The strategy of "Brazilianization" refers to a specific strategic objective in the American involvement of the Brazilian War introduced by the Shannon administration in early 1982 in response to deep public opposition to the ground war in Brazil, in particular after a series of operational blunders had forced the Americans to cede ground in Para in the fall of 1981. With the broader national sentiment remaining that the United States' role should exclusively be to protect Colombian territorial integrity, if even that, the Shannon administration decided to begin a wide-spread strategic shift to training Brazilian guerrilla, especially Republicanos, to become self-sufficient, and ordered a massive consigment of military equipment to sell to Colombia and Argentina, which in turn helped kick-start American manufacturing during the ongoing recession. The objective, as described by Secretary of State George Steinbrenner, was to shift as much of the responsibility for conducting ground campaigns to the rebels and the other Allies as possible while expanding American Naval and air operations. This concluded with the withdrawal of American troops back into Colombian and Argentinean soil in January and February of 1984, respectively, with the focii of American involvement shifting to special forces operations and resource support. Major US airstrikes were ended in late 1985 following the Recife disaster.
While Shannon hailed the fall of the Savala regime in August of 1987 as a confirmation of Brazilianization's success, many Americans regarded the war with mixed emotions and believed that it was embarrassing for the United States Army to have been defeated in open soil by a foreign power. However, military historians credit the withdrawal of American troops as helping decrease overt French support for Savala, in particular post-1985. Brazilianization is also viewed as a specific, and early, implementation of the Shannon doctrine.