Oster plot (WFAC)

Oster plot
Date	28 September 1938 (coup attempt); 1938-1939 (arrests / executions of plot's supporters)
Place	Reichkanzlei, Berlin, Germany
Action	Oster and his associates planned to launch a coup d'état to capture and kill Hitler, seize political control of Germany and its armed forces from the Nazi Party (including the SS) and to make peace with the Allies.
Result	Hitler avoids capture. Military coup d'état against the Nazi government fails within 5 hours. Nazi government victory and insurgents rounded up.
Belligerents
Military-led German resistance	Nazi government
Commanders and leaders
Hans Oster; (Deputy head of Abwehr); Ludwig Beck ; (former Chief of General Staff); Franz Halder; (Chief of General Staff); Erwin von Witzleben; (CO of Military District III); Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz †; (Leader of raiding party)	Adolf Hitler; (Führer and Reich Chancellor); Wilhelm Keitel; (Chief of OKW); Sepp Dietrich; (CO of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler); Hans-Henning von Alten; (CO of Wach-Regiment Berlin); Erwin Rommel; (CO of Führer-Begleit-Bataillon)
Casualties and losses
Coup attempt; 157 dead, 200 wounded; Aftermath; 7,000 arrested; 5,000 executed	103 dead, 150 wounded

On 28 September 1938 an attempt was made to assassinate Adolf Hitler, Führer of the Third Reich, inside the Reichkanzlei (Reich Chancellery) in Berlin, Germany, as a response to Germany going to war with Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland, which had triggered declarations of war by the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.

The apparent purpose of the assassination attempt was to seize political control of Germany and its armed forces from the Nazi Party (including the SS) in order to obtain peace as soon as possible by installing a constitutional monarchy. The underlying desire of many of the involved high ranking Wehrmacht officers was apparently to show to the world what they considered to be widespread opposition to Hitler's policies.

The failure of the assassination and the military coup d'état led to the arrest of at least 7,000 people by the Gestapo. Of these, 5,000 were executed for high treason.

Background[]

There was almost no organized resistance to Hitler’s regime in the period between his appointment as chancellor in January 1933 and the crisis over Czechoslovakia in 1938. By July 1933 all other political parties and the trade unions had been suppressed, the press and radio brought under state control, and most elements of civil society neutralised. The July 1933 Concordat between Germany and the Holy See ended any possibility of systematic resistance by the Catholic Church. The largest Protestant church, the German Evangelical Church, was generally pro-Nazi, although a small number of church members resisted this position. The breaking of the power of the SA in the "Night of the Long Knives" in July 1934 ended any possibility of a challenge from the "socialist" wing of the Nazi Party, and also brought the army into closer alliance with the regime.

Hitler’s regime was overwhelmingly popular with the German people during this period. The failures of the Weimar Republic had discredited democracy in the eyes of most Germans. Hitler’s apparent success in restoring full employment after the ravages of the Great Depression (achieved mainly through the reintroduction of conscription, a policy advocating that women stay home and raise children, a re-armament programme, and the incremental removal of Jews from the workforce as their jobs were tendered to Gentiles), and his bloodless foreign policy successes such as the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the annexation of Austria in 1938, brought him almost universal acclaim.

There remained, however, a substantial base for opposition to Hitler’s regime. Although the Nazi Party had taken control of the German state, it had not destroyed and rebuilt the state apparatus in the way the Bolshevik regime had done in the Soviet Union. Institutions such as the Foreign Office, the intelligence services and, above all, the army, retained some measure of independence, while outwardly submitting to the new regime.

While many army officers had initially welcomed the Nazi regime, their opinion soon soured after the 1934 Night of the Long Knives, in which the Schutzstaffel (SS) extrajudicially murdered many of the leaders of the rival Sturmabteilung (SA) and their political opponents, including General Kurt von Schleicher, last Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, and Major-General Ferdinand von Bredow, former head of the Military Intelligence Organization (Abwehr). In May 1934, Colonel General Ludwig Beck, Chief of Staff of the Army, had offered to resign if preparations were made for an offensive war against Czechoslovakia.

In a meeting on 5 November 1937 between Hitler and his military and foreign policy leadership, Hitler's future expansionist policies were outlined. In his view the German economy had reached such a state of crisis that the only way of stopping a drastic fall in living standards in Germany was to embark on a policy of aggression sooner rather than later to provide sufficient Lebensraum by seizing Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the aftermath of this meeting, Hitler had been dissatisfied with the War Minister, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, and the Army Chief, General Werner von Fritsch, and regarded them as too hesitant toward the war preparations he was demanding.

The independence of the army was eroded in 1938, when both the War Minister von Blomberg and Army Chief von Fritsch were removed from office as a result of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair. On 4 February, Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch was appointed the new army chief by Hitler, on the recommendation of the Army High Command. Brauchitsch, who often seemed intimidated by Hitler, now owed him his personal happiness, as Hitler had set aside his usual anti-divorce sentiments and allowed Brauchitsch to leave his wife to marry his mistress, even lending him 80,000 Reichsmarks so he could afford the divorce. Hitler also used the confusion surrounding the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair to inflict other massive and sudden changes to the army, ordering the summary retirement of 14 senior generals and the abrupt reassignment of 40 others to different commands.

However, despite the removal of Blomberg and Fritsch, the army retained considerable independence, and senior officers were able to discuss their political views in private fairly freely.

Origins of the plot: the Sudeten crisis[]

In May 1938 the army leadership was informed of Hitler's intention of invading Czechoslovakia by 1 October, even at the risk of war with Britain, France, and or the Soviet Union. The Army Chief of Staff, General Ludwig Beck, regarded this as not only immoral but reckless. Beck had no moral objection to the idea of war of aggression to eliminate Czechoslovakia as a state. However, Beck felt that Germany needed more time to rearm before starting such a war. In Beck's assessment, the earliest date Germany could risk a war was 1940, and any war started in 1938 would be a "premature war" that Germany would lose. While most of the generals felt the idea of starting a war in 1938 was highly risky, none of them would confront Hitler with a refusal to carry out orders, since the majority opinion was that Beck's arguments against war in 1938 were flawed. In the first of his memos, on 5 May 1938, Beck argued that the Sino-Japanese War meant Japan would be unable to come to Germany's aid, that the French Army was the best fighting force in Europe, and that Britain was certain to intervene on the side of France should Germany attack Czechoslovakia. The May Crisis of 21–22 May 1938 further convinced Beck of the dangers of going to war in 1938, and led him to increase his efforts to stop a war that he felt Germany could not win.

At first, Beck felt that Hitler's rush to war in 1938 was not caused by the Führer's personality, but was rather caused by Hitler receiving poor military advice, especially from Keitel. Only in June 1938 did Beck realize that it was Hitler who was behind the drive for war, and, in a memo to Brauchitsch, urge that all of the senior officers threaten a mass collective resignation to force Hitler to abandon his plans for Fall Grün in 1938. Beck ended his appeal to Brauchitsch with: "If they all act together, then it will be impossible to carry out military action. (...) If a soldier in a position of highest authority in such times see his duties and tasks only within the limits of his military responsibilities, without consciousness of his higher responsibility to the whole people, then he shows a lack of greatness, a lack of comprehension of responsibility. Extraordinary times demand extraordinary actions!"

Beck's campaign for a mass resignation was not aimed at the overthrow of Hitler, but was rather intended to persuade Hitler to abandon his plans for war in 1938, and to purge certain "radical" elements from the Nazi Party, who Beck believed to have a negative influence on Hitler. Together with the Abwehr chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and the German Foreign Office's State Secretary, Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, Beck was a leader of the "anti-war" group in the German government, which was determined to avoid a war in 1938 that it felt Germany would lose. This group was not necessarily committed to the overthrow of the regime, but was loosely allied to another, more radical group, the "anti-Nazi" fraction centered around Colonel Hans Oster and Hans Bernd Gisevius, which wanted to use the crisis as an excuse for executing a putsch to overthrow the Nazi regime. The divergent aims between these two factions produced considerable tensions.

In a June 1938 General Staff study, Beck concluded that Germany could defeat Czechoslovakia, but that to do so would leave western Germany empty of troops, thus potentially allowing the French to seize the Rhineland with little difficulty. Beck maintained that Czechoslovak defences were very formidable, that Prague could mobilize at least 38 divisions, and that at least 30 German divisions would be needed to break through, requiring at a minimum a three-week-long campaign. Beck concluded that Hitler's assumptions about a limited war in 1938 were mistaken. In July 1938, upon being shown Beck's 5 May 1938 memo opposing Fall Grün by Brauchitsch, Hitler called Beck's arguments "kindische Kräfteberechnungen" ("childish calculations"). In another memo of July 1938, Beck contended that a war with Czechoslovakia, France and Britain could only end in Germany's defeat, and urged Hitler to postpone his plans for aggression until such a time as Germany was strong enough for such a war. In late July 1938, Erich von Manstein, a leading protégé of Beck's, wrote to his mentor urging him to stay at his post, and place his faith in Hitler. On 29 July, Beck wrote a memo stating the German Army had the duty to prepare for possible wars with foreign enemies and "for an internal conflict which need only take place in Berlin". The 29 July memo is normally considered the start of Beck's efforts to overthrow the Nazi regime.

In August 1938, Beck suggested to Brauchitsch that a "house-cleaning" of the Nazi regime was necessary, under which the influence of the SS be reduced, but Hitler would continue as dictator. At a 10 August summit the leading generals of the Reich, Hitler spent much of the time attacking Beck's arguments against Fall Grün, and won the majority of the generals over. Beck resigned alone on 18 August. Beck was highly respected in the army and his removal shocked the officer corps. He was replaced, as head of the General Staff, by General Franz Halder. At Hitler's request, Beck kept his resignation secret, and thus nullified the protest value of his resignation. Hitler promised Beck that if he kept his resignation secret, he would be rewarded with a major field command, and Beck was much disillusioned when he was instead put on the retired list. Beck's resignation removed him from the center of the opposition, but but would hover in the background and offer the conspirators support and advice. He remained in touch with Halder and Hans Oster, the deputy head of the Abwehr (Germany's military intelligence organization). Privately, he said that he considered Hitler “the incarnation of evil.”

Planning the coup[]

With Beck's resignation, and Brauchitsch's indecision, Oster took deliberate control of the resistance movement. Oster, Gisevius and Hjalmar Schacht (the former Minister of Economics) urged Halder and Beck to stage an immediate coup against Hitler, but the army generals argued that they could mobilise support among the officer corps for such a step only if Hitler made overt moves toward war. Halder, nevertheless, asked Oster on 27 August to draw up plans for a coup. It was eventually agreed that Halder would instigate the coup when Hitler committed an overt step toward war. Until the end of September, Oster and Gisevius worked to secure the necessary support for the coup.

The coup, organised by Oster, comprised prominent figures within the German military who opposed the regime for its behaviour that was threatening to bring Germany into a war that they believed it was not ready to fight. Among these were General Beck, Generals Brauchitsch, Halder, Erwin von Witzleben (Commander of the Army District III in Berlin), Walther von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, Erich Hoepner, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (Chief of the Abwehr). In the foreign office, Secretary of State Ernst von Weizsäcker and the diplomats Theodor and Erich Kordt. Theodor Kordt was considered a vital contact with the British on whom the success of the plot depended; the conspirators needed strong British opposition to Hitler's seizure of the Sudetenland. Gisevius, who had access to Gestapo's secret archives, worked together with the Police President of Berlin, Graf von Helldorf, and his deputy, who provided invaluable information regarding the hidden network of heavily armed security posts of the Gestapo (the secret state police), the SS (Hitler's bodyguard) and the SD (security service) camouflaged as private residences. Beck and Oster worked feverishly to map out all those buildings that had to be conquered and paralyzed if the coup was to succeed: ministries, radio stations, the telephone system, NSDAP party offices, as well as the headquarters of the Gestapo, SS and SD headquarters. In early September, Gisevius and Brockdorff drove around Berlin while the general made quick sketches of the buildings and quarters that had to be paralyzed and possible escape routes that had to be blocked if the coup was to succeed.

In a meeting in Oster's appartment on 20 September, the inner circle of the conspiracy (Oster, Witzleben, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz (a close friend and Abwehr colleague of Oster's), Franz Maria Liedig, Helmuth Groschurth, Gisevius, Dohnanyi and Goerdeler) finalized the plans for the coup. After Hitler had issued the attack order on Czechoslovakia, Halder would give the signal to Oster to carry out the coup. A raiding party assembled and led by Captain Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz of the Abwehr then was tasked with storming of the Reich Chancellery. Heinz's raiding party (Stosstrupp) would form an armed escort for Witzleben when he would force an entry into the Reich Chancellery, after which Witzleben would confront Hitler with his demand for resignation. Hitler would then be arrested and transported to a secure location, where he would await trial. Drawing on 20-30 active Wehrmacht officers (including Lieutenants Wolfgang Knaack and Franz Maria Liedig of the Abwehr, Lieutenants Hans-Albrecht Herzner and Hans-Jürgen von Blumenthal), various labour union leaders (Wilhelm Leuschner and Hermann Maass) and student leaders as well as some of Heinz' old contacts in the Stahlhelm (like Lieutenant Arnold Bistrick), the raiding party comprised of 50-60 armed men from a wide variety of opposition factions.

Opposing them, the personal protection for Hitler at the Reich Chancellery consisted of SS guards from the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, Reichsicherheitsdienst (RSD), four criminal police officers (Kripo), four gendarmes, the Führerbegleitkommando (FBK) and the SD-Chancellery. The troop from Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler consisted of 39 men and three officers divided into three shifts, meaning only twelve to fifteen men were on duty. The SS guards were overseen by their own officers who visited several times a da from the nearby Lichterfelde Barracks to inspect their men and check that everything was satisfactory. The Führerbegleitkommando comprised 18 men, while the SD-Chancellery comprised nine men working in shifts of three. The conspirators knew that there was one guard at the main entrance on Wilhelmstraße 78 as well as the entrance to Hitler's residence at Wilhelmstraße 77. One soldier patrolled the yard with the dog at night, and there were single armed guards posted at the entrance to the Führer's adjutant's office, the anteroom to the kitchen, the front yard and the garage ramp on Hermann-Göring-Straße, along with four "special security service" officers who sometimes served as receptionists. With Schulenburg's assistance Kordt proposed to ensure that the great double doors at the entrance were open, thus paving the way for the raiding party; he had also obtained a plan of the Reich Chancellery for Oster. No extraordinary security precautions had apparently been taken, as might have been expected in the light of the situation.

Gisevius and Brockdorff had planned the police and military actions. While Gisevius contacted the Police President of Berlin, Graf von Helldorf, and secured the cooperation or passivity of the Berlin regular police, General Walther von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt's 23rd Infantry Division in Potsdam would march on Berlin and concentrate their efforts on various targets, including the SS barracks at Lichterfelde, Göring's residence as well as the Königswusterhausen radio station and the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

Halder had arranged the invasion plan in such a way that it needed three-days warning before any action could be taken, and the final order had to be issued directly to him at least 24 hours beforehand. He had also taken steps to prevent the only significant SS threat to intervene. In Thuringa, the 1st Light Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Hoepner, would block the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler should it try to reach Berlin when the coup erupted. Major General Paul von Hase's 50th Infantry Regiment in Landsberg on Warte was also at disposal for the conspirators.

Halder reserved himself the issue of the "starting order", as he would inevitably bee the first to know of Hitler's order to march against Czechoslovakia. The role to be played by Brauchitsch in issuing the "starting orders" and during the subsequent upheaval remained obscure until the end. No one could tell how he would decide, and Halder wished only to bring in Brauchitsch to the conspiray at the very last moment. Witzleben, however, was determined to act at the correct moment even without a signal from Halder, should the latter refuse to give one. He was prepared, if necessary, to occupy the War Ministry and have the top-level Army leaders arrested.

Beck, Oster, Witzleben, Brockdorff and the other conspirators all agreed on how to immediately justify the coup against a German public that almost idolized Hitler: An "SS putsch" led by Himmler aimed at eliminating Hitler was defeated by the Wehrmacht to recreate order and guarantee Hitler's safety. This would avoid any conflict of conscience about the removal of Hitler. Further proclamations by the army, government decrees, and a new constitution had been worked out by the conspirators. The conspirators had also discussed the item of political structure to follow if the coup d'état against Hitler were to prove successful. A military dictatorship or military state of emergency of the shortest possible duration would be declared. Thereafter a provisional civil government would be fomed and fresh elections would be called based on the old Weimar constitution. The conspirators involved agreed that they would support the restoration of the Hohenzollern monarchy, with Prince Wilhelm as head of state under the name Wilhelm III. While they understood the importance of a monarch as a symbol of unity that had been lost in 1918, they also understood the importance of a democratic political base and a constitution, and thus had a British-style constitutional monarchy in mind as form of government. The conspirators in the Abwehr had also been busy with drafting proclamations, temporary government orders and a temporary constitution.

While the conspirators reluctantly agreed that Hitler's arrest would entail bloodshed, many were unwilling to endorse assassination openly, as Beck, Goerdeler and Canaris would have been appalled by the cold-blooded killing of Hitler. Halder also favored his arrest over an assassination. However, Heinz, Liedig and Oster agreed that Hitler needed to be killed, as he would still pose a huge threat. They decided that, regardless of whether Hitler's bodyguards offered resistance, they were determined to provoke an incident, open fire and kill Hitler in the ensulting confusion.

The factions[]

The conspiracy was a loosely organized collection of two different groups. One group comprising the army’s Chief of Staff General Ludwig Beck, the Abwehr chief Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and the Foreign Office's State Secretary, Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker were the "anti-war" group in the German government, which was determined to avoid a war in 1938 that it felt Germany would lose. This group was not committed to the overthrow of the regime but was loosely allied to another, more radical group, the "anti-Nazi" fraction centered on Colonel Hans Oster and Hans Bernd Gisevius, which wanted to use the crisis as an excuse for executing a putsch to overthrow the Nazi regime.

Participants in the plot

The plot[]

Preparations[]

By 27 September Heinz had assembled his raiding party and sequestered them in several appartments in central Berlin, one of which was on Eisenacher Straße 118, close to their target on Wilhelmstraße. Canaris had ordered Groschurth to supply Heinz with rifles, hand grenades and ammunition, which were handed out by Heinz at dawn on 28 September at Abwehr's offices in the Bendlerblock complex on Bendlerstraße. The raiding party waited for the signal from General Brockdorff's 23rd Infantry Division was on its way from Potsdam.

Meanwhile the same morning, Oster sent Gisevius a copy of Hitler's response to Chamberlain's last meditation proposal via Sir Horace Wilson to Halder's Office, who took the copy to Witzleben at his headquarters on the Hohenzollerndamm. After having read the letter, they concluded they had the proof that Hitler was determined on waging war against Czechoslovakia and it was time to take action. last meditation proposal. Witzleben went forthwith to Halder in the Army Headquarterss on the Tirpitzufer and showed him the paper. Halder hurried off to Brauchitsch with the paper while Witzleben waited in Halder's office. After a few minutes Halder returned and said that Brauchitsch was outraged and probably would participate in the coup. Witzleben immediately telephoned him from Halder's office, telling Brauchitsch that everything was ready and begged him for God's sake to issue the order to launch the coup. Brauchitsch, however, did not say yes or no, as he wanted to reassure himself first that Halder and Witzleben were right, and stated he had to see Hitler at the Reich Chancellery. Witzleben returned to his district headquarters while Oster and Gisevius remained at the Abwehr offices prepared to alert Heinz and the raiding party to move once Witzleben had given Brockdorff and the 23rd Infantry Division its marching orders. Instead of seeing Hitler personally, Brauchitsch went directly to General Wilhelm Keitel (head of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) and begged him to do everything possible to avoid an invasion. Upon Brauchitsch's return he informs Halder that unless the diplomatic situation changed, he anticipated that Hitler would announce the orders for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and general mobilization at 14:00.

After the deadline of the ultimatum in the Godesberg Memorandum had passed, Germany immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia. At 14:00 Hitler gathered Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Admiral Erich Raeder (head of the Kriegsmarine), Hermann Göring (head of the Luftwaffe), Wilhelm Keitel (head of the OKW), Brauchitsch and Halder for a meeting at the Reich Chancellery, during which Hitler informed of his decision to order hostilities against Czechoslovakia to begin at 06:15 on 1 October (X-Tag) and the order of the full mobilization of the Wehrmacht (Allgemeine Mobilmachung mit öffentlicher Verkündigung). This decision was issued as Directive No. 1 through for the Conduct of the War. Brauchitsch desperately attempted to talk Hitler into putting off X-day by saying that the invasion was guaranteed to result in a military response from France and the United Kingdom, and that morale in the German Army was worse than in 1918, a statement that enraged Hitler. He harshly berated Brauchitsch for incompetence. Brauchitsch went on to complain: "The aggressive spirit of the German infantry is sadly below the standard of the First World War ... [there have been] certain symptoms of insubordination similar to those of 1917–18." Hitler flew into a rage, accusing the General Staff and Brauchitsch personally of disloyalty, cowardice, sabotage, and defeatism.

Oster and Gisevius waited anxiously, as neither Brauchitsch nor Halder had sent word. Halder and Brauchitsch returned to the Bendlerblock at 15:10, where they discussed the situation with Oster and Gisevius. Brauchitsch again refused to participate in the coup, but would oppose it if the British and French armed forces were put on high alert. Frustrated with Brauchitsch's unwillingness, fierce discussions between Halder and Oster continued, as Halder stated he would carry out the mobilization order while waiting for the response from Britain and France before giving the final order to launch the coup. Oster informed Witzleben of Halder's decision at 15:50. Furious, Witzleben told Halder that he would initiate the coup himself. He contacted General Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt at 16:10 to mobilize the 23rd Infantry Division and march on Berlin.

Meanwhile, Hitler had asked Colonel Erwin Rommel, an instructor at the War Academy at Potsdam, for an audience at the Chancellery, who arrived at 15:20. Hitler had ordered the establishment of the Führer-Begleit-Bataillon (escort battalion) from two companies of the Wach-Regiment Berlin, which was to accompany him whenever he traveled outside of Germany, and had specially requested that Rommel be seconded to command the unit. Rommel subsequently continued to the barracks of the Wach-Regiment on Kruppstraße 3 in Moabit, 4 kilometres from the Reich Chancellery, to coordinate with its commander, Colonel Hans-Henning von Alten.

Unbeknownst to the conspirators, the Reich Chancellery was increasing its security in light of the passed deadline. At 14:30, Hitler's adjutant, SA-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Brückner, instructed SS-Standartenführer Johann Rattenhuber (the commander of the RSD) to double the size of the RSD shift. An additional shift of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was ordered from the Lichterfelde Barracks, arriving at the Reich Chancellery 15:45. Additionally, the chancellery guard was beefed up by the addition of sentries from the Wach-Regiment Berlin, with one NCO and six men armed with carbines had arrived at 15:30.

Storming the Reich Chancellery[]

Witzleben arrived at the Bendlerblock at 16:40 where he met up with Heinz, Oster and the raiding party. He informed Oster and Heinz that he himself had launched the coup due to Brauchitsch's hesitance, and that Brockdorff's division was mobilizing and would shortly advance on Berlin. Around the same time, Major General Paul von Hase ordered his 50th Infantry Regiment to march on Berlin from Landsberg an der Warthe. Witzleben and Heinz led the 53 men to the Reich Chancellery at 17:10, around 1.5 kilometres from the Bendlerblock. However, at the Wilhelmsplatz in front of the main entrance of the Reich Chancellery they met a force of 10 SS guards and seven Wehrmacht soldiers blocking the way. As the raiding party took up positions at the square, Witzleben walked up to the guards and informed that he needed to speak with the Führer at once, demanding the SS guards let him inside. The SS guards refused Witzleben entry, after which Witzleben turned around and walked back to the raiding party. Witzleben signalled Heinz to assault the Reich Chancellery. The raiding party opened fire on the SS guards, killing Gesche in the process. The two groups exchanged fire, killing six of the raiding party and eight of the SS guards and Wehrmacht soldiers guarding the Reich Chancellery. The raiders reached the entrance, which the guards had locked when the shooting began. Heinz ordered his men to blow up the door.

The gunfire and explosion of hand grenades outside had alarmed Hitler and the Führerbegleitkommando. As SS-Sturmbannführer Bruno Gesche, the commander of the Führerbegleitkommando, made sure the main entrance was locked and ordered the Leibstandarte guards to take up positions, SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl Wilhelm Krause and SS-Obersturmführer Heinz Linge (two of Hitler's valets) were ordered to escort Hitler to the Reich Chancellery Air-Raid Shelter located one-and-a-half meters under the wine cellar of the reception hall/ballroom and conservatory. In the bunker, Hitler first telephoned SS-Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, who was stationed in the Grafenwöhr training grounds in Bavaria with the majority of the unit. As Dietrich ordered the Leibstandarte to march on Berlin, Hitler telephoned the SS-Leibstandarte's headquarters in Lichterfelde and Colonels Rommel and Alten at the Wach-Regiment Berlin's barracks in Moabit, ordering them to regain control of the situation in Berlin. Colonel Rommel personally took charge of two companies of the Führer-Begleit-Bataillon and advanced on Wilhelmstraße. At the same time, two companies and a machine gun company of the Leibstandarte moved toward the Reich Chancellery from Lichterfelde.

Meanwhile, elements of Brockdorff's 23rd Infantry Division had arrived at the Lichterfelde Barracks at 17:30, where SS and Wehrmacht soldiers exchanged fire. After half an hour the Wehrmacht soldiers had managed to disarm the SS, and captured most of their leadership. At 18:10 Wehrmacht soldiers occupied the Königswusterhausen radio station, and at 18:30 they secured the Gestapo headquarters at Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8. Inside the Reich Chancellery, Heinz and the raiding party were fighting with SS guards, eventually reaching Hitler's office at 18:00. Witzleben telephoned Oster at the Bendlerblock to inform that while the Reich Chancellery had been secured, Hitler had managed to escape. Oster informed that the 23rd Infantry Division had secured the SS barracks at Lichterfelde and the Königswusterhausen radio station, supported by the neutrality of the Berlin police, and were now moving toward Berlin. He warned Witzleben, however, that the whereabouts of the majority of the SS guard regiment was unknown and was probably marching on the Reich Chancellery to come to Hitler's assistance.

Failure of the coup[]

Colonel Erwin Rommel led the government troops which crushed the conspirator's raiding party.

At around 18:10 Rommel and two companies of the Wachbataillon Berlin arrived and took up positions on the intersections of Hermann-Göring-Straße and Lennéstraße, Hermann-Göring-Straße and Voßstraße and on Wilhelmstraße in front of the German Foreign Ministry. The two groups exchanged fire, killing eleven of the raiding party and ten of Rommel's men. Among the dead were Captain Heinz, who was killed by a machine gun burst, while Lieutenant-Commander Liedig had been severly wounded by a hand grenade. Meanwhile, soldiers of the SS Leibstandarte had engaged the Wehrmacht soldiers at the Gestapo headquarters on Prinz-Albrecht-Straße, thus threatening to encircle the raiding party. Witzleben, who had been injured in the fighting, retreated with the remaining members of the raiding party toward the Bendlerblock. At 19:00, Rommel entered Hitler's bunker, where he received a warm welcome. Hitler ordered Rommel to regain control of the situation in Berlin, informing him that the Leibstandarte units were under his disposal until Dietrich arrived from Thuringia. Rommel ordered his troops to surround and seal off the Bendlerblock, but not to enter the buildings. The Leibstandarte and the remnants of the Wachbataillon took up defensive positions around various targets in Berlin, as the Leibstandarte moved to retake the Liechterfelde barracks, but soon came under fire from Brockdorff's Wehrmacht troops.

At 20:00 a furious Witzleben arrived at the Bendlerblock and had a bitter argument with Oster, who was still insisting that the coup could go ahead. Witzleben left shortly afterward for the OKH-HQ (Oberkommando des Heeres Headquarters) at Zossen, where he reported the situation to General Franz Halder. Witzleben then drove back to his country estate, 30 miles away, where he was arrested the next day by Generalmajor (Major General) Bodewin Keitel of the OKH personnel office (Heerespersonalamt). At around the same time (20:00), the planned seizure of power in Western Germany was aborted when Generals Ludwig Beck and Wilhelm Adam, who had recently been appointed commanders-in-chief in the west and the First Army respectively, learned that the raiding party had failed to capture Hitler. Meanwhile, in the Thuringian forests south of Plauen, Sepp Dietrich and the SS Leibstandarte was held back by units of the 1st Light Division. Hoepner's division had been positioned in the Greiz-Plauen-Chemnitz area to prevent the Leibstandarte to move on Berlin. Dietrich was furious and demanded his unit to pass through, to which the Wehrmacht officers responded by ordering the SS men to stand down and disarm. Dietrich was arrested and was marched off to Hoepner's headquarters, where Dietrich was informed that the army was recreating order and guaranteeing Hitler's safety. Dietrich demanded to speak with Hitler, but his request was denied.

As Rommel regained control of the city and word spread that Hitler had not been captured by the conspirators, the less resolute members of the conspiracy in Berlin began to change sides. Fighting broke out in the Bendlerblock between officers supporting and opposing the coup, and Oster was wounded. By 21:00 Rommel had managed to speak with both Generals Halder and Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, who had also been in contact with Witzleben and Oster. Realising that the coup had failed, Halder ordered the SS men detained at the SS barracks in Liechterfelde to be released, hoping by a show of zealous loyalty to save himself. Beck, realising the situation was hopeless, shot himself — the first of many attempted suicides in the coming days. In his argument with Oster over the telephone, Halder reportedly asked: "What else should we do? He succeeds in everything!" He justified his changed attitude with the ideal of Prussian discipline and military obedience to the head of state.

At 23:10 Wehrmacht soldiers led by Rommel entered the Bendlerblock and arrested Oster, Dohnányi and the other conspirators. At 00:10 SS personnel led by SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich arrived at the scene. Meanwhile, at 23:40 Hoepner received a telephone call from Halder informing him that the coup had failed. He subsequently released Dietrich and allowed the Leibstandarte to pass. After speaking with Hitler on the phone, Dietrich ordered the majority of the Leibstandarte to return to its base while he drove towards Berlin to meet with Hitler.

Aftermath[]

Over the following weeks Reinhard Heydrich's Gestapo, driven by a furious Hitler, rounded up nearly everyone who had the remotest connection with the plot. The discovery of letters and diaries in the homes and offices of those arrested revealed the plots of 1938, 1939, and 1943, and this led to further rounds of arrests, including that of Franz Halder, who finished the war in a concentration camp. Under Himmler's new Sippenhaft (blood guilt) laws, all the relatives of the principal plotters were also arrested.

More than 7,000 people were arrested and 4,980 were executed. Not all of them were connected with the plot, since the Gestapo used the occasion to settle scores with many other people suspected of opposition sympathies. The British radio also named possible suspects who had not yet been implicated but then were arrested.

Very few of the plotters tried to escape or to deny their guilt when arrested. Those who survived interrogation were given perfunctory trials before the People's Court (Volksgerichtshof) under court president Otto Georg Thierac, a kangaroo court that always decided in favour of the prosecution. The first trials were held on 5 and 6 February 1939. Hitler had ordered that those found guilty be "hanged like cattle".

Many people took their own lives prior to either their trial or their execution. Stülpnagel also tried to commit suicide, but survived and was hanged.