corps were mobilised, while the second around in Kiev, Chernigov and Shitomir with the 2nd Cavalry Corps, 15th And 18th Corps. But other Soviet sources also speak of the deployment of other Soviet formations around Minsk.
[edit] Order of battle
Order of battle of Czechoslovakia:
Order of battle of the invading forces:
[edit] Details of the campaign
[edit] Opening moves
The news of the Czech refusal to abide by the Munich Agreement, signed by Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini on September 30, came as a shock to the other European countries and the United States, and Germany in particular. Hitler was furious with the Czech decision, and as a result he ordered that Fall Grün was to be executed the following morning at 6.15 A.M. In Britain, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain informed the Czech government "that they had purposely refused to abide by an agreement signed by the major powers in Europe, and thus they should not count on their support."
While the German armed forces received their final march orders, the Czech army formation continued the mobilization ordered on September 23 while taking up positions at the border formations along the border. Defensive positions were also built around the major cities parallel to the continued construction of the main fortified line around Prague and Plzeň. The Czechoslovak Air Force, was moved from air bases to small camouflaged airfields shortly before the war.
While the Czech troops took up positions along the frontier, police and military units in the Sudeten German areas had to hold off intensive demonstrations by Sudeten Germans arranged by the SdP. However, orders were given not to use force, and if possible avoid areas with a predominantly German population.
At the same time, Hitler continued to hope that the Western powers would stay loyal to the agreement in Munich by refraining from aiding the Czechs, and so contocted a pretext to shift the blame on to the Czech government even further. He ordered Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, along with Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Müller, the chief of the Gestapo, to carry out a series of false flag operations on Czech soil with the assistance of Konrad Henlein's Sudetendeutsche Freikorps, which could be used as a casus belli for the justification of a German invasion of Czechoslovakia.
As a result, the SS and Gestapo along with the Sudetendeutsche Freikorps, prepared for a series false flag operation to be carried out later that day. In the aftermath of the demonstration between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech security forces earlier that day, a small group of Sudeten German operatives, dressed in Czech military uniforms, entered the main office of the SdP at Hotel Viktoria in the town of Cheb (Eger) and began firing their rifles and pistols. Shortly after the firefight they broadcast inflammatory and anti-German messages in Czech (sources vary on the content on the message). The Germans' goal was to make the attack and the broadcast look like the work of anti-German Czech soldiers by orders of the Czech government. While doing this, Sudeten Germans dressed in Czech uniforms fired their weapons in several Sudeten villages (including Cheb), and in order to make the attack scene more convincing, the Sudeten Germans placed a number of bodies dressed in civilian clothes. The corpses were subsequently presented as evidence of oppression of the Sudeten German minority by the Czech government to the police and foreign press.
On a border crossing close to the village of Egerteich, located some 6 km south of Cheb, a cross border incident was staged and named the Egerteich incident. However, the Egerteich incident is surrounded by mystery. According to the official story released by the German government, German border guards heard German and Czech shouting on the Czech side of the border followed by a series of shots at 11 o'clock in the evening. The commanding NCO at the scene informed his superior officer, who in turn instructed him to investigate the matter. Upon returning to the scene, he spotted several men running in the direction of German territory. They were followed by a squad of Czech soldiers (who actually were members of the Freikorps also dressed in Czech uniforms). The NCO called for him to halt. Instead, the “Czechs” continued firing in the direction of the Sudeten Germans as well as firing on the German soldiers. The German soldiers returned the fire with 10 rifle rounds. After the “Czech” soldiers had retreated, 5 bodies were detected; 3 of them were Sudeten Germans on the German side of the border, while the remaining two were German soldiers.
Three hours later, Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Minister in Prague, after receiving the news from sources in Berlin, telephoned President Beneš and Prime Minister Syrový, in which he expressed alarm about the attrocities in Sudetenland and the incident itself and urged them to abide by the Munich Agreement.
Around an hour later, Syrový received reports from Krejčí and the chief of military intelligence, General František Moravec, that there were no Czech soldiers in the area opposing Egerteich, and that the alleged atrocities of Sudeten Germans were false allegations made by the German government to give them an excuse for retaliation against Czechoslovakia. They also reported that they had withdrawn all soldiers from areas with a 90-100% German population to avoid incidents exactly like these. Syrový passed this information and the note that the Czech government was willing to continue negotiations with the German government on to Eisenlohr and the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France, Lord Halifax and Bonnet. Eisenlohr passed the information on to the German government, but the response from the German government was that this was "state propaganda manufactured by the liar Beneš and his government."
Once again Europe grimly braced itself for war.
[edit] Phase 1: Battle of the Border
[edit] Fateful day: Fall Grün is executed
The first regular act of war took place on October 1, 1938, at 06:15, when German field artillery opened fire on the Czechoslovak fortifications, artillery emplacements and garrisons along the Czech-German frontier. The artillery barrage proved to be quite accurate, and around 45% of the Czech artillery positioned along the border and 17% of the border fortifications were destroyed. Communication centres and civilian population centres were also targeted, resulting in high numbers of Czech as well as Sudeten German civilian casualties. The artillery bombardment continued for another two hours while the ground forces prepared for crossing the border.
At the same time the artillery began shelling the Czech defences, elements of the German Army crossed the border and took control of several strategically important border crossings, in order to remove any road blocks which could delay for the main invasion force. However, the Luftwaffe was hampered by in its initial strikes on morning of October 1 due to heavy fog and mist. They had warned the German High Command of the problems regarding the bad weather the day before, and informed them that all air force operations would be partially or completely delayed until the mist lifted at around 8 to 11 A.M. at the earliest. Thus, the German ground offensive would be unprotected by air support for the first hours of the invasion. During the whole campaign the Luftwaffe would be partially hampered of conducting aerial operations due to rain, fog, mist, heavy cloud and “variable weather, followed by snow and frost in the winter months. Due to the heavy morning fog the aircraft could first take off at around noon, and when the ground had become wet from rain the airplanes would be immobilized and had to wait for it to dry before being able to take off. If it rained again just as the ground had dried out, the aircraft could remain immobilized for longer periods of time. It was first on October 5 that the weather broke so that relatively good weather prevailed over all of Czechoslovakia for most of the day, but this only lasted until October 8, after which the weather again was dominated by variable weather of heavy clouds, rain and fog.
At 08:00, German troops of the Second, Eight, Tenth and Fourteenth armies, still without a formal declaration of war issued, crossed the Czech-German frontier. Within two hours they had managed of securing several Sudeten villages and towns, including Aš (Asch) and Teplice (Teplitz). However, the Germans now had to assault the Czechoslovak border fortifications, a very difficult task that the German units severely underestimated.
The Fourteenth Army led off the assault on the fortified positions at 11:00 A.M. After securing the border stations without facing any resistance, they continued their advancei into southern Moravia at 8:00. After engineers had cleared the way through the barbed wire and anti-tank obstacles by detonating massive explosive charges, the German 2. Panzer-Division and the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) lead of the attack, but the German tank attacks were poorly co-ordinated with the accompanying infantry; a reflection of the novelty of massed tank operations and the difficulty of putting the new doctrine into practice. While the Czech soldiers occupying the trench systems, bunkers and casemates slaughtered the German infantry with small arms and heavy machine gun fire supported by field artillery, the German tanks were destroyed by the Czech anti-tank cannons and field artillery. After two hours of fighting and only moving a few kilometres into Czech territory the Germans retreated to regroup. Another attempt to attack the line at 1600 hours following preliminary barrages carried out by Junkers Ju 87 Stukas of the Luftwaffe and heavy artillery also failed. By the end of the day, the 2. Panzer-Division had lost 86 tanks and AFVs while the 29. Infanterie-Divison as well as elements of the 2. and 3. Gebirgs-Division had suffered a total of 700 casualties.
The Second Army began their assault on the fortified defences at noon. Following a powerful artillery barrage and aerial attacks of Luftwaffe bombers, the 3. Panzer-Division and the 3., 4., 12., 18., 24. and the 28. Infanterie-Divisions led off the attack, but the offensive bugged down after an hour due to poor co-ordination between the Panzer Division's mechanised infantry and the tanks while the German infantry divisions had not the strength or equipment to break through the defences. After three hours of fighting with no gains made the Germans retreated to regroup, and GenObst. Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of the Second Army, decided to halt operations for the rest of the day in order to let his men regroup while artillery and bombers would soften the defences. The Second Army also suffered heavy casualties: the 3. Panzer-Division had lost 51 tanks and AFVs while the six infantry divisions had lost a total of 900 men.
The Eighth Army began their offensive without facing any resistance, and was greeted enthusiastically by the Sudeten German population as the German soldiers entered the Sudeten villages. But after a few kilometres they ran into the border fortifications, and after a futile attempt to assault it at noon the five infantry divisions (14., 19., 20. (mot.), 23. and the 31. Infanterie-Division) was forced to a halt. As a result, the Commander of the Eight Army, GenObst. Fedor von Bock, ordered his men to dig in along the line, waiting for the artillery to do their job.
At 11:00 AM the Luftwaffe aircraft finally could lift off from their bases in Southern Germany and Silesia. At 11:26 A.M., twenty-five Heinkel He 111 bombers of the 2./KG 157 targeted Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia. Among the first targets to be bombed were military facilities such as infantry barracks, the Ministry of National Defence and the airport and aircraft factory. At 12:05 P.M., Heinkel He 111 bombers of 1./KG 157 and Dornier Do-17 bombers of 5./KG 153 escorted by Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter aircrafts of 1./JG 132 commenced bombing runs on the centres of transportation and political centres of Plzeň and Prague. As a result of these bombing runs, around 1,200 people were killed, most of them civilians. However, damage on the cities and the efficiency of the attacks were severely reduced due to heavy clouds.
Shortly after the first bombs hit their targets in Prague, at 11:50 A.M., two Stuka groups equipped with Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers began bombing military installations behind the border fortifications, such as communication centres, artillery and armour concentrations and regimental headquarters. While being relatively effective despite the bad weather, the first air victory was achieved when a Czech Avia Bk-534 fighter aircraft piloted by František Peřina shot down a German Junkers Ju 87 dive bomber piloted by Kettenführer Leutnant Frank Neubert of 4./St.G.165, who was killed in the engagement.
While Prague and Plzeň were the main targets of the initial bombing campaign, other cities were also targeted by the Luftwaffe. In northern Moravia the cities of Ostrava and Olomouc were targeted by Ju 86s of the 10./KG153 and Do 17s of the 6./KG153. In southern Moravia, Brno was targeted by 20 Heinkel He 111 bombers of the 2./KG254 at 2:00 P.M., but three aircraft were shot down by 8.35 cm vz. 22 heavy anti-aircraft cannons, while one Heinkel and two Bf 109s was shot down by Avia B-534s of the II/3.LP.
At 16:30 the third and final aerial bombardement of Prague for the day was commenced when twenty-five Heinkel He 111 bombers of the 3./KG 157 flew over Prague and dropped their payload over the central railway station. While being quite successfull at this, they were surprised by twenty Avia B-534 fighters of the Stíhací letka 44 and 83.5 mm anti-aircraft cannons on the ground. Again František Peřina achieved several victories, shooting down one Heinkel He 111 bombers and damaging another. Then a group of Bf 109 fighter aircrafts from 6./JG 132 appeared, and a feroucious air-to-air combat commenced. While the German aircraft were superior in terms of firepower and speed, the Czechs had a small advantage in manouevrebility as well as better trained combat pilots. After 30 minutes both sides flew back to their air bases; the Germans had lost 12 aircrafts and the Czechs 18.
In total, one Dornier Do 17 light bomber, six Heinkel He 111 medium bombers, three Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers and 7 Bf 109 fighter aircraft had been lost, of those were three He 111 and the Do 17 shot down by anti-aircraft fire and the rest was lost in air combat. The Czechoslovak Air Force lost 18 Avia B-534 fighter aircraft.
When Germany invaded Czechoslovakia early in the morning of October 1, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the French Prime Minister Daladier were quick to
At 10:00 the historic session of the Reichstag was opened by the President of the Reichstag, Field Marshal Hermann Göring, followed by an adress by Adolf Hitler where he condemned the oppression of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak Government.
Meanwhile, in Czechoslovakia the political and military leadership had followed the situation closely since they received the first reports of German troops crossing the border and reports of heavy German artillery bombardement across the whole German-Czech frontier at 6:40 A.M. Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Arm. Gen. Jan Syrový had been in contact with the Army High Command and General Staff, as well as the military intelligence service since the first reports came through, and at 9:20 A.M. Syrový summoned his cabinet to a meeting with Beneš along with several members of the Army High Command and Military Intelligence at 09:20 A.M. Among the attendees were Chief of Army, Arm. Gen. Ludvík Krejčí, Chief of the General Staff, Brig. Gen. Bohuslav Fiala and Chief of Military Intelligence, Gen. František Moravec. They discussed the further political and military situation, now as war with Germany had broken out. They concluded that they would see what the Western powers, and France in particular, along with the Soviet Union, would react to the German attack. Until then they would have to defend themselves the best they could.
Once it become clear that it was an invasion, and not the outbreak of border fighting (as it was by the early morning of October 1), the Governments of Britain and France condemned the German aggression. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain condemned the German attack on Czechoslovakia and demanded that the Germans should immediately withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia, but also criticized the Czechoslovak government's refusal to abide by the Munich Agreement and for contributing to the escalation of the crisis. In France, the outbreak of war caused a serious crisis within the French Cabinet as a ferocious power struggle between Prime Minister Édouard Daladier and Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet. While Daladier predominantly condemned the German attack on Czechoslovakia and like Chamberlain demanded that the Germans should immediately withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia, he also criticized the aggressionist foreign policy of Adolf Hitler. On the other hand, Bonnet also criticized the Czechoslovak government, and President Beneš and Prime Minister Syrový in particular, for provoking the Germans by continuing the oppression of the Sudeten German minority.
At 13:30, Syrový again summoned the cabinet along with Beneš and the military high command to discuss the developments on the political and military scene since their last meeting. Seeing that the French and British would not support them (as a response of the statement made by their prime minister earlier that morning), they decided to ask the Soviets to intervene militarily. Later that afternoon the Soviet Secretary of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov secretly proclaimed that he would send the promised 300,000 men and material as soon as they were mobilised and got a permission from the Romanian government to pass through their territory. Until then, he urged the Czechs to withstand the German attack and use the Soviet military aircraft already present in Czechoslovak territory.
At 04:00 P.M., the Soviet Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, secretly informed the Czechoslovak government that the Soviet Union would send the promised 300,000 men and material as soon as they were mobilised and got a permission from the Romanian government to pass through their territory. Until then, he urged the Czechs to withstand the German attack and use the Soviet military aircraft already present in Czechoslovak territory.
The response from the neighbouring countries were at most not surprising. Though condemning the German's use of force against Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia declared their neutrality in the conflict. Poland, on the other hand, demanded that the Czechoslovak government should cede Cieszyn and some other territories in northern Slovakia which had a Polish majority. Józef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, loathed Czechoslovakia and President Edvard Beneš, who in his turn reciprocated these feelings in full. By contrast, Beck's relations with the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, were good. Beck had often toyed with the idea of partitioning Czechoslovakia between Poland and Hungary. When the news of the invasion reached Poland, Beck demanded in a speech that the Czechoslovak government should cede Cieszyn and some other territories in northern Slovakia which had a Polish majority. If they did not comply within a week, they would take them by force.
However, rather suprising to the Czech government was the fact that Hungary had not started conducting military operations on October 1, along with their German allies. However, there were several reason of the Hungarians lack of action. The main reason was their low ammunition and supply stockpiles. Despite they had mobilized a considerable, though ill-trained and ill-equipped, force of between 200,000 and 350,000 men, they reportedly had artillery ammunition for only 36 hours of operations. Therefore they clearly engaged in a bluff, which was a bluff the Germans had encouraged, until they could sort out their logistical problems. The second reason was that the Hungarian army had begun reorganising their armed forces the same day the invasion started. Admiral Miklós Horthy made similar demands as Poland. However, they would wait another few weeks before they engaged at a large scale in the conflict, though border clashes between Hungarians and Czechs occured during the time between the German and the Hungarian invasion.
[edit] Offensive repulsed
- Main article: Battle of the Border
Both the Czechoslovak border fortifications and the mountainous terrain in Sudetenland proved to be a real challenge to the German invaders. Despite their technical, operational and numerical superiority, their mobility could not be used in the mountainous border regions, and therefore lost the strategic suprise.
The Second Army began ground operations soon after 8 o'clock in the morning, securing the border stations without facing resistance. After securing the border stations, German troops poured over the German-Czech frontier. However, they ran shortly thereafter into the Czech border fortifications, and after attempting to storm the line twice in under two hours, GenObst. Gerd v. Rundstedt, the commander of the Second Army, decided to halt operations temporarily, seeing that the attacks were futile and the large number of casualties resulting from them. Thus he ordered the artillery and air force to soften up the positions. After four days of heavy fighting, the 3. Infanterie-Division finally broke through the lines where the fortifications were limited, after the defences had been softened with artillery shelling, and thus began its advance towards Ostrava. However, due to heavy casualties, they were ordered only to secure the town and then wait until the remaining elements of the Second Army had broken through the Czech lines.
The Eighth Army similarily crossed the border at 8:00 AM on October 1, but as they ran into the border fortifications, they attempted to break through the lines, but the Czech fortifications proved to be too difficult to break through, and they therefore decided to set up positions along the line, waiting for the artillery and air force to do its job.
Similarily, the Fourteenth Army began its ground offensive in southern Moravia at 8:00. They secured the border stations without meeting serious resistance, but a few kilometres inland they ran into the border fortifications running through the German-Czech border in southern Moravia. After similarily attempting to break through the lines, they had no other choice to temporarily halt the offensive, in order to let the artillery and the Air Force to exhaust the defenders.
In the first two weeks of the campaign, they only gained a few few tactical victories in the well-fortificated border regions of northern Bohemia and in southern and northern Moravia, and therefore did not manage to obtain a major breakthrough, mostly due to lack of coordination between the infantry and the armoured units. While the Germans struggled to break through the defensive lines, the Sudetendeutsche Freikorps sabotaged bridges, positions and when possible, performed guerilla raids on Czech soldiers.
[edit] Battle of Ostrava
- Main article: Battle of Ostrava
After four days of heavy fighting, the 3. Infanterie-Division finally broke through the lines on October 5, where the fortifications were limited, after the defences had been softened with artillery shelling, and thus began its advance towards Ostrava. By the evening the same day, the Germans had pushed around 25 km inland, and encircled Ostrava. Gen.Lt. Walter Petzel, the commander of 3. Infanterie-Division, gave the orders for the capture of the town to begin the next day.
In the early hours of October 6, German artillery of the Artillerie-Regiment 3 bombarded the Czech soldiers of the SOS unit defending the city, while Dornier Do-17 bombers of the 8./KG153 and Junkers Ju-87B Stuka dive bombers of the 9./St.G.165 attacked them from the air.
Three hours later, the begun its assault on the town. They managed to secure the suburbs of Ostrava, but when they began to attack the town proper the assault was repulsed by the Czech defenders. Subsequently the Germans continued to push into the city, with Luftwaffe bombers of making the defence of the town even more difficult. While the Czechs furiously fought back only armed with small arms, machineguns and mortars, the poorly coordinated Czech defence was no match for the superior German forces.
The losses sustained by the German troops were unexpectedly light. Only 210 had been killed and 310 had been wounded. On the other hand, the Czechs had a total of casualties 1,862: 562 killed and 1,300 wounded. 2,000 Czech soldiers were also taken prisoner, along with several machineguns, mortars and rifles.
Due to the heavy casualties sustained in the assault on the Czech border fortifications, the 3. Infanterie-Division was ordered only to secure the town and then wait until the remaining elements of the Second Army had broken through the Czech lines, which occured on October 15.
[edit] The offensive of the Tenth Army
While the Germans faced heavy fortified positions along most of the German-Czech frontier, the troops of the German Tenth Army did not face heavy fortifications at the border, and thus were able to penetrate the Czech defensive lines in Western Bohemia. On October 1, following air strikes carried out by Stuka dive bombers and an artillery barrage, they crossed the border and then managed to break through the relatively light border fortifications positioned along the border at most places the following day at noon, however without the consequence of heavy losses among the storming infantry and field engineers.
The Germans advanced relatively quickly through Western Bohemia, meeting effective, though light resistance. On October 1, they captured Aš (Asch) and Františkovy Lázně (Franzensbad) and Mariánské Lázně (Marienbad) without meeting any resistance. On October 3, the Germans captured Cheb (Eger) after facing moderate resistance from Czechoslovak Border Guards and artillery fire.
In the lead of the Tenth Army's advance was the XVI. Armeekorps under command of Gen.Lt. Heinz Guderian. Consisting of the 1st Panzer Division, 1st Light Division and the SS-Inf.Regt. “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, it was one of the most motorised units in the German Army.
Guderian, the creator of the German armoured forces, had in the interwar era gathered ideas by the British maneuver warfare theorists J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, as well as the writings of Charles de Gaulle and translated them into German. When he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and became chief of staff to the Inspectorate of Motorised Troops in 1931 and in 1933 to full colonel, he had written many papers on motorised warfare His book, Achtung - Panzer! was written in 1936-37 as an explanation of Guderian's theories on the role of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare. It was actually a compilation of not only of Guderian's own theories but also the ideas of other proponents of armored and combined-arms warfare within the general staff, though the bulk of the credit rightly is Guderian's. The panzer force he created would become the core of the German Army's power and would deliver the core of the fighting style known as Blitzkrieg.
However, Guderian repeatedly told the senior miitary leadership and Hitler that the Blitzkrieg consept would first be completely developed in 1940, and therefore the military doctrine used in Czechoslovakia was a motorised variation of the old Vernichtungsgedanke, literally meaning "concept of annihilation". Despite this, Guderian now got the opportunity to test his military doctrine in the field on a divisional scale.
The Blitzkrieg tactic used by Guderian proved on a corps scale to be very efficient: In a week, Guderian's troops had advanced 25 km inland despite relatively efficient (though small) Czech resistance. On October 2, his forces captured Lipová. On October 3 his forces captured Milíkov, on October 4 Prameny and on October 5, Mnichov fell.
[edit] Battle of Karlovy Vary
- Main article: Battle of Karlovy Vary
On October 6, the German forces of the XIV. Armeekorps under command of Gen.d.Inf. Gustav v. Wietersheim had surrounded the spa town of Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad). On 7 October, around 07:00, the received reports of elements of the 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) and 13. Infanterie-Division (mot.) approaching from Březová in the south Jenišov to the west, and elements of the 10. Infanterie-Division approaching Čankov from the north and Dalovice and Všeborovice to the northeast. Those forces consisted of armoured scouts and have engaged Czech infantry units on their approaches.
At 10:05 German artillery opened fire on the Czech defences around and within the town itself, acompanied with a small air strike consisting of Heinkel He-111 bombers. The first German attack on Karlovy Vary at noon was repulsed by the Czech defenders. Subsequently Germans continued to push into the city, and increasingly surrounding the city. By the end of the day the Germans had made several headways into the city.
By October 8, the advanced German armoured units have been reinforced with infantry and several mortars. The Czech defenders delayed the German advance, particularly by holding the bridges, but later that day the coordination of the defence reached its breaking point. At 13:00 the defence collapsed and the remaining Czech defenders capitulated to the Germans.
To the south, elements of the reached the town Bečov nad Teplou on October 7.
[edit] Battle of Otročín
At 9:00 on October 8, the forward elements of Guderian's reached the villages of Tisová and Ranovice. A Fieseler Fi-156 Storch reconnaissance aircraft reported that the Czechs had set up positions around the village of Otročín. The Germans decided to drop leaflets asking the Czechs to give up and claiming that the west had betrayed them and further resistance would be futile. However, as the German Junkers Ju-52 aircrafts flew overhead, they were fired upon by Czech anti-aircraft artillery, which resulted in two aircraft being shot down. The Germans then ordered an artillery barrage on the Czech positions around the village. The Czech artillery in that area was somewhat weaker, but managed to fire back, resulting in several German casualties. After the preparations, the Germans attacked the northern flank of the Czech forces, clashing with them in the village of Brt'.
Schützen-Bataillon III of 1. Schützen-Brigade had cleared the village for Czech defenders by 11:00, but an hour later they were surprised by a Czech counterattack. Following a deadly artillery barrage, twenty-five LT vz. 35 tanks supported by accompanying infantry and Letov Š-328 light bombers, they had to retreat back to Tisová. 1. Schützen-Brigade was reinforced subsequentely by the Schützen-Regiment 113 and elements of Kradschützen-Bataillon 1 supported by ten anti-tank cannons of the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 37 and 40 Pz.Kpfw. I and 25 Pz.Kpfw. II light tanks of Panzer-Regiment 1.
At 13:00 the Czech attacked the village of Tisová after an air attack consisting of three Avia B-71 light bombers and five Letov Š-328, with Avia B-534 fighters controlling the air. The following battle resulted in the first tank-to-tank battle of the war. To the German's horror, they discovered that the Czech tanks were better than their own Pz.Kpfw. I and IIs. After the Germans had lost 18 tanks while only destroying 8 of the Czech tanks, they ordered their anti-tank cannons forward. General Heinz Guderian himself went in the field to lead the battle himself upon the discovery of the quality of the Czech tanks. On his way to Tisová Czech artillery shells began hitting around his command vehicle, one of them only 50 m from him. Only luck saved him from getting killed.
As the 37 mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank cannons arrived at the front line, they immediately opened fire on the Czech tanks. After 10 minutes 5 vehicles had been taken out of action. Seeing that their tanks were vulnerable to the reinforced German anti-tank fire, they retreated back to Otročín. On the way back, a further 4 vehicles came victim of 4 Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers.
After the Germans had regrouped and come over the shock of the sudden Czech counterattack, they advanced again north and south of Otročín. At 16:30 elements of Schützen-Bataillon II had secured the village Poseč east of Otročín, thus encircling the Czech defences there. The next morning, at 06:45, the German artillery opened fire on the Czech positions around and in the village. The saturation of the bombardement lasted two hours. At 9:00, the Czech defences were attacked from three sides by German tanks and infantry. Initially the losses among German infantry were high, but after the regiment's 3 Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. C infantry tanks had been brought in to take out the defences, they managed to break through the defences around the village, and by noon they had captured the village. In the process, they destroyed 3 OA vz. 30 armoured cars and 4 LT vz. 35 light tanks while capturing two pieces. They also took 250 Czech soldiers prisoner, as well as siezing a large number of rifles, ZB vz. 26 machineguns and several heavy machineguns and mortars as well. The remaining two LT vz. 35 tanks had been evacuated the day before due to damage substained in the battle.
Following the battle the Germans secured their flanks and then continued westwards towards their main target Prague. On October 10-11, the SS-Inf.Regt. “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” engaged a Czech infantry battalion at the village Bezděkov. After suffering substantial casualties in close combat, they managed to hold the village.
On October 12, the forward elements of the 1st Panzer Division reached the fortification lines running west and north of Plzeň. While Guderian wished to continue the advance, the commander of the Tenth Army, Gen.d.Art. Walther v. Reichenau, decided that they should halt the advance so that the other armies facing the heavy fortified border fortifications in Northern Bohemia and Northern and Southern Moravia could keep up with the more successfull advance of the Tenth Army. While the Czech army had managed to prevent the Germans from breaking through the defensive lines in northern and southern Moravia and northern Bohemia, the men defending the border fortifications were exausted, and they Germans had almost broken through the lines. However, now a new enemy entered in conflict.
[edit] Poland attacks Zaolzie
Since the German 2. Armee had begun its offensive into the northern Moravian territories of Czechoslovakia on October 1, the Polish and local border guard and police units had been on full alert.
In Bogumin on October 6, the Polish command got the information about Czechoslovak-German skirmishes not far from Ostrava, which alarmed them even further. Following orders by General Władysław Bortnowski, it was decided to initiate the military campaign to capture the Zaolzie region and Český Těšín, before the Germans could do the same.
At 0600 hours on October 8, Polish artillery and heavy machineguns opened fire on Czech border guards and soldiers positioned along the border, and two hours later the begun its offensive.
To the north, a motorised company began pusing into Czech territory at 1000 hours, without facing much resistance. However, some local units did engage them, but these clashes were mostly hit and run operations. By the end of October 9, they had captured the villages of Karviná, Stonava, Albrechtice, and Horní Suchá.
Further southeast, the began military operations at 0800 hours. With support from heavy machinegun fire, mortars and 75 mm guns, the began capturing Český Těšín. However, heavy resistance from , mortars, heavy machineguns and a few howitzers made the conquest heavy, and the Poles suffered heavy casualties. Subsequently, the first attack was repulsed. After they had regrouped, they attacked the Czech positions at the villages of Mosty and Dolní Žukov in a series of flanking manoevres, and then pushed southwards and northwards, thus encircling the town. They then attacked the Czech defenders again, and this time they began to pushing into the city. By the end of the day the Poles had made several headways into the city. At 1300 hours the following morning the Czech defences collapsed, and they capitulated to the Poles.
Southeast of Český Těšín, the 21. Dywizja Piechoty also began military operations at 0800 hours, and pushed with maximum speed into Czech Silesia, only encountering a few units. By the end of the day, they had captured Dolní Láštná, Nový Borek, Třinec and Závist. Tne next morning the advance continued, and by 1000 hours they had reached Smilovice. However, at Střítež the 24th Uhlan Regiment ran into an ambush made up by Czech soldiers equipped with 37 mm vz. 37 anti-tank guns and heavy machineguns, and they were forced to pull back, losing 35 men and three TKS tankettes. However, when the Vickers Mk. E tanks and artillery were put into action, the Czechs were forced to withdraw, sustaining around 20 casualties.
This advance was supported by thrust southwards by the 23. Dywizja Piechoty, which began pushing towards Čadca (Czaca). By the end of October 9, they had captured the villages of Čierne, Svrcinoveč and Podzávoz. But on October 9, they encountered heavy resistance from the 22. divize ”Hviezdoslav” outside of Čadečka, and thus was forced to fall back to Podzávoz. The fighting around Český Těšín had resulted in the 22. divize ”Hviezdoslav” to be positioned along the Český Těšín sector, which worsened the Polish situation significantly.
While the Poles were still engaging Czech soldiers in Český Těšín and at Mosty, the Infanterie-Regiment 29 and the Maschinengewehr-Battalion 8 had been ordered to advance further southeast by the commander of the 3. Infanterie-Division, Gen.Lt. Walter Petzel, against the orders of the commander of the II. Armeekorps, Gen.d.Inf. Johannes Blaskowitz. The 3. Infanterie-Division had on October 6 captured Ostrava afrer heavy fighting, and had as the only division of the army been given orders to wait until the remnants of the Second Army had broken through the border fortifications.
On October 7 the Infanterie-Regiment 29 had captured the villages of Šenov, Havířov, Dolany, Polany, Pacalůvka and Albrechtice while Maschinengewehr-Battalion 8 had captured Dolní Datymě, Horní Bludovice and Teřlicko. On October 8 Maschinengewehr-Battalion 8 captured Pitrov, Rozsudek, Hradiště and Kostelec while the Infanterie-Regiment 29 had reached Dolní Těrlicko and Stanislavice.
The Poles had noticed activity alreadt at Albrechtice, but did not engage them, as they were unsure whether they were Czechs or Germans. At 0800 hours on October 9, the Germans captured the village of Mistřovice facing little resistance from Czech soldiers. However, at 0900 hours they came under fire from Czech 81 mm mortars and heavy machinegun fire from soldiers positioned in Podlesí and Mosty.
The Germans fired back with both light guns, machineguns, small arms and mortars, unknowing that the Poles were also engaging the Czechs at Mosty. The Polish delegation to the German forces hadn't reached the area, and coincidentally the Poles now came under German fire. For about an hour the fighting continued; the Germans mistaking the Poles as Czechs and vice versa.
The Poles, who just received reports that there actually were Germans operating in the area, was faced with a problematic situation, as the Poles had not consulted neither the Germans nor the Hungarians about their military operation in the area. And as the Bogumin was an important railway junction in the area, the Polish commander decided to support Czechoslovaks in defensive action of Těšín with the 21. Dywizja Piechoty. A reconaissance company, equipped with TKS tankettes, was also sent forward on the flank, in case the German assault continued, and would launch counterattack if Germans won't stop their assault.
Still unknowing that they were now engaging Polish troops, the Germans started their major assault towards Těšín at noon. However, thanks to the informations of local citizens, Polish and Czechoslovak forces knew of German plans and succesfully held the line, except for the villages of Podlesí and Mosty, which the Germans captured by 1500 hours. Thus, the German attack failed.
After the failed assault, a delegation of Polish officers led by Colonel Dworak and German officers led by Major Hohennau met at Mosty. The assaults were described as an mistake, and the Germans excused for the attacks, blaming the incident on poor intelligence and similarity in Polish and Czech military uniforms. Thus, the German units halted the assault, and the situation was stabilized.
Another incident occured on October 10, when first a staffel of Junkers Ju 87B Stuka dive bombers and later a group of Henschel Hs-123 ground attack planes of the 4./St.G.165 strafed a column of Polish troops northeast of Albrechtice, killing 40 soldiers and destroyed several vehicles. 10/11 October fights for Gruszow, German attacks on railway station were pull back. After the battle, no further incidents or fights occured between Poland and Germany.
Following the incident at on October 8, the Polish offensive continued. In Zaolzie, the Poles now faced the troops of the 22. divize ”Hviezdoslav”, which gave the Poles a hard time. The Czechs defended their positions effectively, and at times counterattacked.
Despite the heavier resistance, the Poles continued, and by October 10 the 21. Dywizja Piechoty had captured the towns of Podlesi, Horní Žukov, Dolní Žukov, Podlesí, Šusov and Třanovice. On October 11 the Czech soldiers of the 22. divize seriously contested the Polish advance along a line running from Horní Třanovice and Fifejdy, where the I/4 Battalion came under heavy artillery fire. The Poles thus thrusted towards Horní Třanovice, where they encountered heavy resistance from well-trained and relatively well-equipped Czech soldiers. After four hours of heavy fighting, the Poles had cleared the village for Czech soldiers. However, at 1340 hours a local civilian silently led a Czech unit close to the positions of the III/4 Battalion, which now were taking a break from the heavy fighting. The Czech put in a surprise attack and some still bayonet fighting resulted before they were driven off. The next day the Czechs put in a powerful counterattack, supported by howitzers and heavy machineguns. The Poles were taken by surprise, and after two hours of further heavy fighting the Poles fell back from Horní Třanovice and set up their positions along the line of Třanovice-Horní Žukov-Vělopolí. The Poles were further reinforced with a reconnaissance company, consisting of a few TKS tankettes, which hadn't been disabled by German anti-tank cannons.
A couple of hours later the Czechs attacked again, but this time the Poles managed to hold the line, forcing the Czechs to fall back. Despite this, fighting continued for a couple of hours, mostly in form of artillery shelling and machinegun firing. At 1730 the Poles sent a reconnaissance patrol to check out the Czech's positions, but discovered that Horní Třanovice had been abandoned. Thus, the Poles were sent in again, and fortified their positions there.
On October 11 the Czechs attacked again, this time supported both by artillery and heavy machineguns, but also by a group of Letov Š-328 army cooperation aircraft from Pozorovací letka 8, Peruť II/2 of the Letecký pluk 2 Dr. E. Beneše, operating as light bombers. The Czechs stormed towards the position at 0900 hours, but the Poles were better prepared this time, but sustained heavy casualties in the first assault, which failed. Two hours later the Czechs attacked again, but this time they made flanking manouevres, which threatened the III/4 Battalion's flanks. When the Pole's counterattacked with the I/4 Battalion and TK-3 tankettes, they were attacked by five Letov Š-328 army cooperation aircraft, which dropped bombs on the approaching Poles. Five tankettes were destroyed, and the counterattack thus failed. Meanwhile, the Czechs recaptured Horní Třanovice, capturing a handful of Poles in the process. After the battle the Poles fell back to regroup, and prepared for a counteroffensive the following morning, this time with air support from PZL. P-11 fighter aircrafts.
Further southeast the 10. Brygada Kawalerii continued their offensive without meeting much resistance. On October 10 they recaputed the village of Strítez (which they had abandoned following the clash on October 9) and continued westwards. At noon they captured Hnojník without a fight, while the captured Komorní Lhotka after encountering a company of the 22. divize ”Hviezdoslav”. Reports which reached the commander of 10. Brygada Kawalerii, reported that there was a possible strong presence of Czech troops in the area, and the TKS tankettes and the Vickers Mk. E light tanks were subsequently moved to the front, accompanied by infantry on wz. 34 halftracks (which also brought a couple of 37 mm wz. 36 anti-tank cannons to the new frontline).
Suddenly the Poles came under heavy machinegun and mortar fire from the Czech soldiers positioned at Poloniny and Stonávka. The Polish motorised infantry and tanks moved into position and began firing back at the Czechs. After a couple of hours of fighting, the shooting ended, and both sides prepared to attack the following day.
At dawn on October 11, the Czechs began shelling the Polish positions yet again, this time accompanied by a counterattack supported by 37 mm KPÚV vz. 37 anti-tank cannons. The Poles were taken by surprise at Komorní Lhotka, forcing them to retreat. The Czechs thus set up positions there, and subsequently began to fire on the Poles positioned at at Hnojník. However, the Czech attack on Hnojník failed, due to the presence of Vickers Mk. E light tanks and TKS tankettes and due to bad coordination. After several hours of heavy fighting the Czechs halted the counterattack. Meanwhile, the Letov Š-328 army cooperation aircraft of the Peruť II/2 again was sent on a bombing mission, but after dropping their bombs on the Polish troops at Hnojník and Střítež, the aircraft were ambushed by a group of PZL. P-11c fighters, which shot down a total of three Š-328s and damaged the remaining. However, shortly afterwards, several Avia B-534 fighters of the Stíhací letka 33 of the Peruť III/1 appeared at the scene, and a fierce air-to-air fight began. When it ended eight PZL P-11 and nine Avia B-534 fighters had been shot down, while a dousin others were damaged.
On October 12 the 10. Brygada Kawalerii continued the advance, capturing Podlesí, Dobratice, Hranice and Bukovice by the end of the day. The following morning military operations was ended.
The same day, the 23. Dywizja Piechoty continued their advance from Podzávoz and captured Čadečka after a hours fight. At noon the Poles attacked their target town of Čadca (Czaca) defended by the 22. divize ”Hviezdoslav”, and major fighting began at the town's railway station. Surprisingly, for such heavy fighting, losses were very small: Only 100 Poles were killed and 250 wounded, while the Czechs suffered 56 killed and 160 wounded.
This was the last regular battle between Poles and Czechoslovaks. Poland had now secured the areas with a Polish population, and the Poles saw the growing power of Germany with increasing fear.
[edit] Phase 2: Breakthrough
Despite several Czech tactical victories, the Czech forces defending the border fortifications were exausted by a week of continuous fighting, and were soon forced to retreat, as the Germans was breaking through the defensive lines.
Their first major breakthrough was achieved on October 14. At 8:00, a massive artillery barrage by 105 and 150 mm howitzers, supported by Junkers Ju-87 Stukas, bombarded the Czech fortifications, destroying several of the bunkers completely. The saturation lasted for almost two hours. At 10:30, infantry, supported by assault engineers and tanks attacked the line at a wide front, while the artillery hindered reinforcements to reaching the defensive line. While the Pz.Kpfw. IV infantry tanks broke holes in the bunkers, soldiers and pioniers armed with flamethrowers poured into the bunkers, and after 2 hours of feroucious fighting they got their first breakthrough: the men of the Panzer-Regiment 3 of the 2. Panzer-Division finally eliminated the last bunker at 12:05, and now the tanks began pouring into the Czech hinterland, creating confusion and panic among the retreating soldiers. The other units of the Fourteenth Army soon followed in suit, breaking throug the line at different locations within that hour. The soldiers stationed at the defensive line, seeing that they now were being outflanked, were forced to retreat in order to regroup with the other Czech units farther inland.
Following the breakthrough in southern Moravia, the German Second Army broke through the Czech lines on October 15 and then headed for their target city of Olomouc. Later that day the Eighth Army broke through the lines in northern Bohemia, after the Czechs had retreated southwards and taken up positions around Prague and other secondary strongholds such as Mladá Boleslav.
In southern Bohemia, the Twelfth Army had managed to advance 15 km in the first five days of the invasion, but ran then into the fortifications, and several attempts were made in order to break through it, but without success. On October 16, a breakthrough was finally achieved when the 1. Gebirgs-Division and the 27. Infanterie-Division broke through southwest of České Budějovice. As the Germans began to break through at other points as well, the Czech border guard units were ordered to fall back to České Budějovice or other positions in southern Bohemia.
The breakthrough came as a shock to the Czech high command and as a blessing to the German high command. The defensive line had held the Germans out for a longer period of time than the Czech high command had anticipated, but now they had to deal with the multiple breakthrough through their lines, and all reserves were ordered to the most critical sectors of operations.
By October 16, the Czech forces were in retreat and General of the Army Ludvík Krejčí ordered all the troops to fall back to the secondary lines of defences.
[edit] German offensive
The Germans could now take advantage of their armed forces' motorisation and mobility. By October 18, the Fourteenth Army had advanced at some places 40 km inland, and the forward elements of the had reached the town of Pohořelice, 25 km southwest of Brno. On October 19, the 2. Panzer-Division and elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had captured the villages along the line Dukovany-Jamolice-Polánka-Rokytná-Budkovice, while also reaching the Brno suburb of Ořechov, around 11 km from Brno, while elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had captured the villages of Sokolnice, Šaratice and Otnice. On October 20, German artillery began shelling the town of Brno.
To the west, elements of the 2. and 3. Gebirgs-Division, under the overall command of Gen.Maj. Eduard Dietl, captured the town of Moravské Budějovice (Mährisches Budweis) on October 18, Jaroměřice nad Rokytnou (Jarmeritz) on October 19 and had reached the villages of Čásalvice, Kojetice, Výčapy and Třebenice and thus were only 8 km from the town of Třebíč.
At Želetava however, the 2. Gebirgs-Division encountered feroucious resistance from the Skupina 2 ”Jaromír”, under the command of Brig. Gen. František Slunečko. On October 18, the Germans ran into defensive lines set up on the hills around Želetava, and the Czechs begun firing their mortars and heavy machineguns on the advancing Gebirgsjägers, who were forced to retreat. On October 19, German artillery began shelling the hills around the village in order to disorganise the defences, but despite this they failed to capture the town again on October 20.
Div. Gen. Sergěj Ingr, commanding officer of III. sbor “Hálek”, seeing that Třebíč was now threatened by a German attack, ordered Skupina 2 to fall back to Třebíč and set up defensive position in the town and along the villages Stařeč-Čechočovice-Markvarice-Chlístov. He also ordered the 14. divize “Fibich”, under the command of Brig. Gen. Josef Zmek, to move out from its base in Třešť and reinforce their positions in Jihlava and its surroundings.
In northern Moravia, the Second Army had by the end of October 19 marched 30 km southwards on a wide front. On October 20, the 12. Infanterie-Division captured the town of Opava (Troppau). The same day, the 28. Infanterie-Division and elements of the 30. Infanterie-Division reached the outskirts of Ostrava (Ostrau), where they immediately engaged heavy Czech defences, consisting of anti-tank cannons, howitzers, mortars and machineguns. The following day, elements of the 3. Panzer-Division supported by the 18. Infanterie-Division had reached the outskirts of Šumperk (Mährisch Schönberg) following a pincer movement which cut off the defenders in the city. The defenders were the main part of the Hraniční oblast 36 ”Prokop” under the command of Brig. Gen. Otakar Líčka. At 13:00 German artillery began shelling the centre and the Czech positions around Šumperk.
One and a half hour later, the first Germans appeared, but their infantry were forced to retreat due to heavy machinegun fire and artillery positioned in Brníčko. Following an air attack consisting of Dornier Do-17s of the 7./KG153 a second assault, this time supported by infantry guns, armoured cars and 50 Pz.Kpfw. I and II light tanks, attacked the Czech positions two hours later, and this time the Czechs were forced to retreat into the town itself in order to set up defences there. The Germans persued them, but the tanks then suddenly faced soldiers with Molotov cocktails and anti-tank cannons, and thus were forced to halt the attack.
At 21:00 the Germans resumed the attack, this time supported by pioneers armed with satchel charges and flamethrower. The Czech defenders fought bravely, but the fighting was futile. At 05:30 the Germans had seized control of much of the town, and at 06:08, Brig. Gen. Otakar Líčka capitulated to a delegation representing Gen.d.Inf. Johannes Blaskowitz (the commander of II. Armeekorps) and Gen.Lt. Walter Petzel (the commander of 3. Infanterie-Division).
In northern Bohemia significant gains were made as well by the Eighth Army and elements of the Second Army. On October 18 the 14. Infanterie-Division had captured Liberec (Reichenberg), where the German soldiers were welcomed as liberators by the largely German population. The next day they continued their advance southwards. On October 20, the 53. Infanterie-Regiment (of the 14. Infanterie-Division) captured the town of Česká Lípa, and on October 21 Doksy. By October 22, the 24. Infanterie-Division had captured the towns of Náchod, Dvůr Králové nad Labem, and Červený Kostelec.
By October 23, the Germans had advanced 30 km since they broke through on October 18. In the evening of October 26, the 4. Infanterie-Division and the 14. Infanterie-Division had encicled the 17. divize ”Blodek” at Mladá Boleslav. While the other divisions of the Eight and Second Armies secured the front line, the two divisions then began to eliminate the pocket. The next morning Heinkel He-111 bombers of the 2./KG157 attacked key positions in the town, while the Germans slowly advanced towards the centre of the town. However, the bulk of the 17. divize ”Blodek” along with its commander, Brig. Gen. Václav Šidlík, broke out of the pocket, but he was killed along with his staff when his Praga AV command vehicle was struck by a Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber.
By 1 o'clock the remaining defenders in Mladá Boleslav had been taken out or captured. To the west, the 19., 20., 23. and the 31. Infanterie-Division had not advanced much further than 12 km since they began operations on October 1, but on October 24 they advanced further to secure the area around Ústí nad Labem, and by the end of the week they had advanced a further 15 km. In the early morning of October 27, the 10. Infanterie-Division of the Tenth Army advanced further to the northwest, and by the end of the day they met forward elements of the 31. Infantrie-Division.
By the end of October, the Eighth Army had advanced 60 km inland from their starting positions 1 month earlier, making them along with the Tenth Army the two most successful armies of the campaign.
In souther Bohemia, the Geman Twelfth Army began to strike northwards in a pincer movement in order to encircle České Budějovice. After heavy fighting, the VII. Armeekorps, under the command of Gen.d.Inf. Eugen v. Schobert, met up the lforward elements of Gen.d.Inf. Hermann Geyer's V. Armeekorps at Hluboká nad Vlatvou at 9 o'clock in the morning on October 19. As a result, České Budějovice was not cut off from the bulk of the I. armáda ”Havlíček”. The defenders consisted of elements of the 5. divize ”Bezruč”, with its commander Brig. Gen. Alois Benda in České Budějovice, and elements of Czech military units which earlier had manned the fortified positions.
Following an air attack consisting of Heinkel He-111 of the 8./KG 254 and an artillery stike, the Germans began their assault one and a half hour later, and forced forced to retreat into the town itself in order to set up defences there. The Germans persued them, but faced heavy resistance from constant counterattacks, snipers, machinegun and mortar fire.
However, the pressure was too much for the defenders, and in the early morning of October 20, Brig. Gen. Alois Benda surrendered to the Germans. The Germans took 2,500 prisoners, as well as a amount of rifles, mortars and light and heavy machineguns. For the rest of the month, the front in southern Bohemia was relatively quiet, due to the halt of the other German armies in Bohemia and Moravia.
[edit] Siege of Plzeň
At 05:35 hours on October 16, large German artillery concentrations began shelling the fortified line running north of the city of Plzeň. After two hours of artillery barrages, the Junkers Ju-87 dive bombers 1./St.G.168 and 3./St.G.168 of the Luftwaffe was sent in to destroy armour and artillery concentrations and communication centres.
At 10:00 the XIV. Armeekorps supported by the 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) from XIV. Armeekorps began assaulting the fortified line, though met fierce resistance from forward elements of I. sbor “Smetana”. As the German advanced on the fortifications, the Czechs opened fire with machineguns, anti-tank cannons and heavy artillery, and thus were forced to fall back to their staging areas.
After two more hours of heavy artillery barrages, they attempted to break the line once again. This time they were more successfull, but were nontheless forced to fall back again to regroup. They resumed to shell the defences with artillery for the next 10 hours. At 11:00 the next day, artillery began shelling the Czech positions once again, while pioneers armed with satchel charges and flamethrowers approached the bunkers under the cover of the artillery barrage.
At 16:00 the Germans attacked the line for a third time, but while the defenders were busy repelling the German assault, the pioneers went into action, using their flamethrowers and satchel charges to eliminate the threat from within the bunkers. After fierce fighting, most of the defenders in the bunkers had been eliminated or surrendered to the Germans. Half an hour later, the Panzer-Regiment 1 and the Kradschützen-Bataillon 1 broke through the line near the towns of Bezvěrov. On October 18, the rest of the XIV. Armeekorps broke through the lines along the towns of Loučky, Kamýk, Krivce, Úterý and Vidžín and Vlkošov, Zhořec, Mezí, Újezd and Manětín.
The frontline was in chaos, and the Czechs were in retreat. The Czech high command was shocked by the fast pace of the German Tenth Army. On October 20, the 1. Panzer-Division and elements of the 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) advancing north of Plzeň had advanced 26 km, and reached a line running through the villages of Olešná, Planá, Žichlice and Horní Bříza. West of Plzeň the 1. Leichte Division and the 13. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had also made significant gains. On October 20 they had captured the villages of, and by October 21 they had advanced 29 km from heir starting positions two days earlier, reaching the villages of Kozolupy, Heřmanova Huť, Tlučná and Nýřany. On October 23 the two elements of Guderian's XIV. Armeekorps rendezvoused outside the village of Nezvěstice, 15 km southeast of Plzeň. In a month they had advanced around 100 km inland, which was an astounding accomplishment when considering the heavy resistance from the Czech troops. As Guderian wrote in his journal, "The advance towards Prague and Plzeň has gone faster than anticipated - it seems that the cooperation between armoured formations, motorised infantry, artillery and the air force has proven to surprise the Czech Army. I am, however, surprised by the Czechs resistance in the other areas of the country, but I expected this would happen. The OKH underestimated the ability of the Czech border fortifications, which has proven to be a large mistake, perhaps even catastrophic."
Meanwhile, in order to secure the left flank of the advance of the Tenth Army, the XIII. Armeekorps and the XIV. Armeekorps were advancing slowly towards Prague, but mostly remained defensive.
In the evening of October 22, the commander of Hraniční oblast 32 “Miluláš”, Brig. Gen. Ing. RTDr. Jan Kloud, and the mayor of Plzeň urged the citizens of Plzeň to remain calm and to help erect defences on the outskirts of the city. As Plzeň was now encircled by German troops, their only option was to delay the Germans with defending the city for as long as they could.
German tanks of the 1. Panzer-Division first began to probe into the Božkov and Koterov suburbs in the early afternoon on October 25 but were greeted by point-blank artillery fire. The German tanks were not adequately supported by infantry and took moderate losses from camouflaged 37 mm anti-tank guns and 100 mm howitzers that had been positioned at key street intersections. The fighting petered out later on October 27 when the 1. Panzer-Division was ordered to fall back to its positions around Plzeň in order to be at disposal for a thrust later on either towards Prague or Plzeň.
On October 30, the 1. Leichte Division and the Panzer-Regiment 1 of the 1. Panzer-Division began to probe into the Skvrňany and Slovany suburbs, but they made few gains due to camouflaged 37 mm anti-tank guns and 100 mm howitzers and soldiers armed with gasoline bombs.
During the winter, the Germans made limited gains, but continued to shell the centres of defences in the city, as they were ordered not to attack the industrial areas, and refused to attack civilian properties. Instead they focused on disrupting utilities, water, food and energy supplies, and in the end force the Czech defenders to capitulate.
[edit] Intervention of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union had already on September 30 supported the Czech refusal to abide the agreements made in Munich, and promised to send military aid in case of a German attack. At 12:30 the next day, 7 hours after war had broken out, the Czech government led by President Edvard Beneš and Prime Minister Arm. Gen. Jan Syrový met at the Prague Castle to discuss the further political and military situation, now as war with Germany had broken out. Seeing that the French and British had abandoned them (as a response of the statement made by their prime minister earlier that morning), they urged their Soviet ally to intervene militarily.
At 14:00, Vyacheslav Molotov secretly proclaimed that he would at least send the promised 70,000 men and material through Romania as soon as they were mobilised and got a permission from the Romanian government to pass through their territory. Until then, he urged the Czechs to withstand the German attack and use the Soviet military aircraft already present in Czechoslovak territory.
STAVKA thus began to mobilize a corps which should be sent to Czechoslovakia. The 8th Mechanised Corps, commanded by Komdiv Prokofii Logvinovich Romanenko, was selected for the task. On October 2 he was promoted to Komkor and given was given orders to support the Czechoslovak Army with resisting the Germans.
The 8th Mechanised Corps was reinforced, and consisted on October 4 of the following units:
- 7. Strelkovaya Diviziya
- 41. Strelkovaya Diviziya
- 96. Strelkovaya Diviziya
- 9. "Krymskaya" Kavaleriyskaya Diviziya
- 15. Motorizovannaya Diviziya
- 218. Motorizovannaya Diviziya
- 23. Tankovaya Briygada
- 26. Tankovaya Briygada
On October 5, five days after hostilities broke out, the corps was loaded on trains heading for Czechoslovakia. While the men and equipment were preparing for transport, Romanian Foreign Minister Petrescu-Comnen was called to Moscow on October 8 to discuss further the dialogue on the passage of Soviet troops through Romania of September 14 with Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov. The Czechs decision to fight had spawned a solidarity movement among Romanians in support of Czechoslovakia, but they would not themself intervene on the behalf of CSR. However, in the meetings, the passage was agreed, as long as did not stop on Romanian territory. Litvinov and Molotov agreed on the term of the Romanian Foreign Minister, and on October 9 the first trains with Soviet troops crossed the Soviet-Romanian border. On October 13 the Corps had been unloaded in Užhorod, and began then to march towards the frontline in Moravia.
Amounting to 70,000 men, the land force was of the size that Voroshilov had promised to send in case of a conflict between Czechoslovakia. With them were 350 tanks, which was a mixture of various T-26 tanks supported by T-28 medium tanks, while the 750 artillery pieces consisted mostly of 76.2 mm regimental guns and 122 mm howitzers. Furthermore, 20 T-28 tanks were leased to the Czechs to be used in combat, as they meant the Czechs lacked medium tanks. Though the medium tanks were not much better than the Czech tanks already in service, its 76.2 mm main gun was welcomed by the Czechoslovak Army.
However, Voroshilov had problems with keeping the promise of sending the 350,000 men by air. Due to the bad weather and Hungarian and German air superiority at most places, the Soviets only succeeded in devering two divisions. However, the delivery of ammunition and spare parts by air was more successful.
On the Czech side, the production of the LT vz. 38 was set in motion, and some of the vehicles originally planned to be delivered to Iran was kept for use against the Germans. On October 20, 50 tanks of the type LT vz. 38 was completed, and drove off the ČKD factories (Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk) in Prague to replace the losses of LT vz. 35 tanks. The divisions first equipped with the tanks were the 1. rychlá divize “Kazimír” on the Plzen front and the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej” on the Brno front.
[edit] Battle of Ivančice
At 9:00 on October 20, the forward elements of the 2. Panzer-Division had reached the town of Ivančice, while elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had secured its left flank along the villages of Lhánice, Biskoupky and Hrubšice. After an hour of searching for hidden defenders in Ivančice, they held a break in order to prepare for their assault on the village of Oslavany, where they meant elements of the 6. divize “Kalvoda” had set up positions.
In Rosice, Brig. Gen. František Tallavania, the commanding officer of 6. divize “Kalvoda”, was given an order from Div. Gen. Alois Eliáš, the commanding officer of V. sbor “Kolár”, to hold off the Germans at the defensive line running through Čučice, Oslavany, Padochov and Neslovice for as long as possible.
Arm. Gen. Lev Prchala, the commanding officer of the IV. armáda ”Neruda”, was planning an counterattack in that area in order to halt, or at least cause problems for the advance of the XVIII. Armeekorps towards Brno. The plan was the following:
The attack would be carried out in three phases:
- Before the battle, the necessary motorised units would be mobilized in the vicinity of the town of Příbam na Moravě. Until the units had been regrouped, resupplied and prepared for the counterattack, the 6. divize “Kalvoda” would hold the line along the villages of Čučice, Oslavany, Padochov and Neslovice. The participating units for the counterattack would be carried out by the V. sbor “Kolár”, under overall command of Div. Gen. Alois Eliáš. The reinforcement for the counterattack would consist of the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej”, the 14. divize “Fibich” (the only motorised division of the ČSR Army) and the 13. divize ”Úprka”.
- The second phase of the counterattack would begin after the V. sbor “Kolár” had moved south and rendezvous with the 6. divize “Kalvoda”. They would then wait for the German to attack with their armoured units. As the Germans moved over the open landscape in front of the villages, the defenders in the Oslavany would hold it for as long as possible, and then fall back into the forest. As the tanks entered the town, the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej” would advance in a pincer movement and cut of the tanks from the advancing German infantry. While the Czech infantry holds the Germans off, the Czech tanks will attack the German tanks from the rear. After completing this, the spearhead consisting og the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej” and the 14. divize “Fibich” would attack in the direction of Ivančice and secure it. On the second day of the counterattack, the 13. divize ”Úprka” would advance southwards while the 6. divize “Kalvoda” secures the left flank of the corps.
- The third phase would begin on the fourth day, after the advancing troops had regrouped. With sufficient artillery and infantry support, the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej” would split up into two advancing spearheads. One of them would advance in the direction of Moravský Krumlov, while the second would along the Jihlava river and capture Dolní Kounice. The main part of the 13. divize ”Úprka” would secure the right flank by capturing the villages of Jamolice and Dobřínsko, while the remaining would support the advance at Moravský Krumlov. The 14. divize “Fibich” would spit into two units; one supporting the advance on Moravský Krumlov and the second the advance on Dolní Kounice.
The plan was bold, but if successful would give the Germans fighting in the suburbs of Brno serious problems. If they could delay the Germans for a while, that would be enough time for the Soviet troops to take positions in the Brno area.
Around noon on October 20, a Fieseler Fi-156 Storch reconnaissance aircraft reported that the Czechs had set up positions around the village of Oslavany. The Germans then ordered an artillery barrage on the Czech positions around the village. The Czech artillery in that area was somewhat weaker, but managed to fire back, resulting in several German casualties. After the preparations, the Germans attacked in the direction of Oslavany and Neslovice.
The 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) met heavy resistance in Neslovice, while a combined effort from artillery, machineguns and anti-tank guns forced the 2. Panzer-Division to fall back to Ivančice.
At 16:00 the Germans attacked the Oslavany again, this time with support from Stuka dive bombers. As the Germans advanced towards the villages, they were again met by artillery, machineguns and anti-tank guns, and the attack was once again repulsed. Except for a series of artillery duels, the front was quiet for the night.
At 8:00 on September 21, the Germans began shelling the positions in Čučice and Oslavany, while Stuka dive bombers attacked the artillery positions north of Padochov and Neslovice. A group of Avia B-534 managed to shoot down a couple of the dive bombers before they returned to base, but in the following aerial clash were 8 B-534s lost while destroying 4 Messerschmitt Bf-109 while damaging a fifth.
At 10 o'clock they attacked with moderate strenght towards Oslavany, but were thrown back. However, to the Czech's shock, elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) supported by a group of tanks 2. Panzer-Division broke through at Čučice and were advancing towards Zbýšov, threatened the soldiers defending Oslavany. As the planned counterattack and the frontline now were at the brink of collapse, Brig. Gen. František Tallavania personally led a company of infantry and a battery of 100 mm Skoda howitzers from Rosice and set up positions southwest of Důl Anna and Zbýšov. When the German infantry were within 300 metres they opened fire with heavy and light machineguns while using the howitzers against the tanks. The Germans were taken completely by suprise, and over 120 soldiers were killed, along with 14 of the 20 tanks used in the breakthrough were destroyed. Supported by the remaining defenders from Čučice they forced the Germans back across the Oslava river.
On his way towards Oslavany, Brig. Gen. Tallavania's staff vehicle was strafed by an Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighter, and the driver was subsequently killed. The car crashed into the ditch, and he suffered several injuries, including a broken arm and several bullet wounds. Against the medical personnel's wishes, he continued to Oslavany so he could take direct command of the defence. At 23:00 he was telephoned from his adjutant in Rosice that the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej”, the 14. divize “Fibich” and the 13. divize ”Úprka” had reached Příbam na Moravě, and they would be prepared to move out by noon the next day.
The following morning the positions around the villages of Čučice, Oslavany, Padochov and Neslovice came under heavy artillery fire, and at 9 o'clock the 2. Panzer-Division and the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) advanced along a wide front towards the Czech positions. According to plan, the Czech anti-tank guns in Oslavany destroyed a couple of Pz.Kpfw. I tanks before withdrawing northwards. However, confusion arose when a German motorcycle unit and a couple of tanks reached the bridge over the Oslava river before the remaining soldiers managed to withdraw, and fierce close combat action began. In the middle of the fighting the Czech soldiers were being shelled by a Pz.Kpfw. IV. Brig. Gen. Tallavania, seeing that the soldiers would not be able to retreat, took a gasoline bomb and ran up on the side of the building next to the tank. He managed to destroy it, but was shot dead by a German rifleman shortly afterwards. At the same time, infantry elements had captured Padochov.
Div. Gen. Alois Eliáš, the commanding officer of V. sbor “Kolár”, was taken by surpise of the fast advance of the German troops and ordered his units to begin the counterattack three hours earlier than planned. As the Czech tanks were advancing on the flanks of the German tanks in Padochov they met a group of tanks on their way towards Padochov. However, the Germans were taken by surprise, and 17 tanks were destroyed while only loosing 7 LT vz. 35 light tanks to enemy fire. They then closed the pincer in the outskirts of Oslavany. As a company of 14. divize “Fibich” secured the rear flank of the pincer from German infantry, the tanks closed in on the German tanks in Oslavany. After two hours of fierce fighting, the German troops surrendered to the Czechs. 200 soldiers were taken prisoner, and two Pz.Kpfw. II light tanks were captured (due to lack of ammunition). The two tanks were taken back to Příbam na Moravě, where it was repainted and rearmed with 20 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft cannons.
After the Czechs had regrouped, they advanced again north and south of Ivančice. At 13:30 elements of the 30th Mot. Border Batallion had secured the village of Letkovice, 1 km southwest of Ivančice, and an hour later the 2nd Recon Batallion reached Němčice. At the same time the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the 14. divize “Fibich” secured the area east of the town, thus cutting off the Germans in Ivančice from the main bulk of the XVIII. Armeekorps. The next morning, at 06:45, the Czech artillery opened fire on the German positions around and in the town. The saturation of the bombardement lasted two hours. At 9:00, the German defences were attacked from three sides by Czech tanks and infantry. Initially the losses among Czech infantry were high, but after an aerial bombardement of the German defences by a couple of Avia B-71 fast bombers they managed to break through the defences around the town, and by noon they had secured it.
Here they captured 100 German soldiers as well as several machineguns and mortars. At 13:00 the Czechs was caught by surprise when a German counterattack comprising of a small infantry detachment forced them to fall back from Němčice. The Germans left during the night, and the front was quiet until the next morning.
At 8 o'clock on October 23 Brig. Gen. JUDr. Josef Koutňák, the commanding officer of 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej", received a telegram that 15 of the new modern LT vz. 38 light tanks were at his disposal in Moravský Krumlov, along with 10 LT vz. 35 tanks and 3 OA vz. 30 armoured cars from the 3rd Tank Batallion. These were brought to Ivančice, and around 11 o'clock they were deployed with the other tanks and the infantry of the 14. divize “Fibich” along the line Nová Ves-Alexovice-Němčice.
At noon German artillery began shelling the Czech positions in and around Ivančice, and a reconnaissance aircraft reported that there was massive armoured units preparing to attack in the direction of Ivančice. As a result, the V. sbor “Kolár” prepared to hold the line from the German attack. One hour later, Czech forward observers reported that a German reconnaissance unit had reached the village of Budkovice and the German tanks would reach the Czech defences within the next hour. Subsequently the Czechs began shelling the fields south of the village, resulting in heavy German artillery shelling of Nová Ves, Alexovice, Němčice and Ivančice. At the same time, Junkers Ju-87B Stukas of 2./St.G. 168 attacked the positions south of Ivančice while Heinkel He-111 bombers of 3./KG 254 attacked the town itself.
While destroying 6 tanks and several artillery pieces, 4 Stukas and 2 Heinkel He-111 were shot down; 2 of them by anti-aircraft fire and the remaining were shot down by Avia B-534 pilots. The pilot Karel Miroslav Kuttelwascher managed to shot down 1 Stuka and 1 Heinkel before he and the other fighters were forced to flee as a group of Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighters appeared at the scene, shooting down 3 B-534s.
At 13 o'clock the large elements of the 2. Panzer-Division and the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) began its assault on the Czech troops in Nová Ves, Alexovice, Němčice and Ivančice. The German armoured elements, consisting of Pz.Kpfw. I and Pz.Kpfw. II light tanks and Sd.Kfz. 222 and Sd.Kfz. 231 armoured cars, were this time sufficiently supported by motorised infantry. Around 2 km south of the Czech lines, the German soldiers left their trucks and began their advance towards Ivančice. 500 m from Nová Ves, Alexovice and Němčice the Czech machineguns opened fire on the Germans. The Czech infantry came under heavy fire from the German armour, infantry and artillery, and thus suffered heavy losses. However, the German tanks had not discovered the hidden Czech tanks, who now began to open fire. The German light tanks had little chance to destroy the Czech tanks, especially the Pz.Kpfw. I, which was only armed with two machineguns. The German tanks began to suffer heavy losses, and after three hours of fighting, the German tanks attacking in the direction of Alexovice began to retreat.
At Němčice the Germans had better luck, and after an hour of fighting the Germans had broken through the positions held by the Czech infantry, and thus began to retreat or were taken prisoner. The German tanks advanced north of Němčice. The Germans were surprised of the limited resistance of the Czechs, but continued towards Ivančice. However, this was a deliberate act by Brig. Gen. JUDr. Koutňák, who used this to his advantage, and attacked the German light tanks from the rear and the sides with his LT vz. 35 and 38 tanks. The surprise was complete. The Germans were slaughtered, and 21 tanks were destroyed, while 5 were captured, more or less damaged. As a result the German tanks retreated from Němčice. In the evening, the Czechs redeployed their troops around the village of Němčice.
The next morning the Germans attacked with larger strength than the day before, and a further 6 tanks and 20 trucks fell victim to the German artillery. At noon the Germans began their advance towards Němčice and Nová Ves. To the west, the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had reached the towns of Hrubšice and Řeznovice, and began now to cross the river Jihlava.
To the east, the German tanks, supported by infantry, motorcycles and artillery, began to shell the Czech defences in Němčice, resulting in massive losses on the Czech side. However, the German light tanks were not able to break through the lines, and thus retreated after two hours of fighting. However, one hour later they attack with renewed strength, this time equipped with the heavier Pz.Kpfw. III and IV tanks. The Czechs were taken by surprise of the strength of these two tanks, supported by light tanks and infantry, and the Germans broke through the lines and destroyed 7 Czech tanks in the process. The Germans advanced towards the southern part of Ivančice, but a counterattack by Czech LT vz. 35 and 38 light tanks, supported by artillery and Letov Š-328 light bombers forced the Germans to retreat, but not without heavy losses on both sides.
In the evening, the Germans had withdrawn to Budkovice, and the Div. Gen. Alois Eliáš, through Arm. Gen. Lev Prchala, ordered the V. sbor “Kolár” to advance south and east.
On the fifth day, one day behind schedule, the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej” split up into two advancing spearheads. One of them began the advance in the direction of Moravský Krumlov. In the end of the day, the Czechs had secured the villages of Budkovice, Rokytná and Polánka, capturing 300 German soldiers in the process. In the east, the Czechs had reached the town of Moravské Bránice, and were now only 1 km from the town of Nové Bránice, while in the west elements of the 13. divize ”Úprka” had secured the right flank by capturing the villages of Jamolice and Dobřínsko.
Now the situation presented the Czechs with a rare opportunity to enjoy modest numerical superiority over the Germans. On October 26, the Czechs began to shell the German defenders in Moravský Krumlov, while the Czech managed to secure Nové Bránice. In the morning of October 27, the Czechs had achieved most of their goals with the counterattack. Although the Czechs had difficult time seizing control of Moravský Krumlov, reserves were thrown in, including some LT vz. 35 and 3 of the T-28 medium tanks, which had been given to Czechoslovakia as a gift, and the German defences finally crumbled. At 5 o'clock the Czechs had managed to secure Dolní Kounice, capturing a further 200 German prisoners.
By October 28, the German divisions were in retreat and the Czechs had captured over 1,500 prisoners. However, the situation in Brno forced Prchala to order the Czechs to retreat back to their lines before the counterattack began on October 20, with a smaller force defending Ivančice. The battle was the largest tank battle of the campaign, and one of the heaviest in Moravia. The German losses were heavy: 3,000 soldiers were killed, and 7,000 injured, as well as 1,500 were taken prisoner. A total of 103 German tanks were lost in the battle - 13 tanks were captured, which were rearmed with Czech weapons and used as replacement tanks where needed. The Czechs lost 23 tanks and 4 armoured cars, as well as 4,000 men and 6,000 injured.
[edit] Battles of Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky
Following the German breakthrough in southern Moravia, the Germans could take advantage of their armed forces' motorisation and mobility, and by October 20 the Fourteenth Army had advanced at some places more 40 km inland, and the forward elements of the had reached the town of Pohořelice, 25 km southwest of Brno. While the 2. Panzer-Division secured the frontline around Brno, elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had captured the villages of Sokolnice, Šaratice and Otnice.
On October 22, the Germans pulled out of Otnice, which was the result of a communication error. On October 23, elements of the 20. divize “Bernolák”, under command of Brig. Gen. František Kravák, used the German's mistake to his advantage and occupied the village. The division had a shortage of anti-tank weapons, and the ammunition supply was also running out. However, he decided to hold the line along the villages of Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky.
While the Hraniční pásmo XIV “Svatopluk” was engaging troops 2. Panzer-Division around Brno, Gen.Maj. Joachim Lemelsen was furious by the neglect of the company that had occupied Otnice, and ordered the division to take it back. At 10:00 a company of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) entered Borkovany without meeting resistance.
One hour later the continued towards Velké Hostěrádky, but outside the village the German vehicles crashing into a Czech roadblock. Then the Czech machineguns began firing on the German soldiers, killing the leading officer of the coloumn. Confusion arose among the German soldiers, and screams and military commands could be heard, at one point the Czechs could hear a soldier yelling "Feige Tschechen die zuerst schiessen". The ensuing firefight continued until 1300 hours, ending with the German soldiers pulling back. The Czechs were reinforced and regrouped into new positions.
At 1600 hours Div. Gen. Alois Eliáš, commander of the V. sbor “Kolár”, received orders that the Czech forces defending the line Otnice-Bošovice-Velké Hostěrádky would be reinforced by elements of the 23. Tank Brigade, but until the Soviet units had reorganised to defend the sector, the Czechs were given the order to "Hold out at all costs".
Kravák then began preparations for further German attacks, placing anti-tank mines at key attack points, positioning anti-tank cannons and mortars and gathering ammunition and other equipment, with the help of the civilian population. The preparations were relatively uninterupted, except for German artillery fire.
The next morning the Germans attacked the Czech positions at Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky after a brief artillery barrage. The Germans attacked with full strength, but the attack failed to take the Czechs by surprise.
At 0830 in the morning the motorcycle reconnaissance squads of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) made contact with the Czech defences at Velké Hostěrádky. Soon afterwards the AFVs arrived, supported by infantry. However, after several shots from the sides, the German tanks lost orientation, and the attack was repelled by heavy machine gun fire and mortar fire. Two AFVs retreated, while the majority of the motorcyclists were taken prisoner.
The Germans then mounted an assault on the Czech defences at Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky. After a short artillery barrage and aerial bombardment, the German motorised infantry dismounted from the trucks and advanced towards the Czech positions, but heavy small arms, machinegun and mortar fire forced the Germans to retreat.
In the evening of October 25 the Germans were reinforced by a company of Pz.Kpfw. I Ausf. B tanks, and the Germans regrouped and prepared for a new assault the following morning. At 0800 in the morning the Germans began to move out towards Velké Hostěrádky following a short artillery barrage and aerial bombardment. However, although the division lost some mortars, howitzers and approximately five ammunition cars, the bombs mostly missed the defensive positions and the advancing tanks were welcomed at 150 metres by well-positioned Czech 37 mm Bofors anti-tank guns. After two tanks were destroyed the German tanks withdrew at 400 metres and started shelling the Czechs with artillery, but after losing an additional two AFVs (one destroyed and one immobilized), the tanks retreated. At the same time the German infantry was left alone on a flat field, right in front of the Polish positions, without any cover. It was forced to retreat by a Czech attack that caused heavy losses and resulted in a number of prisoners being taken by the Czechs.
However, the Germans had almost eliminated the Czech defences at Otnice, but after 3 hours of close combat fighting the Germans retreated. Brig. Gen. Kravák knew that the situation at Otnice was critical, and another German attack would collapse the defences there. He could not replace the units, as they were fighting Germans at the Brno front.
The Germans also knew this, and thus ordered the main assault to take place at Otnice. At 0730 the Germans initiated a powerful artillery barrage and a aerial bombardment by Stukas on Otnice, even further limiting the Czech's defensive capability. On hour later the Germans launched their attack on the Czechs defences in Otnice, and after a short fight the Germans broke through the lines. As Brig. Gen. Kravák received reports of the fall of Otnice, Komkor P. L. Romanenko informed him that the 7. Strelkovaya Diviziya supported by a company of the 23. Tankovaya Briygada was ready to be deployed in the area. Kravák thus ordered the Soviet troops to counterattack in the direction of Otnice and then set up defensive positions in the abandoned Czech positions.
It was therefore decided to counterattack eastwards, where the the most advanced German troops was known to be some two kilometres northeast of Otnice. While T-26 tanks of the 23. Tankovaya Briygada engaged the German picket from the front whilst infantry of the 7. Strelkovaya Diviziya worked round their flanks. This soon induced the heavily outnumbered Germans to fall back from Otnice towards their main line, allowing the Russians to retake Otnice. The tanks continued down the road a little past Otnice whilst the Soviet infantry fanned out and began to deploy on a front of some four kilometres on either side of them, between the villages of Otnice and Bošovice. The infantry first came under German artillery fire during the occupation of Ubrež, north of the road. At 1300 an attack was launched by the Germans on the Soviet line at Otnice. The Russian response was fierce and effective. The Germans had advanced across open ground to within a kilometre of the town when they began to be struck by Russian field artillery and tank gun fire. The fighting faded out in the early evening, and the frontline was relatively quiet for the next day, except for a few artillery shelling and machinegun fire.
At 0900 on October 28 a general attack was launched by the Germans on the main Czech-Soviet line at Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky. After an artillery barrage and aerial bombardements the Germans advanced across open ground within a kilometre of the town,they halted the advance. After a second artillery barrage was launched on the Czech-Soviet positions, the Germans continued the advance. Then they began to be struck by Czech field artillery and machinegun fire. The Germans continued to assault the villages, but the Germans failed in breaking through the lines. The fighting continued until the early afternoon of October 30.
The Czechs and the Russians had prepared for a counterattack on October 31, but the fall of Brno prevented the plan from being carried out. That day only artillery duels and machinegun fire broke the silence.
In the early morning of November 1, following the loss of Brno, Brig. Gen. Kravák ordered the Czech and Soviet troops to fall back to the defensive line along the villages of, km to the rear. The losses on both sides were quite high. The Germans lost approximately 1,500 men (killed, missing, captured or seriously wounded), and 20 AFVs (12 of them tanks). The Czechs and the Russians lost 1000 killed and 1,300 wounded, as well as 300 horses, several guns and 13 T-26 tanks.
[edit] Capture of Brno
The 2. Panzer-Division and elements of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had captured the villages along the line Dukovany-Jamolice-Polánka-Rokytná-Budkovice, while also reaching the town of Ořechov, around 11 km from Brno on October 19 and began shelling the town the following day, beginning the Battle of Brno.
At 10.00 German motorised units of the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) under Gen.Maj. Joachim Lemelsen arrived to the area. After the had captured Střelice, Troubsko and Zelesice (some 8 kilometres from Brno), the commander of the XVIII. Armeekorps, Gen.d.Inf. Eugen Beyer, ordered his units to break through the Czech defences and capture the city of Brno as soon as possible. The German assault group was composed of and a battery of 150 mm guns. The group outflanked the Czechs and reached the suburbs of the city, but was bloodily repelled by the - numerically inferior - Czech defenders. The Czech commander of the sector, Brig. Gen. Miloš Kudrna, had only the Hraniční pásmo XIV “Svatopluk” to defend the city, which consisted only of the Hraniční oblast 38 “Cyril”, an understrength border defence unit of the army. However, his forces were soon reinforced by elements of the 2. rychlá divize “Ondřej” and a battalion of the 20. divize “Bernolák” and held their positions until dawn.
The Germans halted the offensive for two days, and the front was relatively quiet except for the artillery duels and air battles above the city. At 10.00 on October 22, the main forces of 2. Panzer-Division was prepared for an assault on the city. After a heavy hour-long artillery barrage, the Germans began their assault, and broke through the lines at Nový Lískovec, Bohunice and Horní Heršpice at noon. At 14.00 the Germans broke through to the city centre, but were driven back after heavy city fighting with the small infantry units formed of local volunteers and Soviet reinfocements.
Gen.d.Inf. Beyer decided to fall back and encircle the city waiting for more reinforcements to arrive. His forces achieved a limited success and captured the important suburb of Žabovřesky together with surrounding hills. However, the Czech forces were also reinforced with reserves and new Soviet reinforcements. The hills gave a good overview of the city centre and the German commander placed his artillery there to shell the city. In addition, the city was almost constantly bombed by the Luftwaffe.
On October 26, the Germans began a major assault on the town, and by the end of the day they had made several headways into the town, encircling the Czech and Soviet defenders in the process. They had also secured the airfield and taken the Špilberk Castle and the St. Peter and Paul Cathedral.
By the morning of 28 October the advanced German armoured and infantry units have halted in order for the German commander to send his envoy to the Czech commander, Brig. Gen. Miloš Kudrna. He demanded that the city should surrender to Germany. When the Czech envoy replied that he had no intention of signing such a document, he was informed that the general assault was ordered on September 29 and that the city would most surely be taken. After ten hours of heavy fighting, the Czechs had lost lot of ground, now controlling only the city centre and other smaller pockets. The following day Brig. Gen. Kudrna decided that the situation of his forces was hopeless. The reserves, human resources and war materiel were plentiful, but further defence of the city would be fruitless and would only result in more civilian casualties. It was decided to start the surrender talks with the German Army.
On October 31, 1939, the act of surrender was signed in the suburb of Štýřice. Brig. Gen. Kudrna accepted all conditions proposed by the Germans, as he was eager to avoid further civilian casualties.
[edit] Hungarian offensive
At dawn on October 20, 1938, Hungarian artillery suddenly opened fire on Czech defences along the Slovak-Hungarian border. While the Czechs had anticipated a Hungarian attack, the artillery bombardement still came as a complete surprise, especially for the Soviet soldiers of the 96th Rifle Division positioned in southern Slovakia. While the Hungarian shelled the Czech defences, the invading forces were given orders to "proceed as far as possible".
In the west, south of Bratislava, Brig. Gen. Bohuslav Všetička ordered his 15. divize “Jánošík” to position itself in the area in and around Bratislava, anticipating either a Hungarian or a joint German-Hungarian attack. In the south, the VII. sbor “Myslbek” and Hraniční pásmo XV ”Adam” prepared for combat, while the three reserve division of the III. armáda, including the 3. rychlá divize “David”, was mobilised and organised for combat. Further east the Hraniční pásmo XVI ”Ferdinand” was prepared to defend Eastern Slovakia and Ruthenia, along with some tanks.
The II Corps began ground operations soon after 8 o'clock in the morning, securing the bridges over the Danube River and the border stations without facing much resistance. After securing the border stations, Hungarian troops poured over the Hungarian-Czech frontier. The Hungarian troops advanced quickly towards Bratislava, which surprised both the Czechs and the Germans. Despite the awful confusion caused by the deteriorating situation, the Czech force in Bratislava had coalesced sufficiently to defend the city for a longer period of time. After several failed attempts to approach the city Maj.Gen. Milán Temessy decided to halt operations on November 1. However, at some places, the bridges were blown up by the Czechs, and thus prevented them from entering Czechoslovakia until a pontoon bridge had been built.
Further east the Hungarians were unable to cross the Danube, due to the border fortifications in the area. The I Corps attacked at 8:00 in the morning, following a short but precise artillery bombardement. When the Hungarians attempted to cross the river, they were immediately forced to fall back, due to the heavy resistance of Czech soldiers of the SOS (Stráž obrany státu) and border guards. The Hungarians continued to assault the Czech positions, but had not made any gains by November 1. Similarly the III Corps failed in gaining significant breakthroughs, and after several assault the Corps had still not crossed the border by November 1.
In the area south of Košice, the 13th Infantry Brigade initially made significant gains, having advanced 15 km into Czechoslovak territory. They had then reached the villages of Turňa nad Bodvou, Debraď, Paňovce, Šaca, Haniska, Gyňov and Trstené pri Hornáde. However, the advance was then blocked by the border forifications, and after several attempts to break through it, they halted operations temporarily on October 25.
Meanwhile, the III/13th Infantry Brigade formed the left flank of the spearhead advancing towards Michalovce, while the 3rd Huszar Regiment formed the right. After breaking through the border defences on October 23, they advanced around 15 km inland, but due to logistical limitations were forced to halt the advance in order to get the necessary supplies forward.
Together with the advance towards Bratislava, the largerst gains were made by the 14th Infantry Brigade advancing northwards through Ruthenia. They had by November 1 marched 30 km inland without facing any significant resistance, except for a couple of raids by Czech border guards and Slovak police units and air attacks by the Czechoslovak Air Force.
In the first 10 days of the Hungarian assault, the most fiercely contested action was in the air, and continued after the Hungarian ground advance had halted. The Zemské velitelství letectva Slovensko, under the command of Colonel Jaroslav Skála, was responsible for defending the airspace over Slovakia. Opposing them was the majority of the Hungarian Air Force - the 1st and 2nd Fighter Regiments, the 3rd Bomber Regiment and the 1stIndependent Long-Range Reconnaissance Group.
On the morning of the Hungarian attack, October 20, three Letov Š-328 army cooperation aircraft spotted the Hungarian concentrations south of the border and the Hungarians' advance into Ruthenia. In the early afternoon three more Letovs, equipped with bombs and escorted by five Avia B-534s, set out to attack the Hungarian columns south of Bratislava. The bombing raid was partially successful, but on their way back they were hit by well-directed Hungarian anti-aircraft fire, which downed a B-534 and damaged a Letov. At 1500 three more B-534s strafed a column of Hungarian armour and trucks advancing into Ruthenia, followed by 2 Letovs which dropped bombs on the column. However, another B-534 was lost.
Meanwhile, eighteen Junkers Ju-86K-2 bombers from Debrecen, escorted by nine CR.32 fighters set out to raid Košice. Ten of the bombers found their target at 12:30 and then dropped their bombs over the main railway station there, killing 24 civilians. Bratislava was not targeted by Hungarian bombers, but the city had already been bombed by the Luftwaffe in the first two weeks of the war.
At dawn on October 22, eight B-534s took off from the Air Force station at Spišská Nová Ves on another ground attack mission, but they were intercepted over Kráľovský Chlumec by nine Hungarian Fiat CR.32. One B-534 was shot down and two others crash landed. The pilot of one later that day captured by the Hungarians. A few hours later, three more Letovs bombed the Hungarians around Berehovo. One was damaged by ground fire, but managed to escape. A final air battle took place in the afternoon. Three Letovs, escorted by three B-534s were intercepted by nine CR.32 shortly after delivering their bombs on the forward elements of the 14th Infantry Brigade. One Letov was downed, but the B-534s managed to ensure the escape of the others, shooting down three CR.32s and losing two B-534s in the process. On October 27, a group of Letov bombers escorted by five Avia B-534s attacked again attacked the 14th Infantry Brigade, this time losing no aircrafts to anti-aircraft fire or to enemy fighters.
On October 23 the eighteen Junkers Ju-86K-2 bombers set out to raid Spišská Nová Ves, which the captured Czech pilot had let slip was the main Czech Air Base in eastern Slovakia. Nine of the bombers found their target at 14:10, and destroyed or damaged three Avia B-534s, three Aero AP-32s and two Letov Š-328s on the ground. Although the airfield was still usable, the air raid had killed 13 persons, which resulted with an intense anti-Hungarian movement that arose among the local population.
After 73 civilians had been killed due to Hungarian air raids and artillery shellings, the anti-Hungarian movement that arose among the local population changed the policy of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana) led by Monsignor Jozef Tiso. Instead of fighting against the Czechs, he now agreed (temporarily) to support the Czech government with fighting the invading Germans and Hungarians, and ordered the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova garda) to fight the Hungarians whenever possible and to support the Czech troops already stationed in Slovakia.
During the crisis caused by Hitler's demand for the Sudetenland (in the summer of 1938), the Hlinka Guard emerged spontaneously, and on October 8 of that year, a week after war had broken out between Germany and Czechoslovakia, the guard was officially set up, with Karol Sidor as its first commander.
While hardliners within the party was reluctant to fight along the Czechs, their trust for the Czechs after their decision to fight the invaders had risen, and many were actually supportive to fight along with the Czechs against the hated Hungarians.
[edit] Phase 3: Stalemate
Due to the heavy resistance in both Bohemia and Moravia, the Wehrmacht attempted, on November 20, 1938, a direct offensive against Plzeň and Prague. However, this attack had only limited tank support and was forced to assault extensive Czech defenses. After meeting determined resistance from the 1. rychlá divize “Kazimír” and 18. divize ”Erben”, the German offensive was driven back four days later, with the Germans losing 1,000 men and several dozen tanks.
By early December, the temperatures, so far relatively mild by European standards, dropped as low as twenty degrees Celsius below zero, freezing German troops, who still had no winter clothing, and German vehicles, which were not designed for such severe weather. More than 10,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers. Frozen grease had to be removed from every loaded shell and vehicles had to be heated for hours before use.
The German offensive on Prague stopped. As Guderian wrote in his journal, "the offensive on Prague failed…. We underestimated the enemy's strength, as well as his size and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on December 5, otherwise the catastrophe would be unavoidable."
In the ensuing months, the fronts were relatively quiet, appart from the numbers of artillery duels and raids on each others positions, as well as air-to-air combat. The winter gave both the Axis and the Czechs a chance to regroup and reorganise their troops.
[edit] German operations
Despite the cold weather and the relatively heavy casualties, the Germans gave up to conquer Plzeň and Prague within the end of the year. As a result, the OKW went to regrouping, reorganizing and reinforcing the Army units. Steps to secure the flanks of the army was also taken. On November 22, the SS-Inf.Regt. “Germania” and the 28. Infanterie-Division initiated an offensive in order to connect the Second and Eighth Armies by capturing the Hradec Králové Region (Královehradecký kraj) defended by the Hraniční oblast 35 ”Vítežslav” commanded by Brig. Gen. Karel Kutlvašr. On November 28 the SS-Inf.Regt. “Germania” supported by the forward elements of the 28. Infanterie-Division initated the assault on Hradec Králové, defended by the Hraniční pásmo XII “Otakar“, commanded by Div. Gen. Bedřich Ruml. The Czechs were taken completely by surprise, and after three hours of fighting the Germans were in control of the city. While most of the defending troops and the headquarters of the Hraniční pásmo XII “Otakar“ was captured, Div. Gen. Ruml and the remnants of the HO 35 (including its commander Brig. Gen. Kutlvašr) managed to escape the trap, and after they had regrouped they could return to combat. On December 5 the 28. Infanterie-Division continued southwards, advancing around 10 km before a combination of low supply stockpiles, cold weather and the soldiers of the HO 35 forced the offensive to a halt.
In eastern Bohemia the 17. Infanterie-Division began on December 12 to secure the Tenth Army's right flank. At the same time, the 5. and the 7. Infanterie-Division of the Twelfth Army began to thrust northwards into eastern Bohemia, in order to rendezvous with the 17. Infanterie-Division moving from the north. This offensive, meeting relatively light resistance, continued into January, and on January 10 the 5. and 17. Infanterie-Division met at Klatovy. On January 12 the three divisions ended military operations due to shortage of ammunition supplies.
In southern Bohemia the 1. Gebirgs-Division and the 15. and the 45. Infanterie-Divisions continued their advance northwards on December 12. However, repeated counterattacks by the 26th Tank Brigade, 97th and the 169th Rifle Divisions, the Germans were forced to halt the advance already after on December 17. They had only advanced 10 km from their starting positions. However, the 45. Infanterie-Divisions continued the offensive into January, supported by the 44. Infanterie-Divisions. Despite numberous counterattacks by the 4. rychlá divize “Vojtěch” the Germans continued their offensive, culminating with the Battle of Leština. In the early hours of January 10, the 45. Infanterie-Division approached the village of Letina, where the 1st Bicycle Battalion and 4th Tank Battalion was positioned. After five hours of heavy fighting the Czechs were on the retreat, and the German troops had taken full contol of the village in the early afternoon. On January 14 the two divisions ended military operations, after advancing 20 km from their starting positions.
In southern Moravia the Fourteenth also made small gains. Between November 1 and November 25 the Germans advanced 10 km, under constant counterattacks by Czech forces. The most significant achievement was the conquest of Třebíč (Trebitsch). Around 1000 the forward elements of the 2. Gebirgsdivision supported by armoured elements of the 4. Leichte Division reached the Czech line of defence south of Třebíč running through the villages of Stařeč, Čechočovice, Markvarice and Chlístov. The defenders comprised the 19. divize “Arbes” under the command of Brig. Gen. František Hněvkovský and the Skupina 2 ”Jaromír”, under the command of Brig. Gen. František Slunečko. At 13:00 on November 16 German artillery began shelling the centre and the Czech positions around Třebíč. When the Gebirgsjägers began their assault of the town, the Czechs opened fire with mortars, howitzers and heavy machineguns, forcing the Germans to retreat. On November 17, German artillery began shelling the hills around the village in order to disorganise the defences, but despite this they failed to capture the town again on November 20.
Now the 4. Leichte Division was sent into action, and at the end of November 21, the half of the town was in German hands. Seeing that any continuation of the defence Třebíč would be pointles, Div. Gen. Sergěj Ingr, commanding officer of III. sbor “Hálek”, ordered all units to retreat northwards, and before noon on November 22, the Germans were in full control of the town.
On the right flank, the 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.) managed to push the Czech-Soviet troops 15 km back before being forced to halt military operations. By January 15, all German military operations had been halted, in order to give the Wehrmacht units time to reorganize, reinforce and resupply their troops.
On January 15, 1939, Hitler held a meeting with the leading military officers of the OKW, OKH and OKL, among them Keitel, Brauchitsch, Halder and Göring. In the meeting, Hitler asked the OKW and OKH to make a combined effort to prepare the German forces for a spring offensive aimed against Prague. A draft was made by the OKH (Brauchitsch and Halder in particular) with support from Keitel and Jodl, and on February 18, the new plan was presented for Hitler. The plan was named "Unternehmen Frühlingserwachen" (Operation Spring Awakening), and were to be carried out in early March if approved. The plan was designed to overwhelm the Czech-Soviet defenders in both Bohemia and Moravia, and looked for a quick conquest of major cities such as Plzeň, Olomouc and the capital Prague. It required full cooperation between the different army units and the Luftwaffe.
The plan was the following:
- In northern Moravia, the Second Army should advance with overwhelming power and speed towards Olomouc and capture it, and then rendezvous with the Fourteenth Army coming from the south.
- In northern Bohemia, the Eighth Army should advance southwards and capture Mladá Boleslav, and then make the northern pincer of an encirclement of Prague.
- In Western Bohemia, the Tenth Army should first capture Plzeň, which had been encircled in October 1938 while the Czech defenders inside the city would be under constant pressure from artillery and the Luftwaffe. After securing Plzeň, the XIV. Armeekorps and two divisions of the XIV. Armeekorps (the 2. and 13. Infanterie-Division (mot.), all under the command of Gen.Lt. Heinz Guderian, would turn northeast and make the spearhead towards Prague. The northern spearhead would advance through the defences I. armáda ”Havlíček” and move to form the southern pincer of capital Prague.
- In southern Bohemia, one half of the Twelfth Army would advance northwards towards Prague. The rest would secure the right flank of the offensive towards Prague.
- In southern Moravia, the Fourteenth Army would advance along the Morava river towards Olomouc, as Brno had already fallen in late October the previous year.
Hitler immediately accepted the plan, and Brauchitsch ordered all armies to regroup and prepare for a spring offensive. All units were resupplied with arms, ammunition, supplies and soldiers from the Landwehr and Reserve divisions, all armoured units were reequipped with newly produced tanks and other vehicles.
[edit] Hungarian operations
While the Hungarians made the largest gains in the winter period, they were suffering from lack of ammunition and supplies, as well as winter clothing and heavy casualties, and the Hungarians suffered heavy casualties for each advance they made.
The main achievement of the Hungarian army was the capture of the Slovak capital Bratislava.
At 1000 on November 3, the 4th Infantry Brigade began their assault on Bratislava, while the 2nd Huszar Regiment advanced north of the city in order to prevent an escape by the 15. divize “Jánošík”. At noon the Hungarians received the report by the OKH that they had put the 16. Infanterie-Division and Panzer-Regiment 3 at the Hungarian's disposal. They were immediately dispated to secure the the encirclement of Bratislava and the assault itself. While the Panzer-Regiment 3 used their motorisation at their advantage, the support of the Germans were much welcomed by the Hungarians.
The same night Maj.Gen. Milán Temessy ordered the assault on Bratislava to be carried out at 0800 on November 6, 1938. In the meantime, Brig. Gen. Bohuslav Všetička, seeing he was encircled with no possibility to escape, decided to prepare for combat, mainly by putting up barricades and preparing gasoline bombs to be used against tanks.
At 0800 on November 6, 1938 The Hungarian-German assault was initiated, and by noon they had made several headways into the town. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe and artillery continued to bombard the defences in Bratislava and important facilities in the city itself. The Hungarians halted the offensive temporarily for around 10 hours in order to get the much needed ammunition supplies to the frontline infantry, which gave the Czechs an unexpected opportunity to reorganise the defences. The fighting continued into the night, without any real gains.
Heavy close combat fighting ensued for another 18 hours, until Brig. Gen. Všetička, with few reserves and little to no ammunition, and eager to avoid further civilian casualties, decided to capitulate to the Hungarians. At 07.30 on November 8 all Czech soldiers had laid down their arms.
In central Slovakia, the II Corps and I Corps made large gains, despite several counterattacks by the Hraniční oblast 39 ”Rafael”, 3. rychlá divize “David”, 10. divize “Tomašík”, 11. divize “Dobrovský” and the 22. divize ”Hviezdoslav”, and at some places they had advanced as far as 80 km by February 1939. Especially the clash between tanks of the 3. rychlá divize “David” with the 1st Infantry Brigade at Dudince on November 21 was exceptionally heavy, where the Hungarians were relatively slaughtered until they could send in a number of howitzers, 37 mm anti-tank guns and sufficient air support.
At the Košice front, the 13th Infantry Brigade made limited gains, except for advancing around 30 km northwards west of the town. Meanwhile, the Hraniční oblast 41 ”Alfons”, commanded by Brig. Gen. Ondřej Moravec, began preparations for an assault on the city.
On December 6, elements of the III/13th Infantry Brigade began the assault of Košice following a short artillery barrage. While the III/13th Infantry Brigade attacked from the southeast, the 13th Infantry Brigade assaulted the city from the south, west and northwest, while aslo advancing north of the city, supported by a company of the III/13th Infantry Brigade, in order to cut of the defenders. The Czechs were forced to retreat into the town itself in order to set up defences there. The Hungarians persued them, and fighting continued into the night. At the same time, the commander of Hraniční pásmo XVI ”Ferdinand”, Div. Gen. Ondřej Mézl, and Brig. Gen. Moravec had been encircled with a company of Czech soldiers in the city centre by Hungarians, and thus were unable to escape the pocket. However, remnants of the HO 41 (of battalion strength) led by Staff Lt.Col. J. Pacholík managed to escape, in order to set up positions north of the city.
In the early morning of December 10, Div. Gen. Mézl and Brig. Gen. Moravec, along with the Czech soldiers, capitulated to the Hungarians, but local Hlinka Guard snipers and Czech soldiers continued to fight the Hungarians for the rest of the day. For the rest of February, the only dealt with a few artillery barrages and infantry assaults on their positions.
Further to the east, the 3rd Huszar Regiment was ordered by Maj.Gen. András Littay to begin their offensive in the direction of Užhorod on November 4. Their orders were to advance northwards towards Michalovce and then encircle Užhorod. This resulted in the battle of Michalovce.
In the north, opposite Stakčín, Major Matjka assembled an infantry battalion and two artillery batteries. In the south, around Michalovce, a group of about four infantry battalions and several artillery batteries was gathered. At Martin Lt. Daxner formed a Armoured Group consisting of nine LT vz. 35 light tanks and eight OA vz. 30 armoured cars.
The Hungarian troops advanced quickly, which surprised both the Czechs and the Germans. November 5 they had reached Veľké Kapušany. By November 6 they had captured the villages of Krčava, Orechová and had reached Mtrča and Velký Berežnyj. In the night of November 6-7, the Hungarians attacked in the direction of Stakčin and Sobrance, encountering Czech resistance 4 km beyond Sobrance, thus halting the Hungarian advance. By the end of the day they had reached the line Remetské Hamre - Reskovce - Jesenov - Bunkovce - Blatné Remete. The same evening they stood in front of Závadka. They thus created a safe corridor from Gajdos to Remetské Hamry. Despite the awful confusion caused by the quick advance of the Hungarian Army, the Czech force in Michalovce had coalesced sufficiently to attempt a counterattack by the following day, which was approved by Major Kubíček on November 7. The OA vz. 30 armoured cars were immediately sent on a reconnaissance mission to Budkovce, some 15 km south of Michalovce, but could not find any trace of the Hungarians.
It was therefore decided to counterattack eastwards, where the the most advanced Hungarian outpost was know to be some ten kilometres away at Závadla. At 8:00 on November 8, the Czechs launched a short artillery barrage on the Hungarians, taking them by complete surprise. The armoured cars and the LT vz. 35 tanks engaged the Hungarian picket from the front whilst Czech infantry worked round their flanks. This soon induced the heavily outnumbered Hungarians to fall back from Závadka towards their main line on the River Okna, just in front of Nižná Rybnica, allowing the Czechs to retake Gajdoš and Fekisoviec. Headquarters then ordered them to proceed with the attack to Ubrež and Jovša.
The armoured cars continued down the road a little past Závadka whilst the Czech infantry fanned out and began to deploy on a front of some four kilometres on either side of them, between the villages of Ubrež and Vyšné Revištia. The infantry first came under Hungarian artillery fire during the occupation of Ubrež, north of the road. At 1300 a general attack was launched on the main Hungarian line at Nižná Rybnica. The Hungarian response was fierce and effective. The Czechs had advanced across open ground to within a kilometre of the Okna River when they began to be struck by Hungarian field and anti-tank artillery fire.
One armoured car was hit in the engine and had to be withdrawn. A second was knocked out in the middle of the road by a 37 mm anti-tank gun. The raw infantry went to ground and then began to retreat. This soon turned into a panic that for some could not be stopped before Michalovce, fifteen kilometres to the rear. The armoured cars, still tied to the road, covered the retreating infantry with their machineguns, in order to forestall any possible Hungarian pursuit.
Late on November 8, four more OA vz. 30 armoured cars and 3 LT vz. 35 light tanks and a 37 mm anti-tank cannon arrived in Michalovce from Martin to find total confusion. Early on November 9, they headed eastwards, sometimes steadying the retreating infantry by firing over their heads, thereby ensuring the reoccupation everything up to the old Ubrež - Vyšné Revištia line, which the Hungarians had not occupied. However, the anti-tank section mistakenly drove past the knocked-out armoured car and ran straight into the Hungarian line, where it was captured.
By now, elements of the 41st Infantry Regiment and a battery of 202nd Mountain Artillery Regiment had begun to reach Michalovce, and Kubícek planned a major counterattack for noon, to be spearheaded by the newly arrived tanks and armoured cars. On November 10, following a short artillery saturation, the Czechs quickly took Zavadka, Fetisoviec, Hnojné, Vyšné Revištia and Nižná Rybnica. After a day of fighting the Czechs had recaptured Sobrance, Ostrov and Michajlov.
On November 9, the 1st "Andrej Hlinka" Hlinka Guard Regiment began to reach Michalovce. The 1st Hlinka Guard Regiment was well equipped with a mixture of black Hlinka Guard uniforms and army infantry weapons, and was tolerably disciplined. They began setting up positions around Stakčín. Heavier Hungarian air attacks and army concentration forced the Czechs to fall back to their positions around Závadka on November 11.
The Hungarians then began a series of infantry assaults in the directions of Blatné, Závadka, Ubrež in the south and at Ladomimo, Kolonica and Klenová to the north. The heaviest fighting occured at Závadka and Ubrež, where the Czechs had to fight back with machineguns, mortars and armoured cars and tanks. In the evening, the Hungarians withdrew. To the north the Hlinka Guard proved to be a reliable fighting force, holding off the Hungarians with only small arms and occasional Czech artillery support.
On November 13 the Hungarians tried again to attack the Czech troops and the Hlinka Guard. In the night the Hlinka Guard had in Kolonica had withdrawn to Stakčín, planning to cut of the advancing Hungarians. At noon the Hungarians attacked in the direction of Stakčín, not knowing of the real intensions of the retreat of the Hlinka Guard troops. However, they were cut off from the main unit by Hlinka Guards in Ladomimo and Klenová, and by the end of the day they had captured 100 Hungarians, 10 machineguns, 8 trucks and 3 35.M Ansaldo tankettes from the enemy.
Further southeast, the 1st Motorised Regiment and the 4th Huszar Regiment continued their advance southeast of Užhorod in order to form the right pincer. The Hungarians faced little resistance in this area, and they managed to advance as far as 20 km by December despite Czech air attacks, the cold weather and low stockpiles of supplies.
On December 5, the 1st Motorised Regiment, the 3rd Huszar Regiment and the 4th Huszar Regiment began the operation to encircle Užhorod. The advance went with an amazing speed when considering the critical stage of the ammunition and supply stockpiles and the weather. On December 17 the two pincers met northeast of Užhorod.
Meanwhile, the Hraniční oblast 42 ”Karol”, commanded by Brig. Gen. Oleg Svátek, decided to evacuate all military personnel from the town, but only 3/10 of the division had managed to leave the town. However, the retreating troops had managed to evacuate all valuable equipment. However, Brig. Gen. Svátek's chief of staff, Staff Lt.Col. T. Lang, wished to defend the city, and thus began preparations for an Hungarian assault on the town.
On December 20, elements of the I/4th Huszar Regiment began the assault of Košice following a short artillery barrage. While the I/4th Huszar Regiment attacked from the southeast, the 3rd Huszar Regiment assaulted the city from the northwest. The Czechs had no change to put up any efficient resistance. Lt.Col. T. Lang decided to break out of the encirclement and join Brig. Gen. Oleg Svátek. During the breakout, the column the staff vehicle of Lt.Col. T. Lang was in was ambushed by Hungarian soldiers, and he was killed when his vehicle bursted into flames. Despite this loss, the HO 42 was now of 6/10 of its original strength, though in the following weeks this was reduced to 4/10.
The 14th Infantry Brigade continued their advance through Ruthenia, pushing forward at top speed. On December 28, 1938 the forward elements of the I/14th Infantry Brigade reached the Polish frontier, where they met Polish troops, who were welcomed with great joy.
[edit] Phase 4: Spring Offensive
By the end of February, the Czechs had depleted their ammunition supplies, and the Czech goverment and High Command ordered all units in Moravia and Slovakia to retreat into Poland.
As planned, the German offensive got under way on March 1, 1939. At dawn, German artillery opened fire on the Czech positions, and after three hours of continuous artillery barrage, German air force dropped thousands of leaflets over the cities of Prague, Plzeň and Olomouc, saying that president Edvard Beneš and the Czechoslovak government, the communists, the Soviet Union and others had sent the Czech people into the War, and urged them to capitulate to the Germans. In the meantime, the German Minister in Prague urged the Prime Minister Syrový to capitulate, but he answered that they would do nothing until the matter had been discussed with the cabinet.
One hour after the leaflets had been dropped over the three major cities still in Czech hands, German bombers commence aerial bombings of the cities, aiming key populated centres and key government and military installations.
At 1000 hours, the spearhead of the assault, the XIV. Armeekorps under command of Gen.Lt. Heinz Guderian, began their offensive eastwards towards Prague, and despite the extremely muddy conditions, the Germans managed to attack effectively and take the Czechs by surprise. By the end of the day they had advanced 20 km towards the capital Prague. Meanwhile, the other units of the Tenth Army started a general assault on Plzeň, but yet again it was repelled.
The Czech defences were composed mainly of field fortifications and barricades constructed by the local residents under supervision of military engineers, manned by soldiers of the Hraniční oblast 32 “Miluláš”. Brig. Gen. Ing. RTDr. Jan Kloud ordered organised defence of the outer city rim, with in-depth defences prepared. In the morning of March 4 the first German envoys arrived and started negotiations with the Czech officers. A colonel of a German infantry brigade, announced to the Czech envoy that the Czech government had capitulated and furter resistance would be futile. When the Czech envoy replied that he had no intention of signing such a document, he was informed that the general assault was ordered on March 6 and that the city would most surely be taken. The following day Brig. Gen. Kloud decided that the situation of his forces was hopeless. The reserves, human resources and war materiel were plentiful, but further defence of the city would be fruitless and would only result in more civilian casualties. It was decided to start the surrender talks with the Germans. By the time the talks began the Germans had broken through at numberous locations.
On March 7, 1939, the act of surrender was signed in the suburb of Severní Předměstí. The Wehrmacht accepted all conditions proposed by Brig. Gen. Kloud. The privates and NCOs were to leave the city, register themselves at the German authorities and be allowed to go home. The officers were to be allowed to keep their belongings and leave German for whichever country accepted them. The same day the German forces entered the city. The act of surrender signed in the morning was broken by the Soviets shortly after noon, when German soldiers started arresting Czech officers. They were escorted to German prisoner of war camps.
Meanwhile, the Eighth and Tenth Armies continued their advance towards Prague at full speed, and by March 13 they had completely encircled the capital.
In northern Moravia the Second Army advanced at full speed southwards, and by March 5 they had encircled the city of Olomouc, and the remnants of the II. armáda ”Jirásek”, including its commander Arm. Gen. Vojtěch Boris Luža, had been encircled in the city.
On March 5, around 1700, Arm. Gen. Luža received reports of German forces in the suburbs of Neredín, Řepčín, Černovír, Chválkovice, Bystrovany, Holice and Nové Sady. Those forces consisted of armored scouts and have engaged Czech infantry units on their approaches. Arm. Gen. Luža then decided to defend the city, even though much of the II. armáda ”Jirásek” had left for Poland. The first German attack, carried out by Infanterie-Regiment 96, in the afternoon of the March 6 was repulsed by the Czech defenders and an artillery barrage of the 75 mm vz. 15 mountain guns. Later, in the evening, the Germans subsequently continued to push into the city. By the end of the day the German have secured the inner suburbs, and made several headways into the city.
By the morning of March 7 the advanced German infantry had been reinforced with tanks of the I/15. Pz.Regt. The Czech defenders delayed German advance, particularly by fighting from house to house, but later that day the poorly coordinated Czech defence collapsed and the Germans took control of the city.
In the early hours of March 8 the forward spearheads of the Second and Fourteenth Armies met at a line running southwest and south of Olomouc, completing the pincer movement.
In southern Bohemia and Moravia the Twelfth and Fourteenth Armies began their offensive on the same day ad the Tenth Army, and faced little resistance and despite the extremely muddy and snowy conditions, the Germans managed to attack effectively and take the Czechs and Russians by surprise. By the end of the day they had eliminated the 15. Motorizovannaya Diviziya and the 23. Tankovaya Briygada at Vyškov. By the end of the week the main bulk of the IV. armáda ”Neruda” had been encircled. On March 8 the commander of the IV. armáda ”Neruda”, Arm. Gen. Prchala, decided to leave for Poland with the remnants of the Czech forces positioned east of Brno.
On March 13 the Twelfth and Fourteenth Armies began to clear out the pocket west of Brno, and by the early hours of March 15 over 3/4 of the Czech troops had been eliminated or captured.
In Slovakia the Hungarians also continued their advance after halting operations for a month. In western Slovakia the II Corps continued northwards, and on March 10 the 3rd Motorised Regiment captured the town of Trenčín. Meanwhile, Arm. Gen. Votruba decided to leave for Poland with the remnants of the III. armáda ”Štefánik”. As a result, the Czechs used a tactic based on a mobile retreat, counterattacking the Hungarians whenever possible.
In central Slovakia the offensive continued as well, meeting relatively heavy resistance. Again, despite the extremely muddy and snowy conditions, the Germans managed to attack effectively and take the Czechs and Russians by surprise. The I Corps under had by March 9 advanced 40 km, and they had by the following day encircled Banská Bystrica. Later that day the Hungarians began the assault on the town, facing the Hraniční pásmo XV ”Adam” commanded by Div. Gen. Bedřich Homola. The unit consisted of the Hraniční oblast 40 ”Medard” commanded by Brig. Gen. Bohumil Rytíř. After 10 hours of heavy fighting the Czechs capitulated to the Hungarians.
Meanwhile, the III Corps continued their advance as well, advancing some 25 km by March 13. On March 14 the 5th Infantry Brigade engaged the Soviet 96. Strelkovaya Diviziya, which after half a year of fighting was like its Hungarian counterpart under strength and lacked heavy equipment and supplies. After a day of heavy fighting the Soviets had either surrendered or withdrawn northwards towards Poland.
In eastern Slovakia they met virtually no resistance, as the remnants of HO 41 and HO 42 had already withdrawn into Poland. The Hungarian Army continued their advance, pushing forward at top speed, and reached the Polish border south of Muszyna on March 13. Here they met Polish troops, who were welcomed with great joy.
However, the resistance of the few remaining Czech troops and Hlinka Guards continued to attack the Hungarian troops, and it was not before March 15 that the last resistance in the Slovak and Carpathian mountains was taken out.
[edit] Phase 5: Capitulation
The military situation of Prague was relatively good. Brig. Gen. Cyril Langer, the commander of the Defence of Prague, managed to gather enough forces and war material to successfully defend the city for several weeks longer. However, the situation of the civilian inhabitants of Prague became increasingly tragic, as the city now was surrounded by the Wehrmacht. Despite that the Luftwaffe could not efficiently bombard the civilian facilities, the lack of food and medical supplies resulted in heavy casualties among the civilians.
The water works were destroyed by German bombers and all boroughs of Prague experienced a lack of both potable water and water with which to extinguish the fires caused by the bombardment. Also, the strategic situation became very difficult. As Prague was cut off from the rest of the still Czech-controlled areas, any means of resupplying the Czech defenders were impossible.
On March 11, as the Germans were closing in on Prague, the commander of the Tenth Army, Gen.d.Art. Walther v. Reichenau presented Arm. Gen. Sergěj Vojcechovský and Brig. Gen. Langer an ultimatum: All Czech military units in Prague should capitulate on March 14, or else the Luftwaffe would carry out their orders to "remove Prague from the face of the earth".
Gen. Sergěj Vojcechovský and Brig. Gen. Langer, seeing they had no chance to continue the battle without risking the lives of hundreds of thousands civilians in Prague, started negotiations for capitulation with the Gen.d.Art. v. Reichenau in the morning of March 13. At noon, President Beneš and most of the Czech government left for Warszaw from Prague Ruzyně Airport. The Prime Minister, Arm. Gen. Jan Syrový, wished to stay in Prague, as he insisted that as a soldier and the minister of national defence, he should stay until the end. He shared the same thoughts as Vojcechovský and Langer, and a capitulation would spare the suffering inhabitants of Prague from an unnecessary aerial bombardement. However, he chose to follow the chief of military intelligence František Moravec after being told that his position as prime minister, minister of national defence and as a soldier could be abused in the post-invasion Czechoslovakia.
Considering the circumstances and the strength of the Luftwaffe Prague had been quite lucky, and much of the cultural treasures of Prague, including the Hradčany, Karlův most (Charles Bridge), the many churches and monasteries and the Old Town (Staré Město) were mostly untouched by the German bombing campaign. The bad weather over the city had been partially been responsible for this, but the Czech anti-aircraft cannons and the Air Force had proven to be quite effective in holding off the bombers in the first two months of the war.
In the early morning of March 14, František Moravec, 10 of his fellow intelligence officers and Syrový secretly managed to fly away with the most valuable intelligence files and archives from Prague Ruzyně Airport to Stockholm-Bromma Airport with a stopover on Warszawa-Okęcie Fryderyka Chopina Airport in an ad hoc chartered KLM Douglas DC-3, as the Germans were closing in. Only 20 minutes after Moravec and Syrový left for Warsaw, the forward elements of the 1. Panzer-Division swarmed the airfield. Rescued files and archives were handed over to the British MI6 to be used against Germany.
On March 14, at 16.00 a cease fire agreement was signed and all fighting halted. Soon afterwards Prague capitulated. Several units declined to put down their weapons and cease fire, and their commanding officers had to be visited by generals Vojcechovský and Langer personally. During the night of March 14-15 the garrison of Prague started to hide or destroy their heavy armament. On March 15 German units entered the city. At 10.00 on March 15, an full capitulation of all Czechoslovak Armed Forces was signed on Pražský hrad by Gen. Vojcechovský and Brig. Gen. Langer, with Gen.d.Art. Walther v. Reichenau and Gen.Lt. Heinz Guderian acting as representatives of Germany. The following day the evacuation of Czech forces to German POW camps started. The campaign in Czechoslovakia was over.
[edit] Casualties
[edit] Military losses
The casualties had been high on both sides. About 70,000 Czechoslovaks were killed, 135,000 were wounded and 508,000 others being captured by the Germans and 211,000 more by the Hungarians (for a total of 719,000 prisoners).
30,000 Soviet soldiers had been killed, 47,000 had been wounded and another 21,000 were captured, including their commander, Komkor Prokofii Logvinovich Romanenko.
Most of the Czech tanks had been lost to enemy fire. Of the 300 LT vz. 35 light tanks, 220 were knocked out, with around 200 of them being total write-offs. Around 100 tanks were damaged and later repaired. Of these 40 were destroyed in combat later on, the remaining being captured with 40 other tanks captured in March 1939 they entered service in the German Army, under the designation Pz.Kpfw. 35(t). Of the 50 more modern LT vz. 38 light tanks 31 were destroyed and 18 were captured by the Germans. The rest of the LT vz. 35 and LT vz. 38 light tanks escaped with the retreating soldiers into Poland.
German personnel losses were less than their enemies, though still quite heavy: 41,980 were killed, 109,262 were wounded and 812 were reported as missing. A total of 926 German tanks were knocked out, of which 487 were total write-offs. Other equipment losses included 351 armoured cars, 200 artillery pieces, 6,052 vehicles and 5,538 motorcycles. Around 420 aircraft had also been lost. Hungary also had quite heavy casualties: 18,126 were killed, 51,383 were wounded and 121 were reported missing.
[edit] Civilian losses
The Czechoslovak Campaign was an instance of total war. Consequently, civilian casualties were high during and after combat. From the start, the Luftwaffe attacked civilian targets and columns of refugees along the roads to wreak havoc, disrupt communications and target Czech morale. Apart from the victims of the battles, the German forces (both SS and the regular Wehrmacht) are credited with the mass murder of several thousands of Czech POWs and civilians. Also, during Operation Tannenberg, nearly 5,000 Czechs were shot at 460 mass execution sites by special units, the Einsatzgruppen, in addition to regular Wehrmacht, SS and Selbstschutz.
Altogether, the civilian losses of Czech population amounted to about 80,000 - 120,000, mostly resulting from the air attacks of the Luftwaffe, but also the Royal Hungarian Air Force.
[edit] Aftermath of the Campaign
Czechoslovakia was divided among Nazi Germany, Hungary and Poland. Nazi Germany annexed the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, which were incorporated into the German Reich. Hungary annexed Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, while Poland annexed the Zaolzie territory and parts of northern Slovakia.
Czechoslovakia had payed deeply for their refusal to abide by the Munich Agreement, but their honour remained and sympathy from all over the world was on their side. The Germans was taken by surprise by the training and combat effectiveness of the Czechoslovak Army, and by the Czech military leadership as well. The Czechs resistance had proven to the world that even small countries, surrounded by enemies and betrayed by their allies, could offer even one of the strongest military powers stiff resistance. The weather was on the Czech's side, which prevented serious destruction of cities like Prague, Plzeň and Brno, as the Luftwaffe was forced to prioritise bombing the Czech heavy industry rather than terrorising the Czech population.
Up to 348,000 Czechoslovak and 3,500 Soviet troops escaped to their former enemy Poland (who had declared themselves neutral after regaining their territorial claims), who had since the end of February accepted the many civilian refugees and retreating soldiers. Another 4,000 Czechoslovaks managed to escape to their neutral ally Romania. The majority eventually made their way to France or Britain. The fate of the remaining remains unknown.