Hungarian offensive (Fall Grün)edit

From Alternative History

Hungarian campaign in Czechoslovakia

Hungarian infantry of the 14th Infantry Brigade on the move through Ruthenia on October 26, 1938.
DateOctober 20 - March 15, 1938
Result Hungarian victory
Belligerents
Czechoslovakia
Soviet Union
Hungary

Commanders
Arm. Gen. Josef Votruba
Div. Gen. Josef Mánek
Div. Gen. Bedřich Homola
Div. Gen. Ondřej Mézl
P. L. Romanenko


Inf. Gen. Hugó Sónyi
Lt.FM. Henrik Werth
Maj.Gen. Vilmos Nagy
Maj.Gen. Milán Temessy
Maj.Gen. László B. Kiss
Maj.Gen. András Littay
Strength
III. armáda ”Štefánik”:
6 infantry divisions,
1 fast division,
aircraft support
Hungarian Army:
8 infantry brigades
2 cavalry brigades,
2 motorised brigades,
aircraft support
Casualties and losses
Unknown
Military casualties:
18,126 killed,
51,383 wounded,
121 missing

The Hungarian campaign in Czechoslovakia, codenamed Operation Csaba (Hungarian: Csaba hadművelet) was a military operation carried out by the Kingdom of Hungary against the Republic of Czechoslovakia between October 20, 1938 and March 15, 1939. The operation marked the entrance of Hungary in what would later be known as the Second World War.

Contents

[edit] Background

[edit] Treaty of Trianon

Of the countries bordering the ČSR, Hungary had particular interests in parts of their territory. For years they had wanted a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, which included the unification of the Hungarian-populated parts of the ČSR, if not the whole of Slovakia, with Hungary.

Initially, despite a move back towards nationalism, the new state under Regent Horthy agreed to ending the chance for further immediate conflicts and signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920. Trianon reduced Hungary’s size substantially from its size in Austria-Hungary. Transylvania was taken by Romania; Slovakia became part of Czechoslovakia; Croatia, Slavonia, and Vojvodina joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia after 1929).

But the attitude of its neighbours decisively influenced Hungary's attitudes towards an action against the ČSR. The ČSR, Yugoslavia and Romania formed the "Little Entente" in 1920 and 1921, an alliance with the purpose of common defense against Hungarian irredentism and the prevention of a Habsburg restoration. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country. Even in peacetime status the superiority of the Yugoslav army with 148,000 men in 16 divisions and the Romanian army with 225000 men in 24 divisions oppressive, although the Hungarian army in the summer of 1938 had achieved a peace strength of 85,000 men.

One could not exclude that an Hungarian aggression against ČSR would enable the contracts of the "Little Entente" and would lead the two countries into war against Hungary. Since 1937 Hungary had wished at least to reach the level of neutrality of Yugoslavia, for then to waiver of a border revision and thus be entitled to the Hungarian minorities living there. But for this Yugoslavia was not ready.

[edit] Movement to the right

Hungary after the Treaty of Trianon.

In Hungary, the Great Depression induced a drop in the standard of living and the political mood of the country shifted further toward the right. In 1932, Regent Miklós Horthy appointed a new prime-minister, Gyula Gömbös, that changed the course of Hungarian policy towards closer cooperation with Germany and started an effort to assimilate the small minority population in Hungary, which totalled 5-7% of the population.[citation needed] Gömbös signed a trade agreement with Germany that led to the fast expansion of the economy, drawing Hungary out of the Great Depression, but made Hungary dependent on the German economy for both raw materials and markets.

Gömbös advocated a number of social reforms, a one-party government, a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, and Hungary's withdrawal from the League of Nations. Although he assembled a strong political machine, his efforts to achieve his vision and reforms were frustrated by a parliament composed mostly of István Bethlen's supporters and by Hungary's creditors, who forced Gömbös to follow conventional policies in dealing with the economic and financial crisis. The 1935 elections gave Gömbös more solid support in parliament. He succeeded in gaining control of the ministries of finance, industry, and defense and in replacing several key military officers with his supporters. In October 1936, he died from due to kidney problems without realizing this goal.

Hungary used its relationship with Germany to attempt revision of the Treaty of Trianon. In 1938, Hungary openly repudiated the treaty's restrictions on its armed forces. Adolf Hitler used promises of returning lost territories, and threats of military intervention and economic pressure to encourage the Hungarian Government into supporting the policies and goals of Nazi Germany.

[edit] Plans for military action against Czechoslovakia

The first contacts for joint operations against the ČSR arose during the visit of Göring to the Hungarian Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös de Jákfa in Budapest in June 1935. A few days later the Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, General Somkuthy, visited the German War Minister von Blomberg and the Chief of the Staff Ludwig Beck. Even then the continuation of the discussion between the interests of Hungary's revision of its neighbors and Germany's economic interests with the same states were clear. And so the Hungarians Blomberg recommended waiving revisions, only Hungary was an action against the ČSR. Amazingly the Hungarian General described Czechoslovakia, the most well-equipped and well-trained nation of the "Little Entente", as "our most vulnerable enemy." Despite intensive Hungarian wishes they came no closer to a agreement on German-Hungarian military cooperation. However the OKH included in the 1936 war games that Hungary would participate in an attack on ČSR with a strength of 12 brigades and two cavalry divisions.

In September 1937, War Minister v. Blomberg took up discussions with the Hungarian Minister of Defence during his visit of the German Autumn Manouevres about the prospects of their common war goals against ČSR. The following spring the Hungarian envoy v. Stojay said that these talks were "somewhat dull." Ribbentrop knew the intentions of Hitler and behaved cautiously. On March 31 the Hungarian envoy asked the the Foreign Office, when "the general staff meetings for possible joint actions" against the ČSR would begin. Although the Germans wanted not to be specific on the matter, Göring recommended in early June the Hungarian envoy for Hungary's early participation in a war between Germany and the ČSR. The chief of OKW Gen. D. Art Keitel, who visited Budapest on June 14, would clarify things further.

When the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff in the spring of 1938 met with his with his Czechoslovak colleagues in Brno, the Hungarian Chief of General Staff v. Rácz saw this as proof of the effectiveness of the alliance between the two countries. And in early May, the heads of operational departments of the "Little Entente" gathered to discuss possible reactions against Hungary. The Yugoslavs did not wish to enter a conflict against Germany, because they expected that Italy would enter the war on the side of Germany. On August 23 a conference between the "Little Entente" and Hungary took place in the Yugoslav town of Bled. Here Hungary and the "Little Entente" (including the ČSR) aknowledged eachother's armed forces and renounced the use of armed force on the condition that the questions of each ethnic minorities would be satisfactorily resolved. Hungary were very demanding towards Czechoslovakia. The result of the conference in Bled had unsettled the German Foreign Office there. Such a stance would make Hungary neutralize against ČSR, and they meant that "a relaxation in favor of Czechoslovakia would be undesirable for us (Germany)."

Hungarian huszars and a German officer at the former Austrian-Hungarian border, March 22, 1938.

At the same time the Hungarian Regent Admiral Miklós Horthy visited Berlin and Kiel. There were several partial parallel meetings. In an interview with Hitler Horthy presented the idea of "restoring the old Hungary in a big war in a few years with the help of German troops". Hitler was not interested, saying "that neither wishes nor claims (of Hungary)," and "whether it wants to participate (in the action against ČSR) or not lies with them." Finally Horthy concluded that Hungary would be prepared to intervene two weeks after a war had begun - provided by the unrealistic condition that the powers of the "Little Entente" were not active and prepared to intervene in the conflict on the side of Czechoslovakia.

However, despite the discussions between Horthy and Hitler, the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister remained cautious. They were unsure whether Yugoslavia would remain neutral in case of Hungarian aggression against Czechoslovakia, and they knew the Hungarian rearmament program needed at least a period of 1-2 years to prepare for war. Therefore the Hungarian General Staff returned to discussions over the military readiness and the military stockpiles of the armed forces. In meetings between the German and Hungarian ministers there was no clarity about the timing of a Hungarian intervention in a German-Czech conflict.

The talks requested by the General Staff were finally initiated on 6 September between the new Chief of the General Staff Halder and the Hungarian General Staff. Halder was doing at the express wish of Hitler no hints about the timing of the action. The attitude to win allies was strange, and the Hungarians were not better than Mussolini, who claimed they were not ready for a major European war. No wonder that Jodl already two days later noted that Hungary was "was at least in a good mood." In any event, the Hungarians were on the Reich Party Congress in "a angry mood, ...because the previous talks in Berlin had ended with no results."

When the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visited Hitler again on September 20, Hitler criticized Hungary for their "indecisive attitude." Two days later the British envoy to Hungary in Budapest warned against a military action. Even Ciano exhorted on September 26 Hungaryto show maximum restraint towards the ČSR, so that the Yugoslavs would not be obliged to abide by the agreements of the "Little Entente" to support Czechoslovakia.

But despite this, the Hungarians mobilised between 200,000 and 350,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped men on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders, ready to invade Czechoslovakia in case of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia. After Munich, the Hungarians had remained poised threateningly on the Slovak border. They reportedly had artillery ammunition for only 36 hours of operations, and were clearly engaged in a bluff, but it was a bluff the Germans had encouraged, and one that they would have been obliged to support militarily if the much larger, better trained and better equipped Czechoslovak Army chose to fight. The Czechoslovak army had built 2,000 small concrete emplacements along the border wherever there was no major river obstacle.

The Hungarians had in total mobilised 21 brigades. In the north of the country they had dispositioned the 1st Corps northwest of Budapest, the 2nd Corps northeast of Budapest and the 3rd Corps Moskolc in space. The 6th Corps, positioned around Debrecen, opposed Romania and the 5th Corps north of Szeged.

The Yugoslavs and Romanians announced their military intervention in case of a Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia. The French military attaché in Bucharest assured the chief of the Romanian General Staff Div. Gen. Ştefan Gh Ionescu, that the powers of the Little Entente powers would intervene in case of a Hungarian attack on the ČSR. The Yugoslav army would in this case initiate an offensive on in a northerly direction towards Szeged with cooperation of the left wing of the Romanian Army, and then head to join the 3rd Czechoslovak army positioned in Slovakia. The Yugoslavs had in September 1938 a wartime strength of 1.2 million men and the Romanians a wartime strength of 1.5 million, which is both excessive values. Because of this threat in case of war, Hungary would intervene immediately or within 48 hours, perhaps even within 14 days.

However, another problem emerged: in case Hungary should join the Germans in the attack on Czechoslovakia, a casus belli would be needed as a pretext for a Hungarian declaration of war. This conclusion was made due to the fact that territorial claims alone might not be sufficient for an attack on Czechoslovakia. In September 1938 Leutenant Colonel Homlok of the Hungarian General Staff proposed to Colonel Helmuth Groscurth of the Abwehr, that german planes should drop Czech bombs on Hungarian territory, after some of the czech airfields have been captured, in order to create a false flag operation.

[edit] Opposing forces

[edit] Hungary

See also: Hungarian Order of Battle - October 1, 1938
Hungarian soldiers in a pre-war military parade.

The condition of the Hungarian Armed Forces was in stark contrast to that of both Germany and Czechoslovakia. Because of the small army imposed on them after World War I, the Hungarians had had to concentrate on raising the quality rather than the number of their troops, resulting in a small, but highly professional cadre. Their air force, motorised and cavalry brigades had all been substantially re-equipped with modern German and Italian equipment in the mid-1930's, and the pick of them had been assembled for the invasion of Ruthenia and the subsequent thrust into eastern Slovakia, both of which they conducted with speed and efficiency.

The parts of the Treaty of Trianon relevant to this study abolished general military service (conscription) and set the total strength of the Hungarian Army at no more than 35,000 volunteers of all ranks. This force was limited in its mission to the maintenance of internal order and the guarding of the national borders. Heavy armaments were limited to 105 light cannons and 140 trench mortars. Even these consisted of reserve stocks from the First World War, and were not of the best, being inferior material which the K.u.K. (Kaiserliche- und Königliche, i.e. the Imperial Austrian) Army had doled out to the second-line Hungarian Army.

The Treaty also proscribed the most minute organizational details:

  • the officer corps was numerically fixed at 1,750 men;
  • the armaments industry was totally dismantled;
  • stockpiling for and equipment of the army was exactly described;
  • the maintenance of an air force was forbidden;
  • the creation of a tank force was also strictly forbidden;
  • the production of anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, heavy artillery, etc. was not allowed;
  • only the manufacture of light weapons such as pistols and rifles was allowed.

Hungary was allowed 12 armoured cars used for internal security duties, consisting of several Italian Bianchi and Fiats and German Erhardt M-17s. The rest were more modern Vickers, built especially in England for Hungary, which were added 1926.

An Allied Commission was established to watch over the compliance with the Treaty’s terms. The 52 member Commission consisted of representatives from the USA, England, France and Italy. As even the wear and tear of equipment was predetermined under the terms of the Treaty, it proved to be extremely difficult to establish and maintain an effective field force, let alone stockpile equipment for a larger army – which was exactly the object of the Treaty.

During the 1920’s and 1930’s, Hungary made consistent attempts and used ingenuous means to circumvent the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. With regards to the military restrictions, she was only partially successful. Although officers and NCOs were kept on the active lists in far greater numbers than the small Hungarian Army warranted, Hungary was initially not able to overcome the arms and equipment limitations imposed by the Treaty. The newly created and enlarged nations in the Balkans were eager to keep Hungary weak, especially as the owed their present status to the parcelling of Hungarian territories. They willingly and ably assisted the Control Commission to make certain that the Trianon Treaty was adhered to. A severe handicap was the very nature of Trianon Hungary itself. The flat countryside, as well as the concentration of nearly all the industry around Budapest made production of forbidden equipment next to impossible during the 1920’s.

Early attempts to avoid the constricting terms of the treaty, therefore, were foiled by the “Small Entente”. This was the name given to the alliance between the ČSR, Yugoslavia and Romania, sponsored by France, with the object of maintaining the status quo in the Danube Basin, of preventing the resurrection of the House of Habsburg Monarchy, and of warding off Hungarian claims relating to its one-time territories. Naturally, this interest extended to keeping the Hungarian Army weak. After 1926 the importance of the Small Entente diminished, and it virtually ceased to exist after 1928, as the Control Commission had been dissolved on March 31, 1927.

After control was relaxed somewhat, Hungary began in 1927 – surreptitiously – to expand her army and her armaments industry slightly, to prolong the basic training period for the lower ranks, and to perfect the training of the officers.

In 1927 the army was reorganized. It still very much reflected the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Trianon.

There were now seven mixed brigades:

1. (Budapest);
2. (Székésfehérvár);
3. (Szombathely);
4. (Pécs);
5. (Szeged);
6. (Debrecen);
7. (Miskolc);

and two cavalry brigades:

1. (Budapest);
2. (Nylregyháza).

The armed forces now slowly began to expand. The infantry and cavalry were reorganized, some heavy artillery batteries were added to the artillery corps, and a few airplanes were bought from Italy in secret. The manufacture of airplane engines was also started on a small scale.

There was also a small force of Border Guards and the Danube Flotilla consisting of vessels awarded by the peace treaty. In spite of the prohibition against conscription, the able-bodied male population was called up on reaching military age and passed through a form of military basic training, while a thorough pre-military training scheme was enacted for all boys, known as the Youth Organization (Levente). All these expedients, however, still left Hungary in a state of vast military inferiority, both actual and potential, compared with her neighbours. At this time, Hungary had about 35,000 men under arms as allowed for by the Treaty of Trianon.

After 1928, it was obvious that it might soon be possible to pay less attention to the limitations imposed on Hungary’s armed forces by the Treaty of Trianon and the “Small Entente”.

After several minor reorganizations, it became clear that a long-range plan was called for. The first of these plans was known as the Elöd Plan of October 24, 1932.

The Elöd Plan provided for:

  • The raising of 21 infantry divisions (each with 9 infantry battalions and 12 artillery batteries);
  • The mobile units to be increased in quantity, combining them into larger units;
  • Border Guard units to be increased and strengthened;
  • The modernization of all equipment.

The objectives were only slowly achieved. The Small Entente was still a looming shadow, even if it no longer had a fierce bite.

Over the next six years the Hungarian Army was slowly built up again. Standardization of equipment and training was inadequate. Most equipment was still left over from World War I, and from various other sources. By buying from Italy in 1935, Hungary was able to obtain weapons not allowed to be produced within its own borders. Initially, there was much controversy within the military as to the source of weapons to be bought for Hungary, but the political and economic ties, as well as Italian membership in the victorious dictating nations of Trianon, decided the matter in favour of the Italians.

Made bold by these unsanctioned purchases of armaments, as well as by the German rearmament programs begun after Adolf Hitler came to power, the Hungarian government announced a five-year plan on March 15, 1938 for the rearmament and industrial expansion of Hungary, as well as an increase in the size of the armed forces.

The old Elöd Plan was revised by the Huba Army Expansion and Mobilization Plan, enacted March 5, 1938 as part of the Army Reform Plan. It set the development of the Hungarian Army in three stages:

  • Huba I (to become effective on April 1, 1940)
  • Huba II (to become effective on March 1, 1941)
  • Huba III (to become effective on March 1, 1942)

Political and military events were to influence this timetable to some extent, but without drastically altering the aims of the Plan. Major stumbling blocks in the path of the Elöd Plan were the equipping of all units with heavy weapons, the creation of the armoured and motorised units, as well as acquiring of sufficient modern aircraft. The Huba Plan emphasized increasing the size of the armoured and motorised units troops, expanding and strengthening the Border Guards, and generally modernising the organisation, administration and order of battle of the Hungarian Army itself.

In the spring of 1938 the organisation of the Armed Forces was still governed by the Elöd Plan, in which a Field Corps was supposed to have a mobilised strength of 36,000 men, and an infantry brigade 9,000 men. A study by the Honvéd Ministry regarding general mobilisation, concluded that the personnel requirements for 266 infantry battalions could, in an emergency, only be fulfilled after December 1938. The material requirements would take longer. The international situation in 1938 made it desirable to the Hungarian Government that the pace of the rearmament be increased so that the organisation of the Armed Forces correspond to the guidelines laid down by the Huba Plan.

To allow a relatively uninterrupted mobilisation, the Huba Plan specified that the units of the Border Guard be the first to be strengthened to allow time for the mobilisation within Hungary without exterior interruption. The mobile troops were also to be strengthened to have a highly mobile, rapid reaction force available in case the enemy broke through the Border Guard units. Accordingly, the 1st Mobile Brigade was quickly built up to full strength, and provided with almost its full complements of supply elements. (These were usually only provided to units upon mobilisation). This would enable the 1st Mobile Brigade to be ready to move within 12 hours of receiving mobilisation orders.

The continuing tensions in the international situation caused the cadre of the 2nd Mobile Brigade to be raised in 1938, also with its full complement of weapons, personnel and services, while the heavy infantry weapons allotted to the infantry brigades were further increased.

Also in 1938, the Armed Forces Act as passed to provide the necessary manpower. The Act also entitled the Government to proclaim a state of national emergency, and upon doing so, could assume certain emergency powers, the important of which were:

  • to restrict the right of assembly and combination,
  • to place under police supervision, or to intern, any person whose conduct rendered such measures desirable,
  • to susped provisionally the application of certain laws, in particular those restricting the output of labor,
  • to control wages, profits and prices,
  • to block stocks of commodities

On October 1, 1938, the seven mixed brigades (created in 1927) were used as the basis for the expansion of the Hungarian Army. Each brigade had been located in a specific region of Hungary. This region was redesignated as a Corps, and received the number of the mixed brigade (I - VII). In these corps-sized administrative areas, the headquarters of each Corps was in the same location as that of the old mixed brigades. In effect, the brigades became corps. It was planned that each corps should have three brigades. Two brigades were to be based the regular army regiments, while the thurd was to be raised from the Border Guard units within the corps.

Although this was theoretically possible at the time from a future manpower point of view, there had been barely enough equipment to supply the original seven brigades, let alone 24 new ones. What in fact happened is that each Corps only set up two active brigades, while the third brigade existed only on paper.

The peacetime strength of the Hungarian Army in 1938 comprised 85,000 men in 14 infantry brigades, 2 cavalry brigades and 2 motorised brigades. In late-September 1938 Hungary had supported Hitler by mobilizing between 200,000 and 350,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped men on the Slovak and Ruthenian borders, ready to invade Czechoslovakia in case of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia. After Munich, the Hungarians had remained poised threateningly on the Slovak border. They reportedly had artillery ammunition for only 36 hours of operations, and were clearly engaged in a bluff, but it was a bluff the Germans had encouraged, and one that they would have been obliged to support militarily if the much larger, better trained and better equipped Czechoslovak Army chose to fight.

The terms of the Treaty of Trianon severely limited the amount and type of equipment the fledgling army was allowed. The treaty forbidded Hungary modern mobile troops and tank units, artillery pieces over 105 mm in caliber and an air force. Their army's equipment consisted mostly of surplus arms and equipment, most of them dating from or before the First World War. However, the Hungarians managed to save four 305 mm 11.M and 16.M howitzers and some aircrafts in farms and other locations. In secret the Hungarians continued to work on expanding, modernising and rearming the army and the air force in secret.

Hungarian 35.M Ansaldo tankettes during the preparations for the offensive into Slovakia, October 18, 1938.

In 1938, the Hungarian Army, though still inferior both in numbers and in the number and the quality of equipment, had managed to rearm itself considerably with both Italian and German equipment.

In 1936, the Hajmáskér Mobile Group (Hajmáskéri gépkocsizócsoport) was raised using the Armoured Vehicle group, consisting of a motorised infantry battalion, a tank battalion (with three companies of 16 35M Ansaldo tankettes each, bought from Italy in 1935), motorised artillery battalion (with 3 batteries of light howitzers) a motorised pioneer company, a motorised signal platton and motorised logistic services. In 1936 Hungary received 30 CV.33 and 20 CV. 3/35 tankettes from Italy, and a further 100 CV.33 tankettes in 1937. Another two CV. 3/35 of the former Austrian Army were acquired from Germany following the Anschluss. These were renamed 35.M Ansaldo in Hungarian service. The Hungarians were well aware at that time these vehicles did not meet the criteria of modern combat vehicles, but used them widely until the army was re-equipped with more modern vehicles.

They also bought more 105 mm light field howitzers from Italy and corresponding 3-ton halftrack towing vehicles from Germany.

In early 1938, the artillery had a peace time strength of 92½ batteries, of which only 15% were motorised. The corps had 63 horse-drawn light field gun batteries with 100 mm and 105 mm equipment (mostly 14/a.M) as well as 7 horse-drawn batteries with 14.M 149 mm equipment. The two motorised brigades and the two cavalry brigades had 3 batteries each, for a total of 12 motorised batteries.

Starting with the Army reorganisation in 1938, artillery battalions were no longer kept covert, and assumed their proper numbering within the peacetime order of battle. GHQ artillery received numbers over 100. The batteries of the bicycle battalions were also converted to German 105 mm LeFH 18 howitzer, renamed 37.M in Hungarian service. The Border Guard was reinforced by 11 batteries with four 75 mm 15/35.M moutnain guns each.

Hungarian Fiat CR.32 fighter aircrafts of the 1./I Vadász Osztály before the offensive into Slovakia, October 18, 1938.

Italian and German concepts to modernise Hungary's Air Defence Forces were used by the Head of the LüH (Légügyi Hivatal, Air Department) Dr. György Rákosi, himself a commander of a air force squadron during the First World War. In 1937 the framework of the future fighter element of the Hungarian Air Force was created with the establishment of the 1st Fighter Regiment (1. Vadász Ezred) quickly followed by the 2nd Fighter Regiment. Dur to a shortage of aircrafts available only one group (Vadász Osztály) could be formed for each regiment. These were equipped with Italian Fiat CR. 32 fighter aircrafts.

To meet its bomber requirements the Air Force had, in 1936, finally opted for the Junkers Ju-86K-2 bomber powered by the WM-built Gnôme-Rhône 14K, and successive orders were to result in a total of 66 bombers of this type being acquired. The first recipient of the Ju-86K-2 was the 3rd Bomber Regiment (3. Bombázó Ezred, its 1st Group (3./I Bombázó Osztály) starting to form on the type in 1937, its 2nd Group (3./II Bombázó Osztály) being equippoed with the Caproni Ca-101 ans still known officially as the first Airmail Group (1. Légiposta Osztály).

Following the Anschluss on March 12, 1938, it was believed that Hungary would probably fall within the German sphere of influence. Germany, anxious to strengten its presence in the area, proposed that the Luftwaffe should help the Hungarian government with its expanding air arm and undertook to assist in the reorganisation, modernisation and expansion of the Hungarian Air Force. The Hungarian government, attempting to force a rapid expansion of its military aviation, decided to accept the offer.

As matters stood, after the retirement of Colonel István Petróczy and until the appointment of his successor Valdemár Kenese, the clandestine air armt had been commanded by Army officers with little if any aviation experience. Of the seven commanders of the Air Force between 1920 and 1938, only three had an aviation background; the rest were regular army men because no senior Air Force officers were available to fill the position. Generalmajor Alexander Löhr was sent to Hungary to head up this mission. He had been Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Air Force (Österreichische Luftstreitkräfte) until the Anschluss, and was a highly experienced and energetic officer, and the seconding of General Löhr as an adviser to the Hungarian Air Force was of intererst.

The small Luftwaffe mission sent to Hungary included flying and technical instructiors, specialists in tactics and organisation, as well as other personnel. It arrived in Hungary to direct and staff both the flying schools and the operational units. The Luftwaffe mission recommended reorganising existing training facilities and establishing new schools. The mission also acted as advisers to air staffs ajnd individual operational units.

[edit] Czechoslovakia

General of the Army Josef Votruba.
See also: Czechoslovak Order of Battle - September 30, 1938

The III. armáda ”Štefánik”, under the command of Arm. Gen. Josef Votruba, with its headquarters located in Kremnica, was concentrated in Slovakia with 4 infantry divisions divided into 3 corps, with with 2 infantry divisions and 1 fast division in reserve. Their task was to defend Slovakia from an expected Hungarian advance as well as a German attack into southern Moravia and/or Bratislava.

From October 20, the Czechs in Slovakia was reinforced by troops of the Soviet Union; the 41. Strelkovaya Diviziya and the 96. Strelkovaya Diviziya.

While smaller in size than that of the Hungaraian invasion force, its troops were better equipped, had the advantage of adequate tank and air support and high morale like their Hungarian counterpart. While de facto having air superiority in this theatre, the Czechoslovak Air Force would repeatedly conduct aerial missions on Hungarian troops, such as ground attack and bombing missions, while bombers attacked ammunition and supply depots inside Hungary.

[edit] Details of the campaign

On October 18, 1938, eighteen days after Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, three at that time unidentified planes of apparently Czech origin bombed the city of Miskolc, killing and wounding ten people and causing minor material damage. This became known as the "Miskolc attack."

Three Hungarian CR. 32 fighter planes of was sent up to intercept them, shooting one of the planes down. It was later established that the downed bomber was a Avia B-71 fast bomber of the Czechoslovak Air Force, and bomb shrapnel had clear Czech markings.

However, the attack was a part of a false flag operation, carried out by Abwehr and Luftwaffe forces, with cooperation of Leutenant Colonel Homlok of the Hungarian General Staff.

Hungary immediately condemned the attack, and blamed the Czechs for being responsible. They immediately demanded that Czechoslovakia handed over the border regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia, in which a Hungarian-speaking minority lived. The Czechs denied the accusations, and asked for an investigations from a neutral third party. However, two days after the incident, Hungary declared itself at war with Czechoslovakia.

[edit] Phase 1: Initial operations

The military situation up to November 1, 1938.
75 mm 15/31M hussar guns prepared to fire on Czech positions across the Hungarian-Czech frontier, October 20, 1938.
Soldiers of the II. Bicycle Battalion with their bicycles posing for the photographer before crossing the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border on October 20, 1938.
Hungarian soldiers crosses the Danube river over a pontoon bridge after the Czechs had blown up the original bridge, October 22, 1938.
The armour of the 3. rychlá divize “David” assembled in Levice before entering combat, October 22, 1938. In the foreground a Praga AV command car, behind it LT vz. 35 tanks and OA vz. 30 armoured cars and in the rear the trucks with the infantry.
Soldiers of the 10. divize “Tomašík” on their way to the front, October 24, 1938.
Hungarian cavalry of the marches through the Slovak countryside, October 24, 1938.
Hungarian infantry of the 14th Infantry Brigade on the move through Ruthenia on October 26, 1938.
35.M Ansaldo tankettes of the II/1st Huszar Regiment in during the advance towards Bratislava on October 27, 1938.

At dawn on October 20, 1938, Hungarian artillery suddenly opened fire on Czech defences along the Slovak-Hungarian border. While the Czechs had anticipated a Hungarian attack, the artillery bombardement still came as a complete surprise, especially for the Soviet soldiers of the 96th Rifle Division positioned in southern Slovakia. While the Hungarian shelled the Czech defences, the invading forces were given orders to "proceed as far as possible".

In the west, south of Bratislava, Brig. Gen. Bohuslav Všetička ordered his 15. divize “Jánošík” to position itself in the area in and around Bratislava, anticipating either a Hungarian or a joint German-Hungarian attack. In the south, the VII. sbor “Myslbek” and Hraniční pásmo XV ”Adam” prepared for combat, while the three reserve division of the III. armáda, including the 3. rychlá divize “David”, was mobilised and organised for combat. Further east the Hraniční pásmo XVI ”Ferdinand” was prepared to defend Eastern Slovakia and Ruthenia, along with some tanks.

The II Corps began ground operations soon after 8 o'clock in the morning, securing the bridges over the Danube River and the border stations without facing much resistance. After securing the border stations, Hungarian troops poured over the Hungarian-Czech frontier. The Hungarian troops advanced quickly towards Bratislava, which surprised both the Czechs and the Germans. Despite the awful confusion caused by the deteriorating situation, the Czech force in Bratislava had coalesced sufficiently to defend the city for a longer period of time. After several failed attempts to approach the city Maj.Gen. Milán Temessy decided to halt operations on November 1. However, at some places, the bridges were blown up by the Czechs, and thus prevented them from entering Czechoslovakia until a pontoon bridge had been built.

Further east the Hungarians were unable to cross the Danube, due to the border fortifications in the area. The I Corps attacked at 8:00 in the morning, following a short but precise artillery bombardement. When the Hungarians attempted to cross the river, they were immediately forced to fall back, due to the heavy resistance of Czech soldiers of the SOS (Stráž obrany státu) and border guards. The Hungarians continued to assault the Czech positions, but had not made any gains by November 1. Similarly the III Corps failed in gaining significant breakthroughs, and after several assault the Corps had still not crossed the border by November 1.

In the area south of Košice, the 13th Infantry Brigade initially made significant gains, having advanced 15 km into Czechoslovak territory. They had then reached the villages of Turňa nad Bodvou, Debraď, Paňovce, Šaca, Haniska, Gyňov and Trstené pri Hornáde. However, the advance was then blocked by the border forifications, and after several attempts to break through it, they halted operations temporarily on October 25.

Meanwhile, the III/13th Infantry Brigade formed the left flank of the spearhead advancing towards Michalovce, while the 3rd Huszar Regiment formed the right. After breaking through the border defences on October 23, they advanced around 15 km inland, but due to logistical limitations were forced to halt the advance in order to get the necessary supplies forward.

Together with the advance towards Bratislava, the largerst gains were made by the 14th Infantry Brigade advancing northwards through Ruthenia. They had by November 1 marched 30 km inland without facing any significant resistance, except for a couple of raids by Czech border guards and Slovak police units and air attacks by the Czechoslovak Air Force.

In the first 10 days of the Hungarian assault, the most fiercely contested action was in the air, and continued after the Hungarian ground advance had halted. The Zemské velitelství letectva Slovensko, under the command of Colonel Jaroslav Skála, was responsible for defending the airspace over Slovakia. Opposing them was the majority of the Hungarian Air Force - the 1st and 2nd Fighter Regiments, the 3rd Bomber Regiment and the 1stIndependent Long-Range Reconnaissance Group.

On the morning of the Hungarian attack, October 20, three Letov Š-328 army cooperation aircraft spotted the Hungarian concentrations south of the border and the Hungarians' advance into Ruthenia. In the early afternoon three more Letovs, equipped with bombs and escorted by five Avia B-534s, set out to attack the Hungarian columns south of Bratislava. The bombing raid was partially successful, but on their way back they were hit by well-directed Hungarian anti-aircraft fire, which downed a B-534 and damaged a Letov. At 1500 three more B-534s strafed a column of Hungarian armour and trucks advancing into Ruthenia, followed by 2 Letovs which dropped bombs on the column. However, another B-534 was lost.

Meanwhile, eighteen Junkers Ju-86K-2 bombers from Debrecen, escorted by nine CR.32 fighters set out to raid Košice. Ten of the bombers found their target at 12:30 and then dropped their bombs over the main railway station there, killing 24 civilians. Bratislava was not targeted by Hungarian bombers, but the city had already been bombed by the Luftwaffe in the first two weeks of the war.

At dawn on October 22, eight B-534s took off from the Air Force station at Spišská Nová Ves on another ground attack mission, but they were intercepted over Kráľovský Chlumec by nine Hungarian Fiat CR.32. One B-534 was shot down and two others crash landed. The pilot of one later that day captured by the Hungarians. A few hours later, three more Letovs bombed the Hungarians around Berehovo. One was damaged by ground fire, but managed to escape. A final air battle took place in the afternoon. Three Letovs, escorted by three B-534s were intercepted by nine CR.32 shortly after delivering their bombs on the forward elements of the 14th Infantry Brigade. One Letov was downed, but the B-534s managed to ensure the escape of the others, shooting down three CR.32s and losing two B-534s in the process. On October 27, a group of Letov bombers escorted by five Avia B-534s attacked again attacked the 14th Infantry Brigade, this time losing no aircrafts to anti-aircraft fire or to enemy fighters.

On October 23 the eighteen Junkers Ju-86K-2 bombers set out to raid Spišská Nová Ves, which the captured Czech pilot had let slip was the main Czech Air Base in eastern Slovakia. Nine of the bombers found their target at 14:10, and destroyed or damaged three Avia B-534s, three Aero AP-32s and two Letov Š-328s on the ground. Although the airfield was still usable, the air raid had killed 13 persons, which resulted with an intense anti-Hungarian movement that arose among the local population.

After 73 civilians had been killed due to Hungarian air raids and artillery shellings, the anti-Hungarian movement that arose among the local population changed the policy of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana) led by Monsignor Jozef Tiso. Instead of fighting against the Czechs, he now agreed (temporarily) to support the Czech government with fighting the invading Germans and Hungarians, and ordered the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova garda) to fight the Hungarians whenever possible and to support the Czech troops already stationed in Slovakia.

During the crisis caused by Hitler's demand for the Sudetenland (in the summer of 1938), the Hlinka Guard emerged spontaneously, and on October 8 of that year, a week after war had broken out between Germany and Czechoslovakia, the guard was officially set up, with Karol Sidor as its first commander.

While hardliners within the party was reluctant to fight along the Czechs, their trust for the Czechs after their decision to fight the invaders had risen, and many were actually supportive to fight along with the Czechs against the hated Hungarians.

[edit] Battle of Horné Turovce

[edit] Phase 2: Winter offensive

Hungarian soldiers taking a break in the fighting, November 1938.

While the Hungarians made the largest gains in the winter period, they were suffering from lack of ammunition and supplies, as well as winter clothing and heavy casualties, and the Hungarians suffered heavy casualties for each advance they made.

The main achievement of the Hungarian army was the capture of the Slovak capital Bratislava. At 1000 on November 3, the 4th Infantry Brigade began their assault on Bratislava, while the 2nd Huszar Regiment advanced north of the city in order to prevent an escape by the 15. divize “Jánošík”. At noon the Hungarians received the report by the OKH that they had put the 16. Infanterie-Division and Panzer-Regiment 3 at the Hungarian's disposal. They were immediately dispated to secure the the encirclement of Bratislava and the assault itself. While the Panzer-Regiment 3 used their motorisation at their advantage, the support of the Germans were much welcomed by the Hungarians.

The same night Maj.Gen. Milán Temessy ordered the assault on Bratislava to be carried out at 0800 on November 6, 1938. In the meantime, Brig. Gen. Bohuslav Všetička, seeing he was encircled with no possibility to escape, decided to prepare for combat, mainly by putting up barricades and preparing gasoline bombs to be used against tanks.

At 0800 on November 6, 1938 The Hungarian-German assault was initiated, and by noon they had made several headways into the town. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe and artillery continued to bombard the defences in Bratislava and important facilities in the city itself. The Hungarians halted the offensive temporarily for around 10 hours in order to get the much needed ammunition supplies to the frontline infantry, which gave the Czechs an unexpected opportunity to reorganise the defences. The fighting continued into the night, without any real gains.

Heavy close combat fighting ensued for another 18 hours, until Brig. Gen. Všetička, with few reserves and little to no ammunition, and eager to avoid further civilian casualties, decided to capitulate to the Hungarians. At 07.30 on November 8 all Czech soldiers had laid down their arms.

In central Slovakia, the II Corps and I Corps made large gains, despite several counterattacks by the Hraniční oblast 39 ”Rafael”, 3. rychlá divize “David”, 10. divize “Tomašík”, 11. divize “Dobrovský” and the 22. divize ”Hviezdoslav”, and at some places they had advanced as far as 80 km by February 1939. Especially the clash between tanks of the 3. rychlá divize “David” with the 1st Infantry Brigade at Dudince on November 21 was exceptionally heavy, where the Hungarians were relatively slaughtered until they could send in a number of howitzers, 37 mm anti-tank guns and sufficient air support.

At the Košice front, the 13th Infantry Brigade made limited gains, except for advancing around 30 km northwards west of the town. Meanwhile, the Hraniční oblast 41 ”Alfons”, commanded by Brig. Gen. Ondřej Moravec, began preparations for an assault on the city.

On December 6, elements of the III/13th Infantry Brigade began the assault of Košice following a short artillery barrage. While the III/13th Infantry Brigade attacked from the southeast, the 13th Infantry Brigade assaulted the city from the south, west and northwest, while aslo advancing north of the city, supported by a company of the III/13th Infantry Brigade, in order to cut of the defenders. The Czechs were forced to retreat into the town itself in order to set up defences there. The Hungarians persued them, and fighting continued into the night. At the same time, the commander of Hraniční pásmo XVI ”Ferdinand”, Div. Gen. Ondřej Mézl, and Brig. Gen. Moravec had been encircled with a company of Czech soldiers in the city centre by Hungarians, and thus were unable to escape the pocket. However, remnants of the HO 41 (of battalion strength) led by Staff Lt.Col. J. Pacholík managed to escape, in order to set up positions north of the city.

A LT vz. 35 light tank during the Battle of Michalovce, November 8, 1938.

In the early morning of December 10, Div. Gen. Mézl and Brig. Gen. Moravec, along with the Czech soldiers, capitulated to the Hungarians, but local Hlinka Guard snipers and Czech soldiers continued to fight the Hungarians for the rest of the day. For the rest of February, the only dealt with a few artillery barrages and infantry assaults on their positions.

Further to the east, the 3rd Huszar Regiment was ordered by Maj.Gen. András Littay to begin their offensive in the direction of Užhorod on November 4. Their orders were to advance northwards towards Michalovce and then encircle Užhorod. This resulted in the battle of Michalovce.

Further southeast, the 1st Motorised Regiment and the 4th Huszar Regiment continued their advance southeast of Užhorod in order to form the right pincer. The Hungarians faced little resistance in this area, and they managed to advance as far as 20 km by December despite Czech air attacks, the cold weather and low stockpiles of supplies.

On December 5, the 1st Motorised Regiment, the 3rd Huszar Regiment and the 4th Huszar Regiment began the operation to encircle Užhorod. The advance went with an amazing speed when considering the critical stage of the ammunition and supply stockpiles and the weather. On December 17 the two pincers met northeast of Užhorod.

Meanwhile, the Hraniční oblast 42 ”Karol”, commanded by Brig. Gen. Oleg Svátek, decided to evacuate all military personnel from the town, but only 3/10 of the division had managed to leave the town. However, the retreating troops had managed to evacuate all valuable equipment. However, Brig. Gen. Svátek's chief of staff, Staff Lt.Col. T. Lang, wished to defend the city, and thus began preparations for an Hungarian assault on the town.

Hungarian soldiers burying their fallen comrade. January 1939.

On December 20, elements of the I/4th Huszar Regiment began the assault of Košice following a short artillery barrage. While the I/4th Huszar Regiment attacked from the southeast, the 3rd Huszar Regiment assaulted the city from the northwest. The Czechs had no change to put up any efficient resistance. Lt.Col. T. Lang decided to break out of the encirclement and join Brig. Gen. Oleg Svátek. During the breakout, the column the staff vehicle of Lt.Col. T. Lang was in was ambushed by Hungarian soldiers, and he was killed when his vehicle bursted into flames. Despite this loss, the HO 42 was now of 6/10 of its original strength, though in the following weeks this was reduced to 4/10.

The 14th Infantry Brigade continued their advance through Ruthenia, pushing forward at top speed. On December 28, 1938 the forward elements of the I/14th Infantry Brigade reached the Polish frontier, where they met Polish troops, who were welcomed with great joy.

[edit] Battle of Michalovce

In the north, opposite Stakčín, Major Matjka assembled an infantry battalion and two artillery batteries. In the south, around Michalovce, a group of about four infantry battalions and several artillery batteries was gathered. At Martin Lt. Daxner formed a Armoured Group consisting of nine LT vz. 35 light tanks and eight OA vz. 30 armoured cars.

The Hungarian troops advanced quickly, which surprised both the Czechs and the Germans. November 5 they had reached Veľké Kapušany. By November 6 they had captured the villages of Krčava, Orechová and had reached Mtrča and Velký Berežnyj. In the night of November 6-7, the Hungarians attacked in the direction of Stakčin and Sobrance, encountering Czech resistance 4 km beyond Sobrance, thus halting the Hungarian advance. By the end of the day they had reached the line Remetské Hamre - Reskovce - Jesenov - Bunkovce - Blatné Remete. The same evening they stood in front of Závadka. They thus created a safe corridor from Gajdos to Remetské Hamry. Despite the awful confusion caused by the quick advance of the Hungarian Army, the Czech force in Michalovce had coalesced sufficiently to attempt a counterattack by the following day, which was approved by Major Kubíček on November 7. The OA vz. 30 armoured cars were immediately sent on a reconnaissance mission to Budkovce, some 15 km south of Michalovce, but could not find any trace of the Hungarians.

It was therefore decided to counterattack eastwards, where the the most advanced Hungarian outpost was know to be some ten kilometres away at Závadla. At 8:00 on November 8, the Czechs launched a short artillery barrage on the Hungarians, taking them by complete surprise. The armoured cars and the LT vz. 35 tanks engaged the Hungarian picket from the front whilst Czech infantry worked round their flanks. This soon induced the heavily outnumbered Hungarians to fall back from Závadka towards their main line on the River Okna, just in front of Nižná Rybnica, allowing the Czechs to retake Gajdoš and Fekisoviec. Headquarters then ordered them to proceed with the attack to Ubrež and Jovša.

One of the OA vz. 30 armoured cars captured by the Hungarians during the Battle of Michalovce, November 1938. The retreating crew took with them the two ZB vz. 26 light machineguns.

The armoured cars continued down the road a little past Závadka whilst the Czech infantry fanned out and began to deploy on a front of some four kilometres on either side of them, between the villages of Ubrež and Vyšné Revištia. The infantry first came under Hungarian artillery fire during the occupation of Ubrež, north of the road. At 1300 a general attack was launched on the main Hungarian line at Nižná Rybnica. The Hungarian response was fierce and effective. The Czechs had advanced across open ground to within a kilometre of the Okna River when they began to be struck by Hungarian field and anti-tank artillery fire.

One armoured car was hit in the engine and had to be withdrawn. A second was knocked out in the middle of the road by a 37 mm anti-tank gun. The raw infantry went to ground and then began to retreat. This soon turned into a panic that for some could not be stopped before Michalovce, fifteen kilometres to the rear. The armoured cars, still tied to the road, covered the retreating infantry with their machineguns, in order to forestall any possible Hungarian pursuit.

Late on November 8, four more OA vz. 30 armoured cars and 3 LT vz. 35 light tanks and a 37 mm anti-tank cannon arrived in Michalovce from Martin to find total confusion. Early on November 9, they headed eastwards, sometimes steadying the retreating infantry by firing over their heads, thereby ensuring the reoccupation everything up to the old Ubrež - Vyšné Revištia line, which the Hungarians had not occupied. However, the anti-tank section mistakenly drove past the knocked-out armoured car and ran straight into the Hungarian line, where it was captured.

By now, elements of the 41st Infantry Regiment and a battery of 202nd Mountain Artillery Regiment had begun to reach Michalovce, and Kubícek planned a major counterattack for noon, to be spearheaded by the newly arrived tanks and armoured cars. On November 10, following a short artillery saturation, the Czechs quickly took Zavadka, Fetisoviec, Hnojné, Vyšné Revištia and Nižná Rybnica. After a day of fighting the Czechs had recaptured Sobrance, Ostrov and Michajlov.

A Hlinka Guard armed with a ZB vz. 26 light machinegun in action at Kolonica, November 12, 1938.

On November 9, the 1st "Andrej Hlinka" Hlinka Guard Regiment began to reach Michalovce. The 1st Hlinka Guard Regiment was well equipped with a mixture of black Hlinka Guard uniforms and army infantry weapons, and was tolerably disciplined. They began setting up positions around Stakčín. Heavier Hungarian air attacks and army concentration forced the Czechs to fall back to their positions around Závadka on November 11.

The Hungarians then began a series of infantry assaults in the directions of Blatné, Závadka, Ubrež in the south and at Ladomimo, Kolonica and Klenová to the north. The heaviest fighting occured at Závadka and Ubrež, where the Czechs had to fight back with machineguns, mortars and armoured cars and tanks. In the evening, the Hungarians withdrew. To the north the Hlinka Guard proved to be a reliable fighting force, holding off the Hungarians with only small arms and occasional Czech artillery support.

On November 13 the Hungarians tried again to attack the Czech troops and the Hlinka Guard. In the night the Hlinka Guard had in Kolonica had withdrawn to Stakčín, planning to cut of the advancing Hungarians. At noon the Hungarians attacked in the direction of Stakčín, not knowing of the real intensions of the retreat of the Hlinka Guard troops. However, they were cut off from the main unit by Hlinka Guards in Ladomimo and Klenová, and by the end of the day they had captured 100 Hungarians, 10 machineguns, 8 trucks and 3 35.M Ansaldo tankettes from the enemy.

[edit] Phase 3: Final clashes

Hungarian and Polish officers meet at the former Polish-Czechoslovak frontier south of Muszyna, March 13, 1939.

In Slovakia the Hungarians also continued their advance after halting operations for a month. In western Slovakia the II Corps continued northwards, and on March 10 the 3rd Motorised Regiment captured the town of Trenčín. Meanwhile, Arm. Gen. Votruba decided to leave for Poland with the remnants of the III. armáda ”Štefánik”. As a result, the Czechs used a tactic based on a mobile retreat, counterattacking the Hungarians whenever possible.

In central Slovakia the offensive continued as well, meeting relatively heavy resistance. Again, despite the extremely muddy and snowy conditions, the Germans managed to attack effectively and take the Czechs and Russians by surprise. The I Corps under had by March 9 advanced 40 km, and they had by the following day encircled Banská Bystrica. Later that day the Hungarians began the assault on the town, facing the Hraniční pásmo XV ”Adam” commanded by Div. Gen. Bedřich Homola. The unit consisted of the Hraniční oblast 40 ”Medard” commanded by Brig. Gen. Bohumil Rytíř. After 10 hours of heavy fighting the Czechs capitulated to the Hungarians.

Meanwhile, the III Corps continued their advance as well, advancing some 25 km by March 13. On March 14 the 5th Infantry Brigade engaged the Soviet 96. Strelkovaya Diviziya, which after half a year of fighting was like its Hungarian counterpart under strength and lacked heavy equipment and supplies. After a day of heavy fighting the Soviets had either surrendered or withdrawn northwards towards Poland.

In eastern Slovakia they met virtually no resistance, as the remnants of HO 41 and HO 42 had already withdrawn into Poland. The Hungarian Army continued their advance, pushing forward at top speed, and reached the Polish border south of Muszyna on March 13. Here they met Polish troops, who were welcomed with great joy.

However, the resistance of the few remaining Czech troops and Hlinka Guards continued to attack the Hungarian troops, and it was not before March 15 that the last resistance in the Slovak and Carpathian mountains was taken out.

[edit] Aftermath

Following the capitulation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, Hungary annexed Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine.


Hungary also had quite heavy casualties: 18,126 were killed, 51,383 were wounded and 121 were reported missing.

[edit] See also

Flag of Czechoslovakia Invasion of Czechoslovakia Flag of Nazi Germany
Battles:
The Border - Ostrava - Karlovy Vary - Otročín - Bezděkov - Želetava - Šumperk - Siege of Plzeň - Ivančice - Otnice, Bošovice and Velké Hostěrádky - Brno - Hungarian offensive - Bratislava - Michalovce - Košice - Frühlingserwachen - Olomouc - Siege of Prague

Contemporaneous military operations:
Zaolzie - Miskolc bombing - Batarci incident